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**BENARES SANSKRIT SERIES;**

A

COLLECTION OF SANSKRIT WORKS

EDITED BY THE

PANDITS OF THE BENARES SANSKRIT COLLEGE,

UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF

R. T. H. GRIFFITH M. A.,

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, N. W. P. & OUDH,

& G. THIBAUT PH. DR.,

PRINCIPAL, BENARES COLLEGE.

No. 4.



। अर्थसङ्ग्रहः ।

THE ARTHASAMGRAHA

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE

ON MIMAMSA

BY

LAUGÁKSHI BHÁSKARA,

EDITED AND TRANSLATED

BY

G. THIBAUT PHIL. DR.

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# PREFACE.

The treatise edited and translated in the following is one of the best known and most extensively studied of the elementary works on the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*. It closely follows—and in many passages literally agrees with—the equally popular *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* usually called the *Apadevī*, which latter work would perhaps be the most recommendable to the beginner of all treatises on *Mīmāṃsā*. The *Artha-saṃgraha* has however been preferred for publication in the Benares Sanskrit Series on account of its smaller bulk. Its text has been repeatedly published before, in a lithographed edition at Benares together with a commentary and in a printed edition brought out by Paṇḍit Jībānanda Vidyā-sāgar at Calcutta. Both these editions are incorrect, especially the latter one.

The *Arthasaṃgraha* is by no means an easy book, in spite of—or as it would perhaps be more correct to say, owing to—its limited bulk in which a great amount of matter is condensed by means of the most pregnant language being used. I am greatly obliged to Paṇḍit Dhunḍhi Rāja the able and learned Sanskrit Librarian of the Benares College for continued assistance given to me while editing and translating the *Arthasaṃgraha* and revising the proofsheets. With regard to some specially difficult points I have likewise been greatly benefitted by the advice of the distinguished Paṇḍit Bāla Śāstrī, late Professor of Law in the Benares Sanskrit-College who combines with a perfect mastery of the Śāstras a thorough knowledge of the Veda and therefore is entitled like few others to be appealed to in any question connected with the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra*.—A mere literal translation would have been of comparatively small value; numerous explanations have therefore been added and the plan of inserting them into the text by means of brackets rather than adding them in footnotes has been by preference adhered to.

G. THIBAUT.

BENARES :  
*March, 1882.*

## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

An attempt at an exhaustive review and criticism of the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* would be out of place here. A few remarks however on its general character will form a not unsuitable introduction to the *Artha-saṃgraha* and will, it is hoped, be of some use to those who wish to form an adequate idea of the subject matter of this hitherto some what neglected system. The only longer essay on *Mīmāṃsā* which exists—the one by Colebrooke—gives correct information as far as it goes, is however not well adapted to make the reader acquainted with the leading features of the *Śāstra*. The current accounts of the *Mīmāṃsā* found in handbooks &c. merely extract Colebrooke's remarks and are as a rule more or less vague and incorrect.

The beginnings of the *Mīmāṃsā* may be traced distinctly enough in the *Veda* itself, the very word (*mīmāṃsā*; *mīmāṃsate* &c.) being used there to denote doubt and discussion with regard to points of doctrine and ritual. This early *Mīmāṃsā* may be designated a *bonā fide* *Mīmāṃsā* as it tries to decide the points about which a doubt is raised by free reasoning taking into account the circumstances and exigencies of each case without submitting itself to any authority. It originated in the time when owing to differences in tradition, belief, ritual &c. the various Vedic *śākhās* began to form themselves, a time when the whole religious and sacrificial system of the Brahmins still was in a comparatively unsettled and floating condition.—The later systematical *Mīmāṃsā* on the other hand—the *Mīmāṃsā* which is embodied in the *śāstra*—is of a more limited scope, owing to the altered circumstances of the time in which it arose. The creative period of Brahminical religious thought was then past and the spirit of free inquiry and discussion had yielded to an implicit faith in the authority of the sacred books handed down by unbroken tradition. Difficulties with regard to questions of sacrifice and ritual still indeed presented themselves but they were not as of old difficulties arising from the nature of the things themselves and to be re-

moved by an independent and unbiassed consideration of all sides of the question, but rather difficulties originating in the peculiar nature of the sacred books and obstructing the procedure of any one who endeavoured to obey the injunctions contained in them. The character of the brāhmaṇas—that part of the Veda which more immediately concerns us here—is well known and there can be no doubt that any one attempting to carry out the precepts contained in them or—if we limit ourselves to the main point—to perform the sacrifices which they describe and comment on, would soon find himself assailed by numerous doubts and misgivings as to his actions being a faithful representation of what the sacred texts intimate. The description of the sacrifices contained in the brāhmaṇas is so incomplete and obscure, in the best cases so disjointed and unsystematic, so frequently interrupted by remarks and comments on the mystical signification of the sacrifice and its constituent acts that it would appear almost impossible for the sacrificer to feel assured of having done exactly what he ought to have done unless he had some other help to guide him. That such a help existed at a very early time already, I mean in the time immediately following on the composition of the chief brāhmaṇas, is a matter which does not admit of any doubt. We can not indeed confidently maintain that then already books of the nature of the kalpa-sūtras or prayogas existed, but at any rate there must have existed from the outset a full and circumstantial oral tradition referring to the proper performance of the sacrifices, a tradition for which we may even, from obvious reasons, claim a greater fulness and clearness the higher we ascend into antiquity.

We may thus assume that during a certain period consequent on the composition of the brāhmaṇas—of whatever length that period may have been—acts of religious duty, whereby are meant in the first place sacrifices, were performed on the double ground of the text of the Veda and of oral tradition, two sources of knowledge which we may suppose to have agreed tolerably well in all essential points. But this period was as we know followed by one in which a more systematical and critical spirit began to stir, a period in which the Brahmins felt the want of thoroughly reviewing and recasting all the knowledge they were then possessing, of proving

its soundness and validity by the best possible means and of embodying it in treatises as pregnant and concise as possible. I of course allude to the sūtra-period. One of the many tasks then presenting themselves was to raise the doctrine of the sacrificial performances on an incontrovertible basis. This was indeed a task for which the proper way of procedure was much more clearly defined than was the case with regard to most other departments of knowledge. By far the greater part of the Veda directly refers to the sacrifice and the object to be held in view was therefore to compose treatises describing the different sacrificial performances which should entirely base on the text of the Veda and against which no body appealing to the latter would be able to raise any objection. The difficulties besetting this undertaking originated, as remarked above, in the peculiar nature of the Vedic texts whose object, as is well known, is to point out the symbolical and mystical meaning of the single acts of the sacrifice, not to give a clear and connected description of the latter which the performer might follow with ease. It will suffice shortly to touch here on some few of the circumstances which rendered the task of the sūtra-writer a by no means easy one. It is f. i. observed that those chapters of the Veda which refer to one and the same sacrifice do not immediately follow on each other but are separated by intervening sections which treat of different matters. The fact that throughout the mantras accompanying a certain sacrifice are combined in separate sections apart from those chapters which contain the corresponding brāhmaṇa is in itself a source of frequent perplexity.—Again it often happens that there is an apparent contradiction between two passages referring to the same matter as when f. i. the brāhmaṇa-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place while in the section which contains the mantras accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act mentioned occupies the tenth place.—Or again we find that of two actions referring to the same thing the one which according to the exigencies of the case must be performed in the second place is in the sacred text enjoined before the other one.—Or again the reader of the Veda may be in doubt to whom a certain injunction contained in

the Veda is addressed, what kind of man, in other words, is entitled to perform the sacrifice enjoined and in return to expect the result promised in the Veda.—Or again we meet in the Veda with passages regarding which a *prima facie* doubt arises whether they enjoin an independent sacrifice to be performed from a special motive and attended by a special result or perhaps merely a subordinate sacrificial act which contributes its limited share towards the successful performance of one of the well known great sacrifices.—Or again—and this must have been a point whose consideration very frequently pressed itself on the Brahmins at a time when the various sacrifices mentioned in the Veda were in reality regularly performed—it becomes a matter for reflection and doubt in what manner one has to perform the very numerous so-called *vikṛitis* i. e. the sacrifices which are mere modifications of the few typical sacrifices and which as such the Veda does not describe in detail.—It would be useless here to continue the enumeration of difficult cases of this nature as the treatise edited and translated in the following pages offers many additional examples.

The continually recurring necessity of dealing with difficult cases of the kind described led to the elaboration of a set of rules under the guidance of which it became possible to give an account of the sacrifice which was of real use for practical purposes and which at the same time could be upheld in every particular as being founded on the Veda. So f. i.—to mention only the principles by means of which two of the above stated difficulties are to be solved—it is laid down that whenever the place of the mantra accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a *bráhmaṇa*-passage are in conflict the mantra is to have greater weight than the *bráhmaṇa* because the former being actually recited during the sacrifice is connected with it more intimately than the latter which is not directly used during the performance.—And of two actions referring to the same thing, as f. i. the husking of rice-grains and their cooking, the one to which the exigencies of the case assign the first place is to be done first although in the sacred text it may be mentioned only after the other one ; on the general principle that we must try to find for every individual act constituting the sacrifice a visible purpose by means of

which it may contribute towards the outward form of the sacrifice and that only in the case of such a visible purpose not being traceable it may be assumed that the act directly contributes towards the superzensusous result of the entire sacrifice. In the example alluded to above the visible purpose of the ricegrains being husked first is that thereby they are made fit for being cooked while no such purpose can be discovered if the cooking is made to precede the husking.

The exposition of these rules either directly stated as in the systematical treatises of later origin or implied in the discussion of particular Vedic passages as in Jaimini's sūtras forms the bulk of what is called the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra and the latter might therefore broadly be defined as a body of rules enabling us to construct on the ground of the Veda a kalpa-sūtra or a prayoga (a treatise of the nature of the manuals called prayogas—either actually written down or else mentally conceived—forming the indispensable preliminary step for a kalpasūtra which is nothing but a prayoga highly abbreviated and condensed by means of certain technicalities and conventions). It would be a by no means uninteresting task to submit a kalpasūtra as f. i. Baudhāyana's or Āpastamba's to an investigation of this kind and to show f. i. by a comparison of the accounts given of some primary sacrifice in the Vedic texts on one hand and in the kalpasūtra on the other hand how the transition from the former to the latter can only be effected by certain rules of the Mīmāṃsā being had recourse to.

Although the remarks made in the preceding lines on the scope of the Mīmāṃsā sufficiently characterize the matter occupying the greater part of the śāstra and point out its chiefly practical character they by no means render full justice to the form in which the śāstra was finally elaborated and in which it appears in the systematical treatises a specimen of which is the Artha-samgraha. In this later form the Mīmāṃsā is a systematic analysis of that entire part of the Veda which refers to action, preeminently sacrificial action, of the so-called Karma-kāṇḍa. This part of the Veda comprises all Vedic writings with the only exception of the Upanishads, includes therefore the entire Samhitās and by far the greater part of the brāhmaṇas. The investigation undertaken by

the fully developed Mīmāṃsā has of course originated from the more practical questions above touched upon but it takes a wider scope and establishes a theory which may indeed be applied to the decision of practical questions but which in addition has its own independent interest. The chief features of this theory will be shortly indicated in the following.

The entire Veda (excluding the Upanishads) is declared to treat of dharma, i. e. acts of duty foremost among which are sacrifices. It in the first place enjoins certain acts of duty specifying at the same time the beneficial result which attends the performance of each act. If it be asked on what authority these acts are enjoined and certain results stated to belong to them, the answer is that the Veda as being nitya, eternal is authoritative of its own nature and needs no other basis to rest on. The proofs of the eternity of the Veda are of course by no means satisfactory and may if closely examined be reduced to the faith of the community basing on immemorial tradition. But this point really lies outside the scope of the Mīmāṃsā which rather presupposes the eternity of the Veda and consequently the binding nature of the precepts contained therein and enters on its real task when it begins to demonstrate that every part, in fact every line and every word of the sacred texts somehow or other refers to acts of duty incumbent on men. To do this it becomes necessary to classify the contents of the Veda. The most general classification is to distinguish the mantra-passages from the Brāhmaṇa-passages these two great divisions being clearly pointed out by their different form; the systematical books on Mīmāṃsā however as a rule start at once with the more detailed division of the Veda into injunctions (vidhi), mantras, names (nāmadheya), prohibitions (nishedha) and explanatory passages (arthavāda). Among these five divisions the first place in point of importance is claimed by the injunctions, vedic passages which—their character of eternity and authority being presupposed—impel man to perform a certain action in expectation of a certain result. As f. i. the passage “a man desirous of paradise is to sacrifice” (svargakāmo yajeta). Passages of this kind claim an instigatory character in consequence of their finite verb standing in the optative or imperative form, whereby the hearer or



reader is instigated to act. The difference between these optative forms as found in the Veda and those which are employed in ordinary human intercourse is that in the latter case the enunciation of the optative form originates in the mind of some individual person who has the wish of making another person act, while in the former case the instigatory power rests solely in the eternal word of the Veda which has no human mind for its antecedent. If we wish to bring the matter somewhat nearer to our way of thinking we might say that the optative forms of the Veda embody the eternal commands of God; although this would not exactly correspond to the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas to whom the Veda is a self-subsistent entity.

Among the numerous injunctions which are found in the Vedic texts we have in the first place to distinguish those which in the most general terms enjoin a certain action or sacrifice and to which all other injunctions referring to details are subordinate. Injunctions of this kind are called utpatti-vidhis i. e. originative injunctions and an example is f. i. "agnihotram juhoti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." The very limited number of short sentences embodying injunctions of this nature constitute to the Hindú mind the very kernel of the Veda all the remainder of which comprising among the rest the entire Samhitás has its *raison d'être* only in standing in a certain relation to the utpatti-vidhis and being useful to the person who endeavours to carry out the precepts contained in the latter. These utpatti-vidhis cannot be said to stand to each other in any necessary relation and—as far as known to me—the Mīmāṃsakas have made no attempt to subordinate them to some principle of unity. It can only be said that the order of the sacrifices enjoined in them is a definite one the sacrificer having to proceed in regular succession from the simpler ones to the more complicated. But even from this principle of unity the naimittika sacrifices i. e. those which have to be performed on special occasions arising would have to be excepted. Nor can a principle of unity be discovered in the results to which the sacrifices are said to lead, as these are of the most heterogeneous nature, long life, wealth, progeny, dominion or, as in many cases, paradise or the heavenly world (svarga). The latter is,

most probably on account of its indefiniteness, declared by the Mīmāṃsā to be the fruit of all those sacrifices for which the Veda does not mention a special result.

These originative injunctions impressing man's mind excite in him the desire to perform the action as the result of which the heavenly world or else some earthly possession is pointed out. The utpatti-vidhi itself as a rule intimates the result and in addition to this the general nature of the action by means of which the result is to be obtained, this action being in most cases a sacrifice; but in order to enable the person desirous to sacrifice to carry out his intention the special mode of procedure (the so-called itikartavyatā) remains to be stated. This is done by the second class of injunctions distinguished by the Mīmāṃsakas, the so called viniyoga-vidhis, injunctions of application by means of which all the actions and things subsidiary to a certain sacrifice (the so called aṅgas or members of the sacrifice) are intimated. The injunctions belonging to this class are as they supply information about all the detail of the sacrifice very numerous and the discussion of the different principles according to which they are to be combined with each other and subordinated to the utpatti-vidhis is one of the most, practically perhaps the most important topic of the mīmāṃsā. The pramāṇas which are to guide us in subordinating the various objects and acts constituting the sacrifice to one another and finally to the central action are stated to be six, of successively decreasing force and it must be admitted that the reasoning by which the relative strength of these pramāṇas is settled shows extraordinary acuteness and an astonishing grasp of all the intricate and perplexing detail furnished by the Vedic texts. A full discussion of the matter will be found in the Arthasaṃgraha; here it must suffice to state a few cases exemplifying the general principles. Above was mentioned as an example of the utpatti-vidhi the passage "agnihotram juhōti" "he is to perform the agnihotra-oblation." With this injunction now we have to connect the viniyoga-vidhi "dadhnā juhōti" which as the Mīmāṃsakas explain, in reality means "dadhnā homam bhāvayet" "he is to effect the oblation by means of sour milk." This passage shows us that sour milk is an aṅga, a subsidiary matter of the agnihotra-oblation and the special reason from

which we infer the stated relation is in the present case śruti i. e. direct statement or direct enunciation, the instrumental form “da-dhná” showing directly that sour milk is the means by which the oblation is accomplished. This śruti is justly declared to be the strongest of all the proofs enabling us to infer the connection of subsidiary matter and principal matter; the one of widest application however and the one which must be applied at the outset when we wish to find the link connecting the entire sacrificial action with its constituent parts is prakaraṇa or interdependence i. e. the principle according to which we consider as referring to each other one passage which enjoins some sacrifice in general as leading to a certain result and another which enjoins some special act without naming a special result accruing from it. So f. i. when we read the passage enjoining the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice” we feel the want of other passages pointing out in what way the named sacrifice is to be performed and on the other hand when we meet with the passage referring to the oblations called samidh “he is to offer the samidh” we rest unsatisfied because we do not immediately see what is to be effected by means of the samidh. The consequence is that we become aware of the interdependence of these two injunctions, the particular action mentioned in the latter being subservient to the comprehensive sacrifice enjoined in the former one.

Again after we have by means of the viniyoga-vidhis understood the interior structure of the sacrifice and the successive subordination of its parts to the whole we require, in order to become able to perform the sacrifice, additional information about one point viz. the order in which the several parts have to succeed one another. This want is supplied by the so-called injunctions of performance, prayoga-vidhi. It is however to be remarked that we meet only in very rare cases with vedic passages having no other purpose than to settle the order of the acts constituting the sacrifice. In almost all cases this order of succession is to be concluded from the various indicia given in the viniyoga-vidhis, mantras &c. so that the prayoga-vidhis have rather an inferential than an actual existence. —Here again there are enumerated six means of proof of varying

force by means of which order of succession is determined. The translation of the Artha-saṃgraha will be found to give the requisite details.

There remains one class of injunctions to be noticed, viz. the so-called injunctions of claim or qualification, adhikāra-vidhi. The injunctions enumerated hitherto have taught us firstly what acts are to be done, secondly in what manner the acts enjoined are to be done and thirdly which is the order of succession of the subordinate acts the aggregate of which constitutes the principal act. There remains one question more to be answered viz. who is the person to whom all these different injunctions are addressed? who is qualified to perform the sacrifice enjoined and to claim its promised fruit? and this question is settled by the adhikāra-vidhis. About this class of injunctions too it is to be remarked that few passages only are mere adhikāra-vidhis it frequently happening that one and the same passage is utpatti-vidhi as well as adhikāra-vidhi. And again we must note that a great number of adhikāra-vidhis have a merely ideal existence, as certain qualifications of the sacrificer are nowhere explicitly enounced but have to be inferred from the requirements of the case.—So much about vidhi, injunction.

If we now turn to the second of the five divisions of the Veda, the mantras, the first question presenting itself is again “in what relation do they stand to the sacrificial action? in what manner do they help the latter?” The answer here is somewhat curious. As already remarked the Mīmāṃsakas are extremely anxious to show that every part of the sacrifice, every word and gesture are of visible use, contribute their share towards the proper accomplishment of the outwardly appearing set of actions as which the sacrifice presents itself to the senses and they insist on ascribing what we might call a purely ceremonial character, a significance of a purely spiritual and supersensuous nature to those actions only for which a visible purpose can not by any means be made out. The principle is on the whole certainly a sound one as its application tends to convert the sacrifice into a well connected whole the parts of which are subservient to each other, while the too free use of the contrary principle i. e. of ascribing an independent charac-

ter to each individual act would resolve the whole sacrifice into a string of performances of whom no body would understand how they came to be combined.—In the special case of the mantras however the former principle appears to be carried too far. If we consider the point impartially we can hardly deny that by far the greater part of the verses and short sayings which accompany the different acts of the sacrifice can only have been meant to have a mystical, supersensuous effect, to contribute directly towards the transcendental result, the *apúrva*, which in a manner unknown to man is produced by the sacrifice and is the means of procuring for the sacrificer his reward. The *Mímámsakas* however maintain that while some mantras must be acknowledged merely to have the effect stated just now the great majority of them have the purpose of reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, f. i. of the divinities to whom the various oblations are made. It is clear that the first position is here unduly assigned to a circumstance which is altogether secondary and accidental.

While it is easy to understand why injunction (*vidhi*) and mantra are declared to constitute two of the subdivisions of the veda and again why the same position is assigned to *arthaváda* and *nishedha*, it is, on a superficial view of the matter, difficult to see why *námadheya*, name is coordinated with the four heads enumerated. The distinction of these four heads bases on the obvious circumstance that the many particular sentences constituting in their totality the “*apaurusheyam vákyam*” called Veda show peculiar characteristics naturally leading to the establishment of a fourfold division. The head “*námadheya*” on the other hand does not comprise entire sentences, but only particular words occurring in the *vidhi*-passages. The question of *námadheya* is in the *Mímámsá* regularly treated in connection with four different Vedic passages viz. “*udbhidá yajeta paśukámaḥ*” “*chitrayá yajeta paśukámaḥ*” “*agnihotram juhoti*” “*śyenenábhicharan yajeta*” and it might thus appear as if the quoted passages alone had given rise to the discussion. This is however by no means the case; every passage which contains the name of a sacrifice is equally implicated in the investigation and three at any rate of the four quoted in-

junctions appear to owe their selection merely to the circumstance of the sacrifices enjoined in them being comparatively little known or practised so that it was in addition to the theoretical value of the question a matter of some practical interest to decide what the terms “udbhidá” &c. really denoted. Passages enjoining well known sacrifices—as f. i. “darśapúrṇamásábhyám yajeta” “jyotiṣṭomena yajeta”—might however as well be used as examples.—The reason now why in all such passages particular words like “udbhidá” “darśapúrṇamásábhyám” are singled out as belonging to a special subdivision of the Veda is as follows. According to the theory repeatedly alluded to in the above all the parts of the Veda must be shown to be connected with the action or energy (the so called áarthí bhávaná) roused in the believer by the injunctive passages. This energy requires a result towards which it tends, an instrument whereby to realize the result and the indication of the particular way of procedure. The last named demand is satisfied by the many subsidiary injunctions, as stated above. The instrument is implicitly mentioned in the utpattividhis and is in fact the sacrifice itself, the verb “yajeta” having to be interpreted as meaning “yágena bhávayet” “he is to effect or realize by means of the sacrifice”, the object to be effected being the result of the sacrifice. If we therefore transform the first of the above quoted passages in the same manner we get the following sentence “udbhidá yágena páśum bhávayet”, in which the word “páśum” indicates the result while “yágena” denotes the instrument. Thus—various hypotheses on which the word “udbhidá” might be put in connection with the bhávaná having been disproved—there remains no other course but to declare that it merely serves to define or to limit the idea expressed by the word “yágena”, is merely a name and as such occupies a position by itself, which entitles it to be considered as belonging to a special subdivision of the Vedic texts. The same reasoning applies to the other passages quoted.—I feel not quite sure whether this subtle distinction is really defensible or necessary but at any rate it is a striking proof of the thoroughness with which the Mīmámsakas have carried out their analysis of the Veda.

The fourth subdivision of the Veda, viz. nishedha, prohibition may be left undiscussed here, as its subject matter is not of prima-

ry importance. It is of course intimately connected with vidhi, injunction (many nishedhas being in fact only disguised vidhis) and it is therefore unnecessary to dwell on the position it occupies in the Veda.

Arthaváda, explanatory statement forms the last of the five subdivisions of the Veda adopted by the Mímámsá. The translation of arthaváda by "explanatory statement" is not quite adequate, as arthaváda is defined as comprising all those sentences which either contain a praise of the things enjoined (by vidhi) or a blame of the things prohibited (by nishedha). These passages can not be maintained to be directly connected with the above mentioned árti bhávaná, as the whole action enjoined by vidhi is carried out without any help from the arthaváda sentences, but they occupy a definite position with regard to the so-called śábdí bhávaná, i. e. the energy inherent in vidhi-passages by which the latter are able to impress man's mind and make him act. For the special mode in which the śábdí bhávaná acts (its itikartavyatá) is expressed in the arthaváda-passages, man being on one hand impelled to perform an action when he hears it praised and glorified and on the other hand feeling disinclined to do things which others reprehend and object to.

It is thereby shown that every part of the Veda somehow or other contributes towards dharma and the task of the Mímámsá is thus fulfilled. It will at the same time appear that a theoretical inquiry of this kind into the nature of the Veda satisfies all practical requirements as well; for if the logical connection in which the sentences of the Veda stand to each other is understood the proper way of procedure for him who wishes to act on the precepts of the Veda can no longer be doubtful.

The above remarks have left many interesting points unnoticed, so f. i. the doctrine of the eternity of sound, the doctrine of the different pramáṇas &c. A more detailed account of the system I hope to publish in another place. The Mímámsá certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which the other darśanas derive from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limited and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged

leaves no room for high flights of the imagination. But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasoning in most cases convincing.





# अर्थसङ्ग्रहः ।

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

वासुदेवं रमाकान्तं नत्वा लौगाक्षिभास्करः ।

कुरुते जैमिनिनये प्रवेशायार्थसंग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥

अथ परमकारुणिको भगवान् जैमिनिर्धर्मविवेकाय द्वाद-  
शलक्षणीं प्रणिनाय । तत्रादौ धर्मजिज्ञासां सूत्रयामास अथा-  
तो धर्मजिज्ञासेति । अत्राथशब्दो वेदाध्ययनानन्तर्यवचनः ।  
अतःशब्दो हि वेदाध्ययनस्य दृष्टार्थत्वं ब्रूते । स्वाध्यायो ऽध्येतव्य  
इत्यध्ययनविधौ तदध्ययनस्यार्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकत्वेन व्यवस्था-  
पनात् । तथा च वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं यतो ऽर्थज्ञानरूपदृष्टार्थकं  
तदध्ययनमतो हेतोर्धर्मस्य वेदार्थस्य जिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति शेषः ।  
जिज्ञासापदस्य विचारे लक्षणा । अतो धर्मविचारशास्त्रमिद-  
मारम्भणीयमिति शास्त्रारम्भसूत्रार्थः ॥ १ ॥

अथ को धर्मः किं तस्य लक्षणमिति चेदुच्यते । यागादिरेव  
धर्मः । तल्लक्षणं वेदप्रतिपाद्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थो धर्म इति । प्रयो-  
जने ऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय प्रयोजनवदिति । भोजनादावतिव्याप्ति-  
वारणाय वेदप्रतिपाद्य इति । अनर्थफलकत्वादनर्थभूते श्येना-  
दावतिव्याप्तिवारणायार्थ इति । न च चोदनालक्षणो ऽर्थो धर्म  
इति सौत्रतल्लक्षणविरोधः चोदनापदस्य विधिरूपवेदैकदेश-  
परत्वादिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि चोदनाशब्दस्य वेदमात्रपरत्वात् ।  
वेदस्य सर्वस्य धर्मतात्ययवत्त्वेन धर्मप्रतिपादकत्वात् ॥

स च यागादिर्यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादिवाक्येन स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य  
 पुरुषं प्रति विधीयते। तथा हि। यजेतेत्यत्राख्यंशद्वयं यजिधातुः  
 प्रत्ययश्च। प्रत्यये ऽप्यस्यंशद्वयमाख्यातत्वं लिङ्त्वं च। तत्राख्या-  
 तत्वं दशलकारसाधारणं लिङ्त्वं पुनर्लिङ्मात्रे। उभाभ्याम-  
 प्यंशाभ्यां भावनैवोच्यते। भावना नाम भवितुर्भवनानुकूलो  
 भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः। सा द्विधा (१) शाब्दी भावना आर्यो (२)  
 भावना चेति। तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः  
 शाब्दी भावना। सा च लिङंशेनोच्यते। लिङ्श्रवणे ऽयं मां प्र-  
 वर्त्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारवानिति नियमेन प्रतीतेः। य-  
 द्यस्माच्छब्दान्नियमतः प्रतीयते तत्तस्य वाच्यम्। यथा गामानये-  
 त्यस्मिन्वाक्ये गोशब्दस्य गोत्वम्। स च व्यापारविशेषो लौकि-  
 कवाक्ये पुरुषनिष्ठो ऽभिप्रायविशेषः। वैदिकवाक्ये तु पुरुषा-  
 भावान्निडादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव। अत एव शाब्दी भावनेति  
 व्यवह्रियते। सा च भावनांशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधन-  
 मितिकर्तव्यतां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावयेदिति।  
 तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां वक्ष्यमाणांशत्रयोपेता आर्यी भावना  
 साध्यत्वेनान्वेति। एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः। सं-  
 ख्यादीनामेकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वे ऽप्ययोग्यत्वान्न साध्यत्वेनान्वयः।  
 साधनाकाङ्क्षायां लिङादिज्ञानं करणत्वेनान्वेति। तस्य च क-  
 रणत्वं (३) न भावनोत्पादकत्वेन तत्पूर्वमपि तस्याः शब्दे सत्त्वा-

(१) स्व ग पुस्तकयोः द्विविधा।

(२) स्व घ पुस्तकयोः शब्दभावना अर्थभा०।

(३) तस्य च भावनायां करणत्वमिति पाठः स्व पुस्तके।

त् । किं तु भावनाज्ञापकत्वेन शब्दभावनाभाव्यनिर्वर्तकत्वेन वा । इतिकर्तव्यताकाङ्क्षायां मर्यादाज्ञाप्यप्राप्तस्य मितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति । प्रयोजनेच्छाजनितक्रियाविषयव्यापार आर्थो भावना । सा चाख्यातत्वांशेनोच्यते । आख्यातसामान्यस्य व्यापारवाचित्वात् । साध्यंशत्रयमपेक्षते साध्यं साधनमितिकर्तव्यतां च किं भावयेत्केन भावयेत्कथं भावयेदिति । तत्र साध्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गादि फलं साध्यत्वेनान्वेति । साधनाकाङ्क्षायां यागादिः करणत्वेनान्वेति । इतिकर्तव्यताकाङ्क्षायां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गजातमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति ॥

अथ को वेद इति चेदुच्यते । अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः । स च विधिमन्त्रनामधेयनिषेधार्थवादभेदात्पञ्चविधः ॥

तत्राज्ञातार्थज्ञापको वेदभागो विधिः । स च तादृश (१) प्रयोजनवदर्थविधानेनार्थवान् यादृशं चाथं प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तं विधत्ते । यथा ऽग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इति विधिर्मानान्तरेणाप्राप्तं स्वर्गप्रयोजनवद्भोमं विधत्ते । अग्निहोत्रहोमेन स्वर्गं भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थबोधः । यत्र कर्म मानान्तरेण प्राप्तं तत्र तदुद्देशेन गुणमात्रं विधत्ते । यथा दध्ना जुहोतीत्यत्र होमस्याग्निहोत्रं जुहुयादित्यनेन प्राप्तत्वाद्भोमोद्देशेन दधिमात्रविधानम् । दध्ना होमं भावयेदिति । यत्र त्वभयमप्राप्तं तत्र विशिष्टं विधत्ते यथा सोमेन यजेतेत्यत्र सोमयागयोरप्राप्तत्वात्सोमविशिष्टयागविधानम् । सोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणया सोमवता यागेनेष्टं भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थबोधः । न चोभयविधाने वाक्यभेदः । प्रत्येकमभय-

स्याविधानात् किं तु विशिष्टस्यैकस्यैव विधानात् । न च “ज्यो-  
तिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेते”ति विधिप्राप्तयागोद्देशेन सोमरू-  
पगुणविधानमेवास्तु सोमेन यागं भावयेदिति किं मत्त्वर्थलक्षण-  
येति वाच्यम् । तस्याधिकारविधित्वेनोत्पत्तिविधित्वासंभवात् ।  
ननूद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यस्येव ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्यस्याप्युत्पत्त्य-  
धिकारविधित्वमस्त्विति चेन्न । दृष्टान्तउत्पत्तिवाक्यान्तराभा-  
वेन अन्यथानुपपत्त्या तथात्वाश्रयणात् । किं च ज्योतिष्टोमेनेत्य-  
स्योभयविधित्वे ऽनेनैव यागस्तस्य फलसंबन्धो ऽपि बोधनीय  
इति सुदृढो वाक्यभेदस्तद्वरं सोमपदे मत्त्वर्थलक्षणया विशि-  
ष्टविधानम् ॥

विधिश्चतुर्विधः । उत्पत्तिविधिर्विनियोगविधिरधिकारविधिः  
प्रयोगविधिश्चेति ॥

तत्र कर्मस्वरूपमात्रबोधको विधिरुत्पत्तिविधिः । यथा ऽग्नि-  
होत्रं जुहोतीति । अत्र विधौ कर्मणः करणत्वेनान्वयः । अग्नि-  
होत्रहोमेनेष्टं भावयेदिति । ननु यागस्य द्वे रूपे द्रव्यं देवता च ।  
तथा च रूपाश्रवणे अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीति कथमुत्पत्तिविधिः ।  
अग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य तु तत्प्रख्यन्यायेन नामधेयत्वादिति चेन्न ।  
रूपाश्रवणे ऽप्यस्योत्पत्तिविधित्वात् । अन्यथा रूपश्रवणादध्ना  
जुहोतीत्ययमेवोत्पत्तिविधिः स्यात् । तथा चाग्निहोत्रं जुहोती-  
ति वाक्यमनर्थकं स्यात् ॥

अङ्गप्रधानसंबन्धबोधको विधिर्विनियोगविधिः । यथा दध्ना  
जुहोतीति । स हि तृतीयया प्रतिपन्नाङ्गभावस्य दध्नी होमसं-  
बन्धं विधत्ते । दध्ना होमं भावयेदिति । गुणविधौ च धात्वर्थस्य

साध्यत्वेनान्वयः । कचिदाश्रयत्वेनापि । यथा दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयादित्यत्र दधिकरणत्वेनेन्द्रियं भावयेत् । तच्च किंनिष्ठमित्याकाङ्क्षायां सन्निधिप्राप्तहोम आश्रयत्वेनान्वेति ॥

एतस्य विधेः सहकारिभूतानि षट् प्रमाणानि । श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यारूपाणि । एतत्सहकृतेनानेन विधिनाङ्गत्वं परोद्देशप्रवृत्तकृतिसाध्यत्वरूपं ( १ ) पारार्थ्यापरपर्यायं ज्ञाप्यते ॥

तत्र निरपेक्षो रवः श्रुतिः । सा च त्रिविधा । विधात्री अभिधात्री विनियोक्त्री च । तत्राद्या लिङाद्यात्मिका । द्वितीया ब्रीह्यादिश्रुतिः । यस्य च शब्दस्य श्रवणादेव संबन्धः प्रतीयते सा विनियोक्त्री । सापि त्रिविधा विभक्तिरूपा एकाभिधानरूपा एकपदरूपा चेति । तत्र विभक्तिश्रुत्या अङ्गत्वम् । यथा ब्रीहिभिर्यजेतेति तृतीयाश्रुत्या ब्रीहीणां यागाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि पुरोडाशप्रकृतितया । यथा पशोर्हृदयादिरूपहविष्प्रकृतितया यागाङ्गत्वम् । अरूण्या एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणातीत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये आरूण्यस्यापि तृतीयाश्रुत्या क्रयाङ्गत्वम् । तदपि गोरूपद्रव्यपरिच्छेदद्वारा न तु साक्षात् । अमूर्तत्वात् । ब्रीहीन्प्रोक्षतीति प्रोक्षणस्य ब्रीह्याङ्गत्वं द्वितीयाश्रुत्या । तच्च प्रोक्षणं न ब्रीहिस्वरूपार्थम् । तस्य तेन विनाप्युपपत्तेः । किं त्वपूर्वसाधनत्वप्रयुक्तम् । ब्रीहीन्प्रोक्ष्य यागानुष्ठाने ऽपूर्वानुपपत्तेः । एवं सर्वेष्वङ्गेष्वपूर्वप्रयुक्तमङ्गत्वं बोध्यम् । एवमिमामगृभ्णन्नशनामृतस्येत्यश्वाभिधानीमादत्तइत्यत्र द्वितीयया श्रुत्या मन्त्रस्याश्वाभि-

धान्यङ्गत्वम् । यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्याहवनीयस्य होमाङ्गत्वं  
सप्तमीश्रुत्या । एवमन्यो ऽपि विभक्त्यश्रुत्या विनियोगो ज्ञेयः । प-  
शुना यजेतेत्यत्रैकत्वपुंस्त्वयोः समानाभिधानश्रुत्या कारकाङ्ग-  
त्वम् । यजेतेत्याख्याताभिहितसंख्याया आर्थभावनाङ्गत्वं (१)  
समानाभिधानश्रुतेरेक (२) पदश्रुत्या च यागाङ्गत्वम् । न चामू-  
र्त्तायास्तस्याः कथं भावनाङ्गत्वं वाच्यम् । कर्त्तृपरिच्छेदद्वारा त-  
दुपपत्तेः । कर्त्ता चाशेषलभ्यः । आख्यातेन हि भावनोच्यते ।  
सा च कर्त्तारं विनानुपपन्नेति तमाश्लिषति । सेयं श्रुतिर्लिङ्गा-  
दिभ्यः प्रबला । लिङ्गादिषु न प्रत्यशो विनियोजकः शब्दो ऽस्ति  
किं तु कल्प्यो, यावच्च तौर्विनियोजकः (३) कल्प्यते तावत्प्रत्य-  
क्षया श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य कृतत्वेन तेषां कल्पकत्वशक्तेर्व्याह-  
तत्वात् । अत एवैन्द्रा लिङ्गान्नेन्द्रोपस्थानार्थत्वम् । किं तु ऐ-  
न्द्रा गार्हपत्यम्पतिष्ठतइत्यत्र गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या  
गार्हपत्योपस्थानार्थत्वम् ॥

शब्दसामर्थ्यं लिङ्गम् । यथाहुः । सामर्थ्यं सर्वशब्दानां लिङ्ग-  
मित्यभिधीयते । सामर्थ्यं रूढिरेव । तेन समाख्यातो नाभेदः ।  
यौगिकशब्दसमाख्यातो रूढ्यात्मकलिङ्गशब्दस्य भिन्नत्वात् ।  
(४) तेन बर्हिर्देवसदनं ढामीति मन्त्रस्य कुशलवनाङ्गत्वं न  
ढनपादिनवनाङ्गत्वम् । तस्य बर्हिर्ढामीतिलिङ्गात्तत्त्ववनं प्रका-

(१) संख्याया आर्थभावना० इति पाठः क पुस्तके ।

(२) श्रुतेरेव । पदश्रुत्येति पाठः ख ग घ पुस्तकेषु ।

(३) कः शब्द इति ग घ पुस्तकयोः ।

(४) यौगिकेत्यारभ्य भिन्नत्वादित्यन्तो ग्रन्थः ख ग पुस्तकयोर्नापलभ्यते ।

शयितुं समर्थत्वात् । एवमन्यत्रापि लिङ्गादिनियोगो द्रष्टव्यः । तदिदं लिङ्गं वाक्यादिभ्यो बलवत् । अत एव स्थोनं ते सदनं कृणोमीति मन्त्रस्य पुरोडाशसदनकरणाङ्गत्वं । सदनं कृणोमीति लिङ्गान् न तु वाक्यात् ॥

समभिव्याहारो वाक्यम् । समभिव्याहारश्च साध्यत्वादिवाचकद्वितीयाद्यभावे ऽपि वस्तुतः शेषशेषिवाचकपदयोः सहोच्चारणम् । यथा यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं शृणोतीत्यत्र पर्णताजुह्वोः समभिव्याहारादेव पर्णताया जुह्वङ्गत्वम् । न चानर्थक्यम्, अन्यथापि जुह्वाः सिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम् । जुह्वशब्देन तत्साध्यापूर्वज्ञप्तात् । तथा च वाक्यार्थः । पर्णतया ऽवत्तहविर्धारणद्वारा जुह्वपूर्वं भावयेदिति । एवं च पर्णतया यदि जुह्वः क्रियते तदैव तत्साध्यमपूर्वं भवति नान्यथेति गम्यतइति न पर्णताया वैयर्थ्यम्(१) । अवत्तहविर्धारणद्वारेति चावश्यं वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथा सुवादिष्वपि पर्णतापत्तेः । सेयं पर्णता अनारभ्याधीतापि सर्वप्रकृतिष्वेवान्वेति न विकृतिषु । तत्र चोदकेनापि तत्प्राप्तिसंभवात्पौनरुक्त्यापत्तेः । यत्र समग्राङ्गोपदेशः सा प्रकृतिः । यथा दर्शपूर्णमासादिः । तत्प्रकरणे सर्वाङ्गपाठात् । यत्र न सर्वाङ्गोपदेशः सा विकृतिः । यथा सौर्यादिः । तत्र कतिपयाङ्गानामतिदेशेन प्राप्तत्वात् । अनारभ्यविधिः सामान्यविधिः । तदिदं वाक्यं प्रकरणादिभ्यो बलवत् । अत एवेन्द्राग्नी इदं हविरित्यादेरेकवाक्यत्वाद्दर्शाङ्गत्वं न तु प्रकरणाद्दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् ॥



उभयाकाङ्क्षा प्रकरणम् । यथा प्रयाजादिषु समिधो यजतीत्यादौ वाक्ये फलविशेषस्यानिर्देशात् समिद्यागेन भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं किमिति उपकार्याकाङ्क्षा । दर्शपूर्णमासवाक्येऽपि दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गं भावयेदिति बोधानन्तरं कथमित्युपकारकाकाङ्क्षा । इत्थं चोभयाकाङ्क्षया प्रयाजादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् । तच्च प्रकरणं द्विविधम् । महाप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणं चेति । मुख्यभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणं महाप्रकरणम् । तेन च प्रयाजादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वम् । एतच्च प्रकृतावेव, उभयाकाङ्क्षयाः संभवान्न तु विकृतौ । तत्र प्रकृतिवद्विकृतिः कर्त्तव्येत्यतिदेशेन कथंभावाकाङ्क्षया उपशमेनापूर्वाङ्गानामप्युभयाकाङ्क्षया विनियोगासम्भवात् । तस्मादपूर्वाङ्गानां स्थानादेव विकृत्यर्थत्वमिति । अङ्गभावनासंबन्धिप्रकरणमवान्तरप्रकरणम् । तेन चाभिक्रमणादीनां प्रयाजाद्यङ्गत्वम् । तच्च सन्दंशेनैव ज्ञायते । तदभावे चाविशेषात्सर्वेषां फलभावनाकथंभावेन ग्रहणप्रसङ्गेन प्रधानाङ्गत्वापत्तेः । एकाङ्गानुवादेन विधीयमानयोरप्यङ्गयोरन्तराले विहितत्वं सन्दंशः । यथा ऽभिक्रमणे । तत्र हि “समानयत उपभृतस्तेजो वा” इत्यादिना प्रयाजानुवादेन किं चिदङ्गं विधाय तदनन्तरमपि प्रयाजानुवादेन (१) “यस्यैवं” (२) विदुषः प्रयाजा इज्यन्ते प्रैभ्यो लोकेभ्यो भ्रातृव्यान्नुदते ऽभिक्रामं जुहोत्यभिजित्यै” इत्यनन्तरं “यो वै प्रयाजानां मिथुनं वेदे” इत्यादि किं चिदङ्गं विधीयते ॥

(१) यस्यैवविदुष इत्यारभ्य तरमित्यन्तो ग्रन्थो ग पुस्तके नोपलभ्यते ।

(२) प्रयाजानुवादेन प्रयाजत्वं यस्यैवमिति पाठो ग पुस्तके ।

अतः प्रयाजाङ्गमध्ये ऽभिहितमभिक्रमणं तदङ्गम् । प्रयाजै-  
 रपूर्वं कृत्वा यागोपकारं भावयेदिति ज्ञाते कथमेभिरपूर्वं क-  
 र्त्तव्यमिति कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायाः सत्त्वात् । सा च संदंशपठितैर-  
 भिक्रमणादिभिः श्राम्यति । न चाङ्गभावनायां कथंभावाकाङ्क्षा-  
 भावः । भावनासाम्येन तत्रापि तत्संभवात् । तदिदं (१) प्रक-  
 रणं क्रियाया एव साक्षाद्विनियोजकं द्रव्यगुणयोस्तु तद्वारा ।  
 तथा हि । यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र फलभावनायां कथंभावाका-  
 ङ्क्षायां सन्निधिपठिताश्रूयमाणफलकं क्रियाजातमुपकार्याका-  
 ङ्क्षयेतिकर्त्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति । क्रियाया एव लोके कथंभावा-  
 काङ्क्षायामन्वयदर्शनात् । न हि हस्तेन (२) कुठारेण किञ्चादि-  
 त्यत्र कथंभावाकाङ्क्षायामुच्चार्यमाणो ऽपि हस्तो ऽन्वेति किं  
 तु हस्तेनोद्यम्य निपात्येति उद्यमननिपातने एव । हस्तश्च त-  
 द्वारैवान्वेतीति सार्वजनीनमेतत् । इदं च स्थानादिभ्यो बल-  
 वत् । अत एवाक्षैर्दीव्यति राजन्यमिति देवनादयो (३) धर्मा  
 अभिषेचनीयसन्निधौ पठिता अपि स्थानान्न तदङ्गं किं तु प्रक-  
 रणाद्राजसूयाङ्गमिति ॥

देशसामान्यं स्थानम् । तद्विविधम् । पाठसादेश्यमनुष्ठानसा-  
 देश्यं चेति । स्थानं क्रमश्चेत्यनर्थान्तरम् । पाठसादेश्यमपि द्वि-  
 विधम् । यथासंख्यपाठः सन्निधिपाठश्चेति । तत्रैन्द्राग्रमेकादश-  
 कपालं निर्वपेद् वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेदित्येवंक्रमविहि-  
 तेषु इन्द्राग्नी रोचना दिव इत्यादीनां याज्यानुवाक्यामन्त्रा-

(१) यदिदमिति पाठो “ग च” पुस्तकयोः ।

(२) हस्तकुठारेणेति पाठः क पुस्तके । न हि कुठारेणेति घ च पुस्तकयोः ।

(३) विदेकनादय इति पाठः ख ग च पुस्तकेषु टीकायां च ।

णां यथासंख्यं प्रथमस्य प्रथमं द्वितीयस्य द्वितीयमित्येवंरूपो  
 विनियोगो यथासंख्यपाठात् । प्रथमपठितमन्त्रस्य हि कैमर्थ्या-  
 काङ्क्षायां प्रथमतो विहितं कर्मैव प्रथममुपतिष्ठते समानदेश-  
 त्वात् । एवं द्वितीयमन्त्रस्यापि । वैकृताङ्गानां प्राकृताङ्गानुवादेन  
 विहितानां संदंशपतितानां विकृत्यर्थत्वं सन्निधिपाठात् । यथा  
 आमनहोमानाम् । तेषां हि कैमर्थ्याकाङ्क्षायां फलं विकृत्यपूर्-  
 वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते उपस्थितत्वात् । स्वतन्त्रफलकत्वे वि-  
 कृतिसन्निधिपाठानर्थक्यापत्तेः । पशुधर्माणामग्नीषोमीयार्थत्व-  
 मनुष्ठानसादेष्ट्यात् । औपवसथ्ये ऽङ्गि अग्नीषोमीयः पशुरनु-  
 ष्ठीयते तस्मिन्नेव दिने ते धर्माः पठ्यन्ते । अतस्तेषां कैमर्थ्याका-  
 ङ्क्षायामनुष्ठेयत्वेनोपस्थितं पश्वपूर्वमेव भाव्यत्वेन संबध्यते । त-  
 च स्थानं समाख्यातः प्रबलम् । अत एव शुन्धनमन्त्रः सान्ना-  
 य्यपात्राङ्गं पाठसादेष्ट्यात् । न तु पौरोडाशिकमिति समाख्यया  
 पुरोडाशमात्राङ्गम् ॥

समाख्या यौगिकः शब्दः । सा च द्विविधा वैदिकी लौकिकी  
 च । तत्र होतुश्चमसभक्षणाङ्गत्वं होतृचमस इति वैदिकसमा-  
 ख्यया । अध्वर्योस्तत्तत्पदार्थाङ्गत्वं लौकिक्या आध्वर्यवमिति  
 समाख्ययेति सङ्क्षेपः ॥

तदेवं निरूपितानि सङ्क्षेपतः श्रुत्यादीनि षट् प्रमाणानि एत-  
 त्सहकृतेन विनियोगविधिना समिदादिभिरुपकृत्य दर्शपूर्ण-  
 मासाभ्यां यजेतेत्येवंरूपेण यानि नियोज्यन्ते तान्यङ्गानि द्वि-  
 विधानि सिद्धरूपाणि (१) क्रियारूपाणि चेति । तत्र सिद्धानि

जातिद्रव्यसंख्यादीनि तानि च दृष्टार्थान्येव । क्रियारूपाणि च द्विविधानि गुणकर्माणि प्रधानकर्माणि च एतान्येव सन्निपत्योपकारकाणि आरादुपकारकाणि चोच्यन्ते । कर्माङ्गद्रव्याद्युद्देशेन विधीयमानं कर्म सन्निपत्योपकारकम् । यथा ऽवघात-प्रोक्षणादि तच्च दृष्टार्थमदृष्टार्थं दृष्टादृष्टार्थं चेति । तच्च दृष्टार्थमवघातादि । अदृष्टार्थं प्रोक्षणादि । दृष्टादृष्टार्थं पशुपुरोडाशादि । तद्वि द्रव्यत्यागांशेनैव अदृष्टं देवतोद्देशेन च देवतास्मरणं दृष्टं करोति । द्रव्याद्यनुद्दिश्य केवलं विधीयमानं कर्म आरादुपकारकम् । यथा प्रयाजादि । आरादुपकारकं च (१) परमापूर्वात्यक्तावेवोपयुज्यते । सन्निपत्योपकारकं तु द्रव्यदेवतासंस्कारद्वारा यागस्वरूप ऽप्युपयुज्यत । इदमव चाश्राय कर्मेत्युच्यते । तदेवं निरूपितः सङ्क्षेपतो विनियोगविधिः ॥

प्रयोगप्राशुभावबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिः । स चाङ्गवाक्यैकवाक्यतापन्नः प्रधानविधिरेव । स हि साङ्गं प्रधानमनुष्ठापयन्विलम्बे प्रमाणाभावाद्विलम्बापरपर्यायं प्रयोगप्राशुभावं विधत्ते । न च तद्विलम्बे ऽपि प्रमाणाभाव इति वाच्यम् । विलम्बे त्वङ्गप्रधानविध्येकवाक्यतावगततत्साहित्यानुपपत्तिः । विलम्बेन क्रियमाणयोः पदार्थयोरिदमनेन सह कृतमिति साहित्यव्यवहाराभावात् । स चाविलम्बो नियते क्रमे आश्रीयमाणे भवति । अन्यथा हि किमेतदनन्तरमेतत्कर्तव्यमेतदनन्तरं वेति प्रयोगविशेषापत्तेः । अतः प्रयोगविधिरेव स्वविधेयप्रयोगप्राशुभावसिद्ध्यर्थं नियतं क्रममपि पदार्थविशेषणतया विधत्ते । अत ए-

वाङ्मनानां क्रमबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिरित्यपि लक्षणम् । तत्र क्रमो नाम विततिविशेषः । पौर्वापर्यरूपो वा । तत्र षट् प्रमाणानि श्रुत्यर्थपाठस्थानमुख्यप्रवृत्त्याख्यानि । तत्र क्रमपरं वचनं श्रुतिः । तच्च द्विविधम् । केवलक्रमपरं तद्विशिष्टपदार्थपरं चेति । तत्र वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोतीति केवलक्रमपरं वेदिकरणादेर्वचनान्तरप्राप्तत्वात् । वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्ष इति तु क्रमविशिष्टपदार्थपरम् । एकप्रसरताभङ्गभयेन भक्षानुवादेन क्रममात्रस्य विधातुमशक्यत्वात् । सेयं श्रुतिरितरप्रमाणापेक्षया बलवती तेषां वचनकल्पनद्वारा क्रमप्रमाणत्वात् । अत एवाश्विनग्रहणस्य पाठक्रमात्तृतीयस्थाने ग्रहणप्रसक्तावाश्विनो दशमो गृह्यतइति वचनाद्दशमस्थाने ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । यत्र प्रयोजनवशेन क्रमनिर्णयः सो ऽर्थक्रमः । यथाऽग्निहोत्रं जुहोति यवागूं पचतीत्यग्निहोत्रयवागूपाकयोः । अत्र हि यवाग्वा होमार्थत्वेन तत्पाकः प्रयोजनवशेन पूर्वमनुष्ठीयते । स चायं पाठक्रमाद्वलवान् । यथापाठं ह्यनुष्ठाने क्रमप्रयोजनबाधे ऽदृष्टार्थत्वं (१) स्यात् । न हि होमानन्तरं क्रियमाणस्य पाकस्य किञ्चिद्दृष्टं प्रयोजनमस्ति । पदार्थबोधकवाक्यानां यः क्रमः स पाठक्रमः । तस्माच्च पदार्थानां क्रम आश्रीयते । येन हि क्रमेण वाक्यानि पठितानि तेनैव क्रमेणाधीतान्यर्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति । यथाप्रत्ययं (२) च पदार्थानामनुष्ठानम् । स च पाठो द्विविधः । मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठश्चेति । तत्राग्नेयाग्नीषोमीययोस्तत्तदा-

(१) बाधो ऽदृष्टार्थत्वं चेति 'स्व ग च' पुस्तकयोः ।

(२) यथार्थप्रत्ययमिति पाठो 'ग च' पुस्तकयोः ।

क्यानां याज्यानुवाक्यानां (१) पाठाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते स मन्त्र-  
पाठात् स चायं मन्त्रपाठो ब्राह्मणपाठाद्वर्तीयान् । अनुष्ठाने  
ब्राह्मणवाक्यापेक्षया मन्त्रपाठस्यान्तरङ्गत्वात् । ब्राह्मणवाक्यं हि  
प्रयोगाद्वहिरेवेदं कर्त्तव्यमित्यवबोध्य कृतार्थम् । मन्त्राः पुनः  
प्रयोगकाले व्याप्रियन्ते । अनुष्ठानक्रमस्य स्मरणक्रमाधीनत्वा-  
त् तत्क्रमस्य च मन्त्रक्रमाधीनत्वादन्तरङ्गो मन्त्रपाठ इति  
प्रयाजानां समिधो यजति तनूनपातं यजति इत्येवं विधिपा-  
ठक्रमाद्यः (२) क्रमः स ब्राह्मणपाठक्रमात् । यद्यपि ब्राह्मण-  
वाक्यान्यर्थं विधाय कृतार्थानि तथापि प्रयाजादीनां क्रमस्मा-  
रकान्तरस्याभावात्तान्येव क्रमस्मारकत्वेन स्वीक्रियन्ते ॥

स्थानं नामोपस्थितिः । यस्य हि देशे यो ऽनुष्ठायते तत्पूर्वतने  
पदार्थे कृते स एव प्रथममुपस्थितो भवतीति युक्तं तस्य प्रथम-  
मनुष्ठानम् । अत एव साद्यस्के अग्नीषोमीयसवनीयानुबन्ध्यानां  
सवनीयदेशे सहानुष्ठाने कर्त्तव्ये आदौ सवनीयपशोरनुष्ठान-  
मितरयोः पश्चात् तस्मिन्देशे आश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयस्यैव  
प्रथममुपस्थितेः । तथा हि । ज्योतिष्टोमे त्रयः पशुयागा अग्नी-  
षोमीयः सवनीय आनुबन्ध्यश्चेति । ते च भिन्नदेशाः । अग्नीषो-  
मीय औपवस्ये ऽङ्गि सवनीयः सुत्याकाले आनुबन्ध्यस्त्वन्ते ।  
साद्यस्करो नाम सोमयागविशेषः । स चाव्यक्तत्वाज्ज्योतिष्टोम-  
विकारः । अतस्ते त्रयो ऽपि पशुयागाः साद्यस्के चोदकप्रा-

(१) स्तत्तयाज्यानुवाक्याक्रमाद्यः क्रम आश्रीयते इति पाठः 'स ग' पुस्तकयोः ।  
स्तत्तयाज्यानुवाक्याक्रम आश्रीयते इति 'च' पुस्तके ॥

(२) इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्यः इति 'स ग' पुस्तकयोः । इत्येवंविधवाक्यक्रमाद्य  
इति 'च' पुस्तके ।

ज्ञाः । तेषां तत्र साहित्यं श्रुतं सह पशुनालभत इति । तच्च साहित्यं सवनीयदेशे तस्य प्रधानप्रत्यासत्तेः स्थानातिक्रमण-  
 सास्याच्च । सवनीयदेशे ह्यनुष्ठाने ऽग्नीषोमीयानुबन्ध्ययोः स्व-  
 स्वस्थानातिक्रमो भवति । अग्नीषोमीयदेशे ऽनुबन्ध्यदेशे वानु-  
 छाने त्रयाणामपि मध्ये द्वयोः स्वस्वस्थानातिक्रमः(१) । तथा च  
 प्रकृतावाग्निवग्रहं कृत्वा त्रिवृता यूपं परिवीय सवनीयं पशु-  
 मुपाकरोतीत्याश्विनग्रहणानन्तरं सवनीयो विहित इति सा-  
 द्यस्के ऽप्याग्निवग्रहणे कृते सवनीय एवोपस्थितो भवत्यतो  
 युक्तं तस्य स्थानात्पथममनुष्ठानमितरयोस्तु पश्चादित्युक्तम् ॥

प्रधानक्रमेण यो ऽङ्गानां क्रमः स मुख्यः क्रमः । येन हि क्र-  
 मेण प्रधानानि क्रियन्ते तेनैव क्रमेण तेषामङ्गान्यनुष्ठायन्ते ।  
 तदा सर्वेषामङ्गानां स्वैः स्वैः प्रधानैस्तुल्यं व्यवधानं भवति । व्यु-  
 त्क्रमेणानुष्ठाने केषां चिदङ्गानां स्वैः प्रधानैरत्यन्तमव्यवधानं  
 केषां चिदत्यन्तव्यवधानं स्यात्तच्चायुक्तं प्रयोगविध्यवगतसा-  
 हित्यवाधापत्तेः । अतः प्रधानक्रमो ऽपि अङ्गक्रमे हेतुः । अत  
 एव प्रयाजशेषेणादावाग्नेयहविषो ऽभिघारणं पश्चादैन्द्रस्य  
 दध्नः आग्नेयैन्द्रयागयोः पौर्वापर्यात् । एवं च द्वयोर्द्वयोरभि-  
 घारणयोः स्वस्वप्रधानेन तुल्यमेकान्तरितं व्यवधानम् । व्युत्क्र-  
 मेणाभिघारणे त्वाग्नेयहविरभिघारणाग्नेययागयोरत्यन्तम-  
 व्यवधानम् । ऐन्द्रदध्यभिघारणैन्द्रयागयोर्द्वान्तरितं व्यवधानं  
 तच्चायुक्तमित्युक्तमेव । स मुख्यः क्रमः पाठक्रमादुर्वचः । मुख्य-  
 क्रमो हि प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षप्रधानक्रमप्रतिपत्तिसापेक्षतया वि-

लम्बितप्रतिपत्तिकः । पाठक्रमस्तु निरपेक्षस्वाध्यायपाठक्रममा-  
त्रसापेक्षतया न तथेति बलवान् । स चायं मुख्यक्रमः प्रवृत्ति-  
क्रमाच्च बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमा-  
नुष्ठितक्रमापेक्षा बहूनामङ्गानां (१) प्रधानविप्रकर्षान्मुख्यक्रमे  
तु सन्निकर्षात् ॥

सह प्रयुज्यमानेषु प्रधानेषु सन्निपातिनामङ्गानामावृत्त्या ऽनु-  
ष्ठाने कर्त्तव्ये द्वितीयादिपदार्थानां प्रथमानुष्ठितपदार्थक्रमाद्यः  
क्रमः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । यथा प्राजापत्यपञ्चङ्गेषु प्राजापत्या हि  
वैश्वदेवीं कृत्वा प्राजापत्यैश्वरन्तीति वाक्येन तृतीयानिर्देशात्से-  
तिकर्त्तव्यताका एककालत्वेन विहिता अतस्तेषां तदङ्गानां  
चोपाकरणनियोजनप्रभृतीनां साहित्यं संपाद्यम् । तच्च प्राजा-  
पत्यपशूनां संप्रतिपन्नदेवताकत्वेन (२) युगपदनुष्ठानादुपपद्यते ।  
तदङ्गानां चोपाकरणादीनां युगपदनुष्ठानमशक्यम् । अतस्तेषां  
साहित्यमव्यवहितानुष्ठानात्संपाद्यम् । तच्चैकस्योपाकरणं विधा-  
यापरस्योपाकरणं विधेयम् । एवं नियोजनादिकमपि । तथा च  
प्राजापत्येषु कस्माच्चित्यशोरारभ्य एकं सर्वं सर्वत्रानुष्ठाय (३)  
द्वितीयादिपदार्थस्तेनैव क्रमेणानुष्ठेयः स प्रवृत्तिक्रमः । सो ऽयं  
श्रुत्यादिभ्यो दुर्बलः । तदेवं संक्षेपतो निरूपितः षड्विधक्रमनि-  
रूपणेन प्रयोगविधिः ॥

कर्मजन्यफलस्वाम्यबोधको विधिरधिकारविधिः । कर्मज-

(१) बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमाच्च बलवान् । प्रवृत्तिक्रमे हि बहूनामङ्गानामिति पाठो  
'ग च' पुस्तकयोः

(२) देवताकालत्वेनेति पाठः केषु चित्पुस्तकेष्वसीदिति टीकाखेसतो ऽवगम्यते ।

(३) एकं सर्वत्रानुष्ठेयमिति पाठः 'ख ग च' पुस्तकेषु ।



न्यफलस्वाम्यं कर्मजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वम् । स च यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादिरूपः । स्वर्गमुद्दिश्य यागं विदधता ऽनेन स्वर्गकामस्य यागजन्यफलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । यस्याहिताग्नेरग्निर्गृह्णान् दहेत्सो ऽग्नये शामवते ऽष्टाकपालं निर्वपेदित्यादिनाग्निदाहदौ निमित्ते कर्म विदधता निमित्तवतः कर्मजन्यपापक्षयरूप-फलस्वाम्यं प्रतिपाद्यते । एवमहरहः सन्ध्योपासीतेत्यादिना शुचिविहितकालजीविनः सन्ध्योपासनजन्यप्रत्यवायपरिहार-रूपफलस्वाम्यं चोद्यते । तच्च फलस्वाम्यं तस्यैव यो ऽधिकारवि-शिष्टः । अधिकारश्च (१) यद्विधिवाक्येषु पुरुषविशेषणत्वेन श्रूय-ते । यथा काम्ये कर्मणि फलकामना नैमित्ते कर्मणि निमित्त-निश्चयः । नित्ये सन्ध्योपासनादौ शुचिविहितकालजीवित्वम् । अत एव राजा राजन्येन स्वाराज्यकामो यजेतेतदनेन विधि-वाक्येन स्वाराज्यमुद्दिश्य विदधतापि न स्वाराज्यमात्रकामस्य तत्फलभोक्तृत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । किं तु राज्ञः सतः स्वाराज्यकाम-स्यैव राजत्वस्यापि अधिकारिविशेषणत्वेन श्रवणात् । क्वचित्तु पुरुषविशेषणत्वेनाश्रुतमप्यधिकारिविशेषणम् । यथाध्ययनवि-धिसिद्धा विद्या क्रतुविधीनामर्थज्ञानापेक्षणीयत्वेनाध्ययनविधि-सिद्धार्थज्ञानवन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवमग्निसाध्यकर्मसु आधा-नसिद्धाग्निमत्ता । अग्निसाध्यकर्मणामग्न्यपेक्षत्वेन तद्विधीना-माधानसिद्धाग्निमन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवं सामर्थ्यमपि । आ-ख्यातानामर्थं ब्रूवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणीति न्यायात् समर्थं प्र-त्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ॥

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारका मन्त्राः । तेषां च तादृशार्थस्मारक-  
 त्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वम् । न तु तदुच्चारणमदृष्टार्थम् । संभवति दृष्टफल-  
 कत्वे ऽदृष्टफलकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । न च दृष्टस्यार्थस्मरणस्य  
 प्रकारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मन्त्रान्नानं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । मन्त्रै-  
 रेव स्मर्त्तव्यमिति नियमविध्याश्रयणात् । नानासाधनसाध्यक्रि-  
 यायामेकसाधनप्राप्तावप्राप्तस्यापरसाधनस्य प्रापको विधिर्निय-  
 मविधिः । (१) यथाहुः । विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्तौ नियमः पाक्षिके  
 सति । तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्तौ परिसंख्येति गीयतइति । अस्यार्थः ।  
 प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्वविधिः । यथा यजेत स्व-  
 र्गकाम इत्यादिः । स्वर्गार्थकयागस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्यानेन  
 विधानात् । पक्षे ऽप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिर्नियमविधिः । यथा  
 ब्रोहीनवहन्तीत्यादिः । कथमस्य पक्षे ऽप्राप्तप्रापकत्वमिति चे-  
 दित्यम् । अनेन ह्यवघातस्य वैतुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते ऽन्व-  
 यव्यतिरेकसिद्धत्वात् । किं तु नियमः । स चाप्राप्तांशपूरणम् ।  
 वैतुष्यस्य हि नानोपायसाध्यत्वाद्यदा ऽवघातं परित्यज्य उपा-  
 यान्तरं गृहीतुमारभते तदा ऽवघातस्याप्राप्तत्वन तद्विधानना-  
 मकमप्राप्तांशपूरणमेवानेन विधिना क्रियते । अतश्च नियमवि-  
 धावप्राप्तांशपूरणात्मको नियम एव वाक्यार्थः । पक्षे ऽप्राप्ताव-  
 घातस्य विधानमिति यावत् । उभयोश्च युगपत्प्राप्तावितरव्यावृ-  
 त्तिपरो विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः । यथा पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या  
 इति । इदं हि वाक्यं न पञ्चनखभक्षणपरं तस्य रागतः प्राप्त-

(१) साधनद्वयस्य पक्षे प्राप्तावन्यतरसाधनस्याप्राप्ततादृशायां यो विधिः स नियम-  
 विधिरिति पाठः 'ब' पुस्तके ।

त्वात् । नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनखापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य युगपत्प्राप्तेः  
 पक्षे प्राप्त्यभावात् । अत इदमपञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तिपरमिति  
 भवति परिसंख्याविधिः । सा च द्विविधा । श्रौती लाक्षणिकी  
 चेति । तत्रात्र ह्येवावयन्तीति श्रौती परिसंख्या । एवकारेण प-  
 वमानातिरिक्तस्तोत्रव्यावृत्तेरभिधानात् । पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या  
 इति तु लाक्षणिकी । इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावात् । अत एवै-  
 षा त्रिदोषग्रस्ता । दोषत्रयं च श्रुतहानिरश्रुतकल्पना प्राप्तवा-  
 धस्येति । तदुक्तम् । श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनात् । प्रा-  
 प्तस्य बाधादित्येवं परिसंख्या त्रिदूषणा इति श्रुतस्य पञ्चनख-  
 भक्षणस्य हानाद् अश्रुतापञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तेः कल्पनात्प्राप्त-  
 स्य चाऽपञ्चनखभक्षणस्य बाधनादिति । अस्मिंश्च दोषत्रये दो-  
 षद्वयं शब्दनिष्ठम् । प्राप्तबाधस्त्वर्थनिष्ठ इति द्विक् । येषां तु प्र-  
 योगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्यानन्यगत्या  
 ऽदृष्टार्थकत्वं कल्प्यते इति नानर्थक्यमिति ॥

नामधेयानां च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतया ऽर्थवत्त्वम् । तथा  
 हि । उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दो यागनामधेयं  
 तेन च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदः (१) क्रियते । तथा हि । अनेन वाक्ये-  
 नाप्राप्तत्वात् फलोद्देशेन यागो विधीयते । यागसामान्यस्यावि-  
 धेयत्वाद् यागविशेष एव विधीयते । तत्र को ऽसौ यागविशेष  
 इत्यपेक्षायामुद्भिच्छब्दादुद्भिद्रूपो याग इति विज्ञायते उद्भिदा  
 यागेन पशुं भावयेदित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन नामधेयान्वया-  
 त । नामधेयत्वं च निमित्तचतुष्टयात् । मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयाद्वाक्य-

भेदभयात्तत्प्रत्यक्षात्तद्व्यपदेशादिति ॥

तत्रोद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दस्य यागनामधेयत्वं मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयात् । तथा हि । न तावदनेन वाक्येन फलं प्रति यागविधानं तं प्रति च गुणविधानं युज्यते । वाक्यभेदापत्तेः । उद्भिच्छब्दस्य गुणसमर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्राप्तत्वाद्गुणविशिष्टकर्मविधानं वाच्यम् । उद्भिदता यागेन पशुं भावयेदिति । विशिष्टविधौ मत्वर्थलक्षणेत्युक्तमेव ॥

चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम इत्यत्र चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं वाक्यभेदभयात् । तथा हि । न तावदत्र गुणविशिष्टयागविधानं संभवति । दधि मधु पयो घृतं धाना उदकं तण्डुलाः तत्संसृष्टं प्राजापत्यमित्यनेन गुणस्य विहितत्वात्तद्विशिष्टयागविध्यनुपपत्तेः । यागस्य फलसंबन्धे गुणसम्बन्धे च विधीयमाने वाक्यभेदः । तस्माच्चित्राशब्दः कर्मनामधेयम् । तथा च चित्रायागेन पशुं भावयेदिति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयान्न वाक्यभेदः । प्रकृतेष्टेरनेकद्रव्यत्वेन चित्राशब्दवाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः । अग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीत्यत्राग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तत्प्रत्यक्षात् । तस्य गुणस्य प्रख्यापकस्य प्रापकस्य (१) शास्त्रस्य विद्यमानत्वाद्-अग्निहोत्रशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति यावत् । नन्वयं गुणविधिरेव कुतो नति चेन्न । यद्यग्नौ होत्रमस्मिन्निति सप्तमीसमासमाश्रित्य होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपो गुणो विधेयस्तदा यदाहवनीये जुहोतीत्यनेनैवाग्नेः प्राप्तत्वात्तद्विधानानर्थक्यम् । अग्नये होत्रमिति चतुर्थीसमासमाश्रित्य अग्निदेवतारूपगुणो ऽनेन विधीयतइति

चेन्न । तद्देवतायाः शास्त्रान्तरेण प्राप्तत्वात् । किं तच्छास्त्रान्तर-  
मिति चेत् । यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीति केचित् ।  
अपरे त्वग्निर्ज्यातिर्ज्यातिरग्निस्वाहेति मन्त्रवर्ण एवाग्निरूपदे-  
वताप्रापकः । नन्वग्नेर्मन्त्रवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिदेवताया बाधः  
स्यात् । मन्त्रवर्णस्य चतुर्थीतो दुर्बलत्वात् । यथाहुः ॥

तद्वितेन चतुर्थ्या च मन्त्रवर्णेन वा पुनः ।

देवताया विधिस्तत्र दुर्बलं तु परंपरमिति ॥

चेन्न । यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोतीत्यत्र न केवलं  
प्रजापतिविधानम् । किं तु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चि-  
तप्रजापतेः । एवं च न बाधः केवलप्रजापतिविधानाभावात् । न  
चात्र समुच्चितोभयविधानमेव कथं नेति वाच्यम् । समुच्चितो-  
भयविधानापेक्षया ऽन्यतः प्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजाप-  
तिमात्रविधाने लाघवात् । एवं च प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवतानां  
समिधः समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्वित्यादिमन्त्रवर्णेभ्यः प्राप्त-  
त्वात् । समिधो यजतीत्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रत्ययशास्त्रा-  
त्कर्मनामधेयाः ॥

श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं त-  
द्व्यपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति याव-  
त् । तथा हि यद्विधेयं तस्य स्तुतिर्भवति । यद्यत्र श्येनो विधेयः  
स्यात् तदार्थवादैस्तस्यैव स्तुतिः कार्या । यथा वै श्येनो निपत्या-  
दत्ते एवमयं द्विषन्तं भ्रातृव्यं निपत्यादत्त इत्यनेनार्थवादेन श्येनः  
स्तोतुं न शक्यः । श्येनोपमानेनार्थान्तरस्तुतेः क्रियमाणत्वात् ।  
न च श्येनोपमानत्वेन स एव स्तोतुं शक्यते । उपमानोपमेयभा-

वस्य भिन्ननिष्ठत्वात् । यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते त-  
दार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्यतइति श्येनश-  
ब्दः कर्मनामधेयं तद्व्यपदेशादिति । उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणबलीयस्त्व-  
मपि पञ्चमं नामधेयनिमित्तमिति क चित् । यथा वैश्वदेवेन  
यजेतेत्यादौ । अत्रोत्पत्तिशिष्टाग्न्यादीनां बलीयस्त्वाद्वैश्वदेवश-  
ब्दस्य विश्वेदेवदेवताविधायकत्वं न संभवतीति कर्मनामधेयत्व-  
म् । वस्तुतस्तु तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रादेवास्य कर्मनामधेयत्वम् । प्रकृत-  
यागे विश्वेदेवरूपगुणसंप्रतिपन्नशास्त्रस्यार्थवादरूपस्यैव सत्त्वा-  
त् । यद्विश्वेदेवाः समयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्वम् ॥

पुरुषस्य निवर्तकं वाक्यं निषेधः । निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतु-  
क्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वात् । तथा हि । यथा विधिः प्र-  
वर्तनां प्रतिपादयन् स्वप्रवर्तकत्वनिर्वाहार्थं विधेयस्य यागादेरि-  
ष्टसाधनत्वमाशिपन् पुरुषं तत्र प्रवर्तयति तथा न कलञ्जं भक्ष-  
येदित्यादिनिषेधो ऽपि निवर्तनां प्रतिपादयन् स्वनिवर्तकत्वनि-  
र्वाहार्थं निषेध्यस्य कलञ्जभक्षणस्य परानिष्टसाधनत्वमाशिपन्  
पुरुषं ततो निवर्तयति । ननु निषेधवाक्यस्य कथं निवर्तनाप्रति-  
पादकत्वमिति चेदुच्यते । न तावदत्र धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वयः ।  
अव्यवधाने ऽपि तस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः । न  
ह्यन्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितमन्यत्रान्वेति । अन्यथा राजपुरुष-  
मानयेत्यादावपि राज्ञः क्रियान्वयापत्तेः । अतः प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव  
नञर्थेनान्वयः । तत्रापि नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावनायास्तस्या  
लिङंशवाच्यप्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः । किं तु लिङंशवा-  
च्यशब्दभावंनायास्तस्याः सर्वापेक्षया प्रधानत्वात् । नञश्चैवं स्व-

भावो यत्स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वम् । यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ अस्तीतिशब्दसमभिव्याहृतो नञ् घटसत्त्वविरोधि घटासत्त्वं गमयति तदिह लिङ्समभिव्याहृतो नञ् लिङर्थ-प्रवर्तनाविरोधनो निवर्तनामेव बोधयति । विधिवाक्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रतीतेः (१) । तस्मान्निषेधवाक्यस्थले निवर्तनैव वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये बाधकं तदा धात्वर्थ-स्यैव तत्रान्वयः । तच्च बाधकं द्विविधम् । तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमो विकल्पप्रसक्तिश्च । तत्राद्यं नेशेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्यादौ तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमस्यैतद्वाक्यपाठात् । तथा चात्र पर्युदासाश्रयणम् । तथा हि । व्रतशब्दस्य कर्त्तव्यार्थे रूढत्वात्तस्य व्रतमित्यत्र स्ना-तकस्य व्रतानां कर्त्तव्यत्वेनोपक्रमात् । किं तत्कर्त्तव्यमित्याकाङ्क्षायां नेशेतोद्यन्तमित्यादिना कर्त्तव्यार्थ एव प्रतिपादनोप-  
 अन्यथा पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । तथा च न-  
 जर्थेन न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः । कर्त्तव्यार्थानवबोधात् । विध्यर्थप्रव-  
 र्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनाया एव तादृशनञ्चा बोधनात् । तस्यास्य  
 कर्त्तव्यार्थत्वाभावात् । तस्मान्नेच्छेतेत्यत्र नञ्चा धात्वर्थविरोध्यनो-  
 क्षणसंकल्प एव लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य कर्त्तव्यत्वसंभवात् ।  
 आदित्यविषयकानोक्षणसंकल्पेन भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थः । तत्र  
 भाव्याकाङ्क्षायां एतावता ह्येनसा वियुक्तो भवतीति वाक्यशेषा-

(१) प्रतीतेरिति । प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः । यद्वा यजेत स्वर्गकाम इति विधिवा-  
 क्यश्रवणे ऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतिवन्न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादिनिषेधवा-  
 क्यश्रवणे ऽप्ययं मां निवर्तयतीति निवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यध्याहारेण, विधीत्यादिहेतुवा-  
 क्यं दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकविधया योजनीयमिति टीकाग्रन्थः । एतदनुसारेण क्वचित्पुस्तके  
 पाठभेदो ऽपि ॥

वगतः पापशयो भाव्यतया ऽन्वेति । एवं च पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकवाक्यत्वं निर्वहत्येव । न चात्र धात्वर्थविरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरस्यापि संभवात्कथमनीक्षणसंकल्पस्यैव भावनान्वय इति वाच्यम् । तस्य कर्त्तव्यताभावेन प्रकृते भावनान्वयायोग्यत्वात् । द्वितीयं यजतिषु येयजामहं करोति नानुयाजेष्वित्यादौ अत्र विकल्पप्रसक्तौ च पर्युदासाश्रयणात् । तथा हि यद्यत्र वाक्ये नञर्थे प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः स्यात्तदानुयाजेषु येयजामहमिति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधः स्यात् । अनुयाजेषु येयजामहं न कुर्यादिति । स च प्राप्तिपूर्वक एव प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधात् । प्राप्तिश्च यजतिषु येयजामहं करोतीति शास्त्रादेव वाच्या शास्त्रप्राप्तस्य च प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव न तु बाधः । प्राप्तिमूलरागस्यैव तन्मूलशास्त्रस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण बाधायोगात् । न च पदे जुहोतीति विशेषशास्त्रेणाहवनीये जुहोतीति शास्त्रस्यैव नानुयाजेष्वित्यनेन यजतिषु येयजामहं करोतीत्यस्य बाधः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । परस्परनिरपेक्षयोरेव शास्त्रयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावात् । पदशास्त्रस्य हि स्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनीयशास्त्रानपेक्षणान्निरपेक्षत्वम् । प्रकृते तु निषेधशास्त्रस्य निषेध्यप्रसक्त्यर्थं यजतिषु येयजामहमित्यस्यापेक्षणान्न निरपेक्षत्वम् । तस्माच्छास्त्रविहितस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव । स च न युक्तः । विकल्पे शास्त्रस्य पाक्षिकाप्रामाण्यसंपातात् । न ह्यनुयाजेषु येयजामहमित्यस्यानुष्ठाने नानुयाजेष्वित्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । ब्रीहियागानुष्ठाने यवशास्त्रस्यैव द्विरदृष्टकल्पना च स्यात् । विधिप्रतिषेधयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वात् । अतो नात्र प्रतिषेधस्याश्रयणं किं तु नञो ऽनुयाजसंबन्धमाश्रित्य



पर्युदासस्यैव । इत्थं चानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेषु यजतिषु येयजाम-  
हमिति मन्त्रं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थबोधः । नञो ऽनुयाजव्यतिरि-  
क्ते लाक्षणिकत्वात् । एवं च न विकल्पः । अत्र च वाक्ये येयजा-  
महइति न विधीयते यजतिषु येयजामह इत्यनेनैव च प्राप्तत्वा-  
त् । किं तु सामान्यशास्त्रप्राप्तयेयजामह इत्यनुवादेन तस्यानु-  
याजव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वं विधीयते । यद्यजतिषु येयजामहं क-  
रोतीति तदनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेष्वेवेति । नन्वेवं सामान्यशास्त्रप्रा-  
प्तस्य विशेषे संकोचनरूपादुपसंहारात्पर्युदासस्य भेदो न  
स्यादिति चेन्न । उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थः । यथा प-  
रोडाशं चतुर्धा करोतीति सामान्यप्राप्तं चतुर्धाकरणम् । आ-  
ग्नेयं चतुर्धा करोतीति विशेषादाग्नेयपुरोडाशमात्रे संकोच्य-  
ते । पर्युदासस्तु तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति ततो भेदात् । कुत्र  
चित् विकल्पप्रसक्तावप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाश्रयणम् । यथा ना-  
तिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यादौ । अत्र हि अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं  
गृह्णातीति शास्त्रप्राप्तषोडशिग्रहणस्य निषेधादिकल्पप्रसक्तावपि  
न पर्युदासाश्रयणम् । असंभवात् । तथा हि । यद्यत्र षोडशिप-  
दाथन नञर्थान्नयस्तदातिरात्रे षोडशिव्यतिरिक्तं गृह्णातीति  
वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात्स च न संभवति । अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृ-  
ह्णातीति प्रत्यक्षविधिविरोधात् । यदि चातिरात्रेण पदार्थेना-  
न्वयस्तदातिरात्रव्यतिरिक्ते षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः  
स्यात्सो ऽपि न संभवति तद्विधिविरोधात् । अतो ऽत्रानन्य-  
गत्या शास्त्रप्राप्तषोडशिग्रहणस्यैव निषेधः । न च विकल्पप्रस-  
क्तिः तस्याप्यपेक्षणीयत्वात् । इयांस्तुविशेषो यद्विकल्पादेकप्रति-

षेधे ऽपि प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतुत्वम् । विधिनिषेधोभय-  
स्यापि क्रत्वर्थत्वात् । यत्र तु न विकल्पः प्राप्तिश्च रागत एव प्र-  
तिषेधश्च पुरुषार्थः तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वम् । यथा न  
कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादौ कलञ्जभक्षणादेः । तत्र भक्षणनिषेध-  
स्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात् । न च दीक्षितो न ददाति न जुहोतीत्यादौ  
शास्त्रप्राप्तदानहोमादीनां निषेधाद्विकल्पापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ।  
स्वतः पुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावे  
ऽपि ( १ ) निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात् यथा ऋतौ स्वस्तीगम-  
नादेः । तन्निषेधस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वेन तस्य क्रतुवैगुण्यसंपादकत्वात् ॥

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः । तस्य च लक्षण्या  
प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसानम् । तथा हि । अर्थवादवाक्यं हि स्वार्थ-  
प्रतिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाद्विधेयनिषेध्ययोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितत्वे  
लक्षण्या प्रतिपादयति । स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे आनर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् ।  
आम्नायस्य हि क्रियार्थत्वात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । स्वाध्यायो ऽध्ये-  
तव्य इत्यध्ययनविधिना सकलवेदाध्ययनं कर्त्तव्यमिति बोधय-  
ता सर्ववेदस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसायित्वं सूचयतोपात्तत्वेना-  
नर्थक्यानुपपत्तेः । स द्विविधः । विधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति । तत्र  
वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकाम इत्यादिविधिशेषस्य वायुर्वै-  
क्ष्णपिष्ठा देवतेत्यादेर्विधेयार्थप्राशस्त्यबोधकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । ब-  
र्हिषि रजतं न देयमित्यादिनिषेधशेषस्य सो ऽरोदीद्यदरो-  
दीत्तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वमित्यादेर्निषेधस्य निन्दितत्वबोधकतयार्थ-  
वत्त्वम् । न च प्राशस्त्यादिवोधस्य निष्प्रयोजनत्वेन नार्थवाद-

स्यार्थवत्त्वमिति वाच्यम् । आलस्यादिवशादप्रवर्त्तमानस्य  
 पुंसः प्रवृत्त्यादिजनकत्वेन तद्धोधस्योपयोगात् । स पनखेधा ।  
 तदुक्तम् । विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादो ऽवधारिते । भूतार्थ-  
 वादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मत इति । अस्यार्थः । प्रमाणान्तर-  
 विरोधे सत्यर्थवादो गुणवादः । यथाऽऽदित्यो यूप इत्यादि ।  
 यूपे आदित्याभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वादादित्यवदुज्ज्वलत्वरू-  
 पगुणो ऽनेन लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते । प्रमाणान्तरावगतार्थबोध-  
 को ऽनुवादः । यथा ऽग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजमित्यत्र हिमविरोधि-  
 त्वस्याग्नौ प्रत्यक्षावगतत्वात् । प्रमाणान्तरविरोधतत्प्राप्ति(१)-  
 रहितार्थबोधको वादो भूतार्थवादः । यथेन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुद-  
 यच्छदित्यादि । एवं च यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यादि निखिलवेदस्य  
 साक्षात्परंपरया वा यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् । सो ऽयं  
 धर्मो यदुद्दिश्य विहितस्तदुद्देशेन क्रियमाणस्तद्देतुः । ईश्वरा-  
 र्पणबुद्ध्या क्रियमाणस्तु निश्चयसद्देतुः । न च तदर्पणबुद्धानुष्ठाने  
 प्रमाणाभावः । यत्करोषि यदश्नासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत् ।  
 यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणमिति भगवद्गीतास्मृते-  
 रेव प्रमाणत्वात् । स्मृतिचरणे तत्प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुतिमूलकत्वेन  
 व्यवस्थापनादिति शिवम् ॥

बालानां सुखबोधाय भास्करेण सुमेधसा ।

रचितो ऽयं समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहोपाध्यायलोणाचिभास्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसा-  
 र्थसंग्रहनामकं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमगात् ॥

# TRANSLATION.



Reverence to Kṛishṇa.—

Having shown his reverence to Vāsudeva the husband of Rāmā, Laugākshi—Bhāskara composes the Artha-Saṃgraha as an introduction to the doctrine of Jaimini.

The highly benevolent reverend Jaimini has composed a book in twelve adhyāyas for the discriminative knowledge of duty. At its beginning he speaks of the desire of knowing duty in the following aphorism “next therefore a desire to know duty”. In this aphorism the word “next” expresses the immediate consecution (of the desire of knowing duty) on the reading of the Veda. The word “therefore” expresses the circumstance of the reading of the Veda having a visible purpose (and not merely tending to produce an unseen result as f. i. the performance of the sacrifices does), as the passage enjoining the reading of the Veda (viz. “one is to read the Veda”) settles that this reading has for its visible purpose the knowledge of the sense of the Veda. (For a proper understanding of the aphorism quoted above) we have therefore to complement the aphorism as follows “Because the reading of the Veda has a visible purpose which consists in the knowledge of its sense, for this reason, after the reading of the Veda, the desire of knowing duty which latter is the purport of the Veda has to be entertained. The phrase “desire of knowing” implies the idea of enquiry, so that the aphorism actually refers to the beginning of the (Mīmāṃsā—) śāstra and means “this Śāstra whose matter is the enquiry into duty is to be begun.” (1)

Here the question arises :—What is duty? what is its distinctive character (its definition)?—To this we reply : Sacrifices etc. only(2) are duty ; and we define duty as that matter which has a

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(1) For a full discussion of the not very important question of the meaning of *atha* and *atas* see Jaim. Nyāya M. V. pp. 11 12.

(2) The word “only” serves to exclude quasi—religious acts like the worship of *chaityas* which are not taught in the Veda.

purpose and is to be accomplished according to the Veda. The phrase "which has a purpose" serves to exclude from the things comprised in the definition matters which are themselves of the nature of a purpose (as f. i. the different results of the sacrifices viz. *paradī* etc.)—The phrase "which is to be accomplished according to the Veda" serves to exclude from the definition matters like the act of eating (which is performed not on the authority of the Veda but on the prompting of a natural instinct). The word "matter" (*artha* : which includes the idea of goodness or usefulness) serves to exclude actions like the sacrifice called "*Śyena*", which are to be considered as bad things (*anartha*) on account of their having a bad result (viz. the death of some enemy, for the bringing about of which the sacrificer himself will have to go to hell<sup>(1)</sup>).

Here it might be objected that this definition of duty is in conflict with the definition given in the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras* where it is said (I. 2) "Duty is that matter the distinctive character of which is instigation": in which latter definition the word "instigation" denotes only that one part of the Veda which has the form of injunctions (*vidhā*)—To this we reply that in reality the two definitions are not conflicting because in the *Sūtra* also the word "instigation" denotes the Veda in general as the whole Veda on account of its aiming at duty serves to express the accomplishment of duty.

(If now we be asked to point out in detail the appropriateness of our definition of duty we proceed: Acts of duty as sacrifices etc. are enjoined with reference to man by vedic sentences (as f. i. "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice") in which paradise etc. is pointed out as the result. The particulars are as follows. The word *yajeta* "he may sacrifice" contains two constituent elements viz. the root *yaj* (*yaji*) and the suffix. The suffix again contains

(1) Cp. *Jean Nāy. M. V.* pp. 14-15. But why then—might it be asked—are Sacrifices of the nature of the *Śyena* taught in the Veda?—To this question the *Sābara-bhāṣya* (to 5) answers—(Katham puṇar anarthaḥ kartavyatayopadiśyate-uchyate)—*naiva śyenaḥ kartavyā vijnāyante—yo hi himsitum icchhet tasyāyam aśhyupāya—iti hi teshu upadeśah—śyenaśbbhicharan yajeta iti he samāmananti—na abhicharanavāraṇaḥ*

two elements as it expresses as well the property of a verb as the property of an optative. The property of expressing a verb is common to the suffixes of the ten moods and tenses (all of which when added to a root turn the latter into a verb); the property of expressing an optative exclusively belongs to the optative suffixes.—Both elements express a creative energy (*bhāvanā*) only.<sup>(1)</sup> By *bhāvanā* (“creative energy” or “productive energy” or “tendency to realize something”) we understand the particular activity of some productive agent (*bhāvayitṛi*) which tends to bring about the existence of something which is going to be (*bhāvitṛi*; which is capable of future existence). Such productive energy is twofold being either verbal (*śābda*) or actual (*ārtha*)—By “verbal *bhāvanā*” we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent which tends to make a person act: it is expressed by the optative element (of words like “*ṛajeta*”); for if some person hears a verb with an optative termination there arises in his mind the exclusive notion “he (the speaker) instigates me to act: he is engaged in an energy tending to make me act.” (In this explanation of the element which expresses the *bhāvanā* we proceed) according to the general rule that whatever is exclusively understood in consequence of some word being uttered is expressed by it (is the sense of the word); as f. i. in the sentence “bring the cow” the general character of cow (*goṇa*) is the sense of the word “cow.” The peculiar activity (which has been mentioned above in the definition of *bhāvanā*) is in the case of a sentence belonging to ordinary worldly language some particular intention dwelling in the mind of a speaking person; in vedic sentences on the other hand where there is no speaking person it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. For this reason this *bhāvanā* is called verbal *bhāvanā*.

This *bhāvanā* requires three constituent elements; the matter which is to be accomplished (the result; *sādhya*); the means by which the result is effected (the instrument; *sādhana*); and the mode in which the result is effected (*itikartavyatā*); according to the three questions (suggested by each *bhāvanā*): what is to be ef-

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(1) The word “only” is meant to exclude the agent (*kartr*) etc

fected? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected?—  
 Here now the want of a result to be accomplished being felt there  
 steps in the actual bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) with its three consti-  
 tuent elements which we shall explain further on and fills the place  
 of the wanted result, since here takes place a samānābbhidhāna-  
 śruti i. e. a direct statement of the intimate connexion of two mat-  
 ters by means of the two being expressed by the same word, (the  
 śābdī as well as the ārtī bhāvanā being expressed by the one op-  
 tative form). (To supply the ārtī bhāvanā—i. e. the peculiar  
 energy of a person to which the śābdī bhāvanā instigates—as that  
 which is to be accomplished is more natural than to supply any-  
 thing else as f. i. the sacrifice itself, because the optative form of  
 words like “yajeta” expresses both bhāvanās, from which circum-  
 stance the intimate connexion of the two is readily inferred).  
 It might perhaps be remarked by some one that other matters  
 too, as f. i. number (i. e. singular, dual, plural) and time (present  
 etc.) are expressed by the one optative affix and that therefore  
 number, time etc. likewise occupy the place of sādhyā with  
 regard to the verbal bhāvanā. But such an assumption would  
 be erroneous as number, time etc. are not fit to fill the place  
 of the thing to be accomplished.—If the want of an instrument  
 (of the verbal bhāvanā) arises, the place of such a one is  
 filled by the knowledge of the optative form etc. The ins-  
 trumentality of the optative does not lie in its producing the  
 bhāvanā—for the latter exists in the word even before the  
 knowledge (by some person) of the optative form—; but ra-  
 ther in the circumstance of the optative form expressing the  
 bhāvanā or its tending to bring about the result to be effected by  
 the verbal bhāvanā (which result as remarked above is the actual  
 bhāvanā).—If finally the want of a mode (of the verbal bhāvanā)  
 presents itself, the place of such a one is filled by the praise or glo-  
 rification (of the acts of duty) which is found in the arthavāda-  
 passages.

Actual (ārthī) bhāvanā is to be defined as the peculiar energy (of  
 some person) which refers to some action (as f. i. a sacrifice) which  
 energy is engendered by the desire of some object. This actual  
 bhāvanā is—in words like yajeta—expressed by that element of the

word which denotes the verb : for the verb in general (independent of the different moods and tenses) expresses an energy.—This bhávaná too requires three constituent elements, the matter which is to be accomplished,—the result; the means by which the result is effected—the instrument; and the mode in which the result is effected; according to the three questions (suggested by the actual bhávaná as well as the verbal bhávaná): what is to be effected? by what means is it to be effected? how is it to be effected? If the thing to be accomplished is asked for, results of the nature of paradise step in as the things to be accomplished; if the instrument is asked for, actions like the sacrifice present themselves as the instruments (by which the result is obtained); if the mode of action is asked for, all the subsidiary matters as f. i. the prayájas (which form a part of the sacrifice) present themselves and point out the mode of action.

If now the question is asked “what is the Veda”, we answer : sentences not produced by man. The Veda is fivefold, being either injunction (vidhi) or sacrificial formula (mantra) or name (nómadheya) or prohibition (nishedha) or explanatory statement (arthaváda). That part of the Veda which intimates a thing not known (by other means) is called “Injunction.”

Injunction has a sense in consequence of its enjoining a matter having a certain purpose in as far as it enjoins the matter as not established by any other means of proof<sup>(1)</sup>; as f. i. the vedic passage “he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the agnihotra;” which injunction enjoins an oblation having for its purpose (the attaining of) paradise which is not settled by any other means of proof; so that the sense conveyed by the passage is “he is to realize paradise by means of the Agnihotra-oblation”. When on the other hand the (sacrificial) action is already settled by some other means of proof, an injunction merely enjoins some secondary matter (guṇa) with a view to that action. As is f. i. the case in the passage “he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk.” Here, the oblation itself being already established by the injunction “he is to

(1) This appears a somewhat clumsy way of stating what is more clearly expressed in the following words of the Ápadevi. Sa cha vidhiḥ prayojanavadarthavidhínenárthaván sa chápṛáptam artham vidhatte



offer the Agnihotra', there is only enjoined sour milk with a view to the oblation ( as the material to be used for the oblation ); so that the sense is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk."—Where both things are non-established ( i. e. in the case of neither the sacrifice nor any secondary matter pertaining to the sacrifice being established by a previous injunction ), the injunction enjoins something particularized ( or specialized ; *viśiṣṭa* ); as f. i. in the injunction " he is to sacrifice by means of soma "; here, the soma as well ( which is the material of the sacrifice ) as the sacrifice itself not being established ( by any other injunction ), there takes place the injunction of that sacrifice which is particularized by soma ( as its material ).—Nor is it to be objected that ( the passage being interpreted in the aforesaid manner ) there takes place a split of the sentence ( *vākyabheda* ) the word " *somena* " enjoining two things; for there are not enjoined two separate things, but only one particularized thing ( viz. that particular sacrifice for which soma is used )—Nor again is it to be objected that the passage " *somena yajeta* " merely enjoins soma as the material of that sacrifice which itself is already established by the other passage " he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice by means of the *jyotiṣṭoma* " so that the sense of the injunction would be " he is to realize the sacrifice ( the *jyotiṣṭoma* ) by means of soma "; it being pleaded for this interpretation that it allows us to dispense with the assumption of possessive indication ( *matvartha-lakṣhaṇā* ; by which term is understood the denoting a thing by something else connected with it, as a quality etc. : as when the word " soma " is made to denote a sacrifice in which soma is used ). For the passage referring to the *jyotiṣṭoma* is an injunction intimating a claim ( *adhikāra-vidhi* ) and this cannot be taken as an originative injunction ( *utpatti-vidhi* ; if the passage about the *jyotiṣṭoma* could be taken as the one containing the primary, original injunction of the soma-sacrifice, the passage " *somena yajeta* " might be taken as a *guṇa-vidhi* and thus " *somena* " would not have to be explained as meaning " *somavatā yāgena* ; but as the purport of the passage about the *jyotiṣṭoma* is not simply to enjoin the soma-sacrifice but to intimate the claim which the sacrificer has to the fruit of the sacrifice, we are compelled to take " *somena yajeta* "

as the originative injunction of the soma-sacrifice and therefore to explain "somena" by "somavatá yágena")—To this reasoning it might be objected that the passage about the jyotishtōma may be taken as comprising an originative injunction as well as an injunction intimating a claim as this is avowedly the case with other passages as f. i. the passage "he who desires cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid." But we answer: It is not so. In the apparently parallel case which you adduce ( viz. the passage about the udbhid) we assume the double nature of the injunction because such an assumption is unavoidable, there being no other statement originative of the sacrifice ( while in the case of the soma-sacrifice there are two injunctions; the instances are therefore not parallel).—And moreover if we explain the passage about the jyotishtōma as containing two injunctions it would have to be taken as intimating the sacrifice itself and its connection with its fruit and this would be a manifest split of the sentence; better than which is the assumption of the passage enjoining something particularized (a sacrifice particularized by soma), by means of our attributing to the word soma the power of possessive indication.—

Injunction is of four different kinds, being either originative injunction (utpattividhi) or applicatory injunction (viniyogavidhi) or injunction of a claim (adbhikāravidhi) or injunction of performance (prayogavidhi).

That injunction which merely indicates the general nature of some action is called originative injunction as f. i. the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation". In injunctions of this kind the sacrificial action itself occupies the place of the instrument, so that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the object of his desire by means of the agnihotra-oblation."—But, it may be objected, the two forms (aspects; rūpa) of a sacrifice are the material (offered) and the divinity (to whom the material is offered). How then can the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation", in which neither of these two forms is mentioned be considered an originative injunction, the word "agnihotra" ( which seemingly indicates the divinity of the sacrifice viz. agni) being merely a name (and not indicating the divinity) according to the principle of ( the existence of another scriptural passage) declaratory of it; ( which

principle will be explained in the chapter on námadheya). To this objection we reply : The passage is an originative injunction although neither of the two forms of the sacrifice is mentioned in it. Otherwise the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk" would have to be considered as the originative injunction (of the agnihotra) as it contains a statement of one of the two forms (viz. the material) and then the passage "he is to offer the agnihotra-oblation" would be purposeless.

That injunction which intimates the connexion of some subsidiary matter with some principal matter is called applicatory injunction (showing how the subsidiary matter is to be applied to the principal matter). As f. i. the passage "he is to perform the oblation by means of sour milk" which enjoins the connexion, with the oblation, of sour milk the subsidiary position of which is intimated by the third case-affix (the case-affix of dadhná showing that sour milk is to be used as an instrument and therefore is merely subsidiary to the action whose instrument it is). So that the sense of the passage is "he is to realize the oblation by means of sour milk"—In injunctions of some secondary matter (guṇa) that which is expressed by the root (as "juhoti" in the above example) occupies the position of the object to be accomplished (so that "juhoti" is properly explained by "homam bhāvayet.—In an utpatti-vidhi and an adbhūtaravidhi on the the other hand the root denotes the instrument : agnihotram juhoti = agnihotra-homena ishtam bhāvayet).

Sometimes the root expresses the abode of an action as f. i. "he is to perform the oblation for him, who is desirous of strength of the senses, by means of sour milk"; where the sense is "he is to realize strength of the senses by the instrumentality of sour milk"; and if now the question arises "wherein does it (the instrumentality of sour milk) reside?" the oblation which is mentioned close by steps in denoting the abode.

Injunctions of this kind are assisted by six means of proof, viz. direct statement (śruti); power (līnga); sentence or syntactical connexion (vākya); interdependence (prakaraṇa); place or order (sthāna); name (samākhya). Applicatory injunctions assisted by these six means of proof intimate subsidiary relation; the

subsidiary position of something consists in its being accomplished by the action of some agent engaged in the pursuit of some other result (so f. i. the prayājas are performed by a sacrificer offering the newmoon-sacrifice with a view to obtaining paradise); the same subsidiary position is expressed by the term “pārārthya” “existing for the purpose of something else.”

( We now proceed to a detailed discussion of the above mentioned six means of proof).

Direct statement ( śruti ; literally “text”) we define as irrespective or independent words (words which intimate their sense directly without any intermediate steps of the nature of those required by the other means of proof). Direct statement is of three different kinds being either injunctive (vidhātrī) or denotative (abhidhātrī) or applicative (vinīyoktrī). To the first class belong the direct statements contained in optative forms etc. (the optative form directly indicating the bhāvanā). To the second class belong statements as those about the rice-grains (viz. sentences like “vrīhīṁ ayabanti” “vrīhīṁ prokshati” etc., where the word “rice-grains” directly produces the idea of the corresponding thing and its connexion with the bhāvanā). If finally from the mere hearing (the mere statement) of a word a connexion (between some primary and some subsidiary matter) is understood, we have an applicatory śruti.

Śruti of this latter kind is again threefold, being either direct statement by means of case-affixes or direct statement by means of one denotative word (or element of a word) or direct statement by means of one pada (in the restricted grammatical sense). Direct statement by means of case-affixes expresses the relation of a subsidiary, as f. i. in the passage “he is to sacrifice by means of rice grains” where by the direct statement of the third case-affix the subsidiary relation of the rice-grains to the sacrifice is expressed. This subsidiary relation is here brought about by the rice-grains forming the original substance out of which the cake is made (which latter stands in direct subsidiary relation to the sacrifice); in the same way as the animal (offered in the animal sacrifice) stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrifice in consequence of its being the original substance from which the parts actually offered

viz. the heart etc. are taken.—In the passage “he is to buy the soma by means of a tawny, one year old (cow)” the quality of being tawny is by the direct enunciation of the third case affix shown to stand in subsidiary relation to the act of buying; this subsidiary relation takes here place by (the quality’s) defining a substance viz. the cow, not directly; the latter not being possible on account of the immateriality of a mere quality.—Again in the passage “he sprinkles the rice-grains with water” the sprinkling stands in subsidiary relation to the rice-grains, as appears from the direct enunciation of the second case affix. And, it is to be observed, this sprinkling is not for the sake of the rice-grains considered in themselves as they would be perfect without the sprinkling, but has the purpose of bringing about the transcendental result (*apúrva*), which would not be brought about were the sacrifice performed without sprinkling the rice grains with water. In the same manner it is to be understood with reference to all subsidiaries that the subsidiary relation has the purpose of contributing towards bringing about the transcendental result.—Let us take another passage. “Thus I seized this bridle of the right; with these words he is to take hold of the bridle of the horse.” Here the direct enunciation of the second case affix shows the mantra to stand in a subsidiary relation to the bridle of the horse.<sup>(1)</sup>—Or another passage. “When he offers the oblation in the *áhavaniya*-fire.” Here the seventh case affix shows that the *áhavaniya* stands in auxiliary relation to the

(1) The above quoted example seems hardly to fall under the category of *śruti* but rather under *vākya*; which opinion as we see from the commentary was actually held by some teachers. The commentary says “some teachers maintain that the application (of the mantra to the action of taking the bridle of the horse) is founded on *vākya*. Others however object to this assumption and maintain that, in consequence of *hūga* having greater force than *vākya*, *hūga* would settle the mantra’s standing in subsidiary relation to a bridle in general before *vākya* could establish its exclusive relation to the bridle of the horse. Those however who suppose the application of the mantra to be founded on *vākya* defend their opinion by maintaining that the mantra does not point to a bridle in general but to the bridle of the right i. e. the horse which is an instrument to bring about the right and that therefore the mantra is to be applied to the taking of the horse’s bridle in consequence of the *vākya* “*aśvābhidhānum ādatte*” which is merely assisted by *hūga*—The author of the text (i. e. *Laugākshi-Bhāskara*) however does not admit that a *hūga* in the mantra points to some peculiar kind of bridle (rather than to the bridle in general).

offering.—Thus in other cases too direct statement by means of case-affixes points out the proper application (of subsidiary matters).

(We now proceed to the two other kinds of *viniyoktrī śruti*). In the sentence “*paśunā yajeta*” “he is to sacrifice by means of an animal” direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which singularity and masculinity stand to the *kāraka*; while again direct statement by means of one denotative word points out the subsidiary relation in which the number expressed by the verbal termination of “*yajeta*” stands to the *bhāvanā*. On the other hand direct statement by means of one *pada* points out that this number stands in subsidiary relation to the sacrificial action (for the sacrificial action as well as the singular number is expressed by the one *pada* “*yajeta*.”)

Nor is the following objection to be raised “how can the immaterial number stand in subsidiary relation to the *bhāvanā*?”; for this is possible in consequence of the number defining an agent. This agent again is to be supplied by inference. For the verb expresses the *bhāvanā* only; but the *bhāvanā* can not take place without an agent and therefore it leads to the inference of the latter.

Direct enunciation is stronger than suggestive power (*liṅga*) and the other proofs (by which one thing is shown to be subsidiary to another); for in cases where the subsidiary relation is established by suggestive power there is no verbal statement to be found which would directly teach the application (of a secondary matter to a primary one), but such a statement has to be formed (*viz.* from the sentence containing the *liṅga*); and in as far as in the latter case an applicatory injunction has to be assumed while in the case of direct enunciation such a one is already actually existing, the power of *liṅga* etc. which is founded on an assumption is set aside by the power of the direct enunciation. For this reason we do not conclude at once on the ground of suggestive power that a verse (apparently) addressed to Indra (*i. e.* a verse containing a mention of Indra’s name or one of his attributes etc.) is really to be used for addressing Indra; but rather decide if we find at the same time a direct enunciation as *f. i.* “with a verse bearing Indra’s mark he addresses the *Gārhapatya*” that in consequence of the direct enun-

ciation of the second case termination (*gūṛhapatyam*) the verse is subsidiary to the act of addressing the *Gūṛhapatya*-fire.(1)

Power residing in words (the power words possess to denote or point out something) is called *līṅga*. As it is said "the power of all words is named *līṅga*". By power the same thing is understood as by the technical term *rūḍhi* (conventional meaning ; i. e. a word has the power of denoting that thing as whose name it has been settled by convention and tradition) and it can therefore not be said that *līṅga* does not differ from *saṁākhyā* (name); for *līṅga* which bases altogether on conventional meaning is different from name (*saṁākhyā*) which consists in words the meaning of which is to be made out from the meaning of their constituent parts. Therefore the mantra "I cut grass for the seat of the gods" can only be taken as being subsidiary to the cutting of *kuśa*-grass and not to the cutting of *ulapa*-grass and other kinds of grass, since from the power residing in the words "I cut etc." it appears that the mantra is able to declare the cutting of *kuśa*-grass only.(2)

In the same manner in other places too the application of a subsidiary matter is to be learned from suggestive power.

Power (*līṅga*) has greater force than syntactical connexion (*vākya*) and the following means of proof. Let us take for an example the following mantra "I make a pleasant seat for thee, I make it very lovely with a stream of ghee ; on this, the immortal one, sit down, repose on it propitiously minded o marrow of the rice-grains". Here the first half of the mantra (I make a pleasant seat—ghee) is to be considered as subsidiary to the act of making

(1) The quoted *śloka* is "sometimes thou art not hantān, Indra, but earnest to the worshippa" etc.; a verse which as mentioning Indra would be considered as connected with the worship of Indra, were it not for the direct statement referring it to the adoration of the *Gūṛhapatya*. The decision in favour of *śruti* as possessing greater force than *līṅga* rests on the principle that on the basis of *līṅga* an injunction may be constructed containing a direct statement (in the above case "andramatreṇa mīḥam upatishṭhet"), that however a direct statement actually found in the text (*andryā gūṇapatyam upatishṭhate*) has greater force than one constructed.

(2) The example of *līṅga* given in the text does not come in very appropriately after the remark on the difference of *līṅga* and *saṁākhyā* as *saṁākhyā* has nothing whatever to do with it. The passage is discussed as giving rise to a doubt in the *Mīm. Sūtr* ; but the doubt is whether words like *barhis* are to be taken in their *mukhya* (primary) sense only or also in their *gaṇa* (secondary) or derived sense.

a seat for the sacrificial cake, on account of the power of the words 'I make a seat', and (the decision to what act the different parts of the mantra are subsidiary) is not to be made according to syntactical connexion (In the above mantra the two halves form one syntactical whole, the connexion being effected by the word "tasmin" (on this) beginning the second half. It might therefore be maintained that the whole undivided mantra is subsidiary to one act, either the making of a seat for the cake or the placing of the cake on the seat; or else that both acts are to be accompanied by the whole mantra. But here *līṅga* steps in and shows that one half belongs to the preparation of a seat and the other half to the placing of the cake).

By sentence or syntactical connexion (*vākya*) we understand common employment and by this term we understand the connected enunciation of two words denoting two things which in reality stand to each other in the relation of principal and subsidiary although this is not indicated by second case affixes etc. directly indicating the one of the two things to be the thing to be accomplished by the other etc. (which relations are directly indicated by *vibhakti-śruti* etc.) Take f. i. the passage "he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parṇa-wood hears no evil sound." Here we see from the connected enunciation of the quality of consisting of parṇa-wood and the ladle that the former stands in subsidiary relation to the latter. Nor is it to be said that the circumstance of being made of parṇa-wood is purposeless as the ladle could be made also in a different way (i. e. from some other kind of wood). For the word ladle intimates at the same time the peculiar transcendental result to be accomplished by it (by a ladle made of parṇa-wood). So that the sense of the passage is "By its being made of parṇa-wood he is to realize the peculiar transcendental result connected with the ladle, by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel (by *avadāna*). As it thus appears that if the ladle is made of parṇa-wood then the transcendental result to be brought about by it ensues and not in any other case the circumstance of its consisting of parṇa-wood is not purposeless. The phrase "by means of carrying in it the oblation after it has been taken out of the vessel by *avadāna*" (i. e. the



last clause of this phrase) is necessarily to be used as otherwise the quality of being made of parṇa-wood might be extended to sruva, srūk etc. also ( for these implements also might be denoted by the word "juhú"—explained as a yaugika "húyate'nayá"—and in them also the oblation is carried, but not when it has been taken out of the vessel in the manner called avadána).

This quality of the ladle of being made of parṇa-wood although it is given in the text in a detached rule (anárabhyádhíta ; a rule which stands by itself, out of connexion with some particular sacrifice to which it might be referred ; so that it must be considered as a general rule) is to be referred only to all the fundamental forms of the sacrifice (prakṛiti) not to their modifications (vikṛiti); for with regard to the latter it is already settled by an express rule (viz. by the general principle that a modification is to be performed in the same way as the fundamental form of which it is a modification) and thus there would be a useless repetition (if we directly referred the statement about the ladle having to be made of parṇa-wood to the modifications also).

A fundamental form of the sacrifice (prakṛiti) is that one where we find a set of direct rules extending over all the subsidiary things ( requisite for the sacrifice). Of this nature is f. i. the darśapáṇṇamāsa-sacrifice, in immediate connexion with which we find all the requisite subsidiary matters stated in the text—A mere modification (vikṛiti) on the other hand is that form of sacrifice where there are no direct rules with regard to the subsidiary matters, as f. i. the oblation made to Súrya ( sauryam charum mr-vapet ; there some of the subsidiaries are settled (not by direct rules given for this special sacrifice but) by transfer (atideśa; by transferring or extending the rules given for the fundamental form to the modification) Detached injunctions are injunctions of general validity ( while rules which are not detached but under the influence of some prakaraṇa refer to that particular sacrifice only with which the prakaraṇa connects them).

Syntactical connexion as a means of settling subsidiary relation is of greater weight than prakaraṇa and the rest. Thus f. i. with regard to the mantra ( forming a part of the súktaváka ) "o Indrá-  
gní you accepted this offering etc". This whole manṭra is on ac-

count of its forming one syntactical whole to be taken as subsidiary to the newmoon-sacrifice only and not, on account of prakaraṇa, as subsidiary to the fullmoon-sacrifice as well. (The sūktavāka belongs by prakaraṇa to the darśa-sacrifice as well as to the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice. It however contains mantras which by their līṅga are marked as belonging to either of these two sacrifices exclusively; so f. i. the mantra “indrāgnī idam havir ajushetām avīridhetām mahojyāyo'krātām” which by the word “indrāgnī” is shown not to be applicable to the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice. It might however be maintained that it is sufficient to leave out the one word “indrāgnī” and that then the remainder of the mantra is to be used at the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice too, with which it is connected by prakaraṇa. This opinion however is impugned by the Mīmāṃsists who maintain that the syntactical connexion binding “indrāgnī” to the remainder of the mantra is stronger than prakaraṇa and that consequently the whole mantra has to be left out at the pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice.)

Prakarāṇa means interdependence (ubhayākāṅkshā; mutual desire; mutual want of a complement). An example is afforded by the following passage connected with the prayājas “he is to offer the samidh”. As in this passage no special fruit (of the offering) is mentioned, the sense merely being “he is to realize by means of offering the samidh”, there arises the question “what (is he to realize)?” originating in the want of something to which the offering of the samidh might contribute. And again after the passage about the darśapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice has given rise to the idea “he is to realize paradise by means of the darśapūrṇamāsa” there arises the question “how (is he to realize paradise)?” originating in the want of something which may contribute towards bringing about the desired result. And thus by mutual interdependence the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas stand to the darśapūrṇamāsa is established.—This prakaraṇa is of two kinds, great prakaraṇa (mahāprakaraṇa) and included prakaraṇa (avāntara-prakaraṇa). By the former is to be understood that kind of prakaraṇa which refers to the principal bhāvanā (i. e. the energy productive of the fruit of the entire sacrificial action). This great prakaraṇa establishes f. i. the subsidiary relation in which the prayājas etc.

stand to the *daśapūrṇamāsa*. Great *prakaraṇa* takes place with reference to the fundamental forms ( *prakṛiti* ) of the sacrifice only, as there only the relation of interdependence or mutual want is found ( viz. if a fundamental form of the sacrifice is enjoined there arises at once the want of subsidiaries by means of which the sacrifice can be accomplished : at the same time statements regarding subsidiaries give rise to the question to what sacrifice these subsidiaries belong ) . The case is different with regard to the modifications ( of the fundamental forms ). For there, by the principle of transfer expressed in the words "a modification is to be carried out in the same manner as its fundamental form" the want of something indicating how the action is to be performed is already satisfied and it is therefore impossible that the proper application of the new subsidiaries should be settled by interdependence (there being in this case no mutual want, but a want on one side only viz. on the side of the subsidiaries.) Therefore the application of the new subsidiaries is in the case of a modification settled by place ( *sthāna* ) only, not by *prakaraṇa*.—By included *prakaraṇa* is to be understood *prakaraṇa* connected with the creative energy belonging to the subsidiary parts of the sacrifice. Included *prakaraṇa* f. i. establishes the subsidiary relation in which the act of stepping forward ( *abdhikramana* ) stands to the oblations called *prayājas*. *Prakarana* of this kind is only known by the circumstance of an injunction being inserted in the middle of two others ( *sandamśa* ; the inserted injunction being grasped as it were by the two encompassing injunctions as by the two limbs of a pair of tongs). For if this peculiar position is not found all the subsidiaries mentioned (among them the stepping forward) would be taken as expressing the mode of action of the energy productive of the general result (of the sacrifice) and would then be subsidiary to the principal action (as the *prayājas* are). By the term *sandamśa* is to be understood the position of an injunction between two subsidiaries enjoined with reference to some one subsidiary. An example is furnished by the act of advancing ( towards the *āhavanīya* ; which forms a part of the sacrificial action of offering the *prayājas*). For

( , *Atānya* in this context means simply "new", the subsidiaries which do not belong to the *prakṛiti* but to the *vikṛiti* only.

there at first a matter subsidiary to the prayájas is mentioned in the words "he is to pour (the butter) out of the upabhrít (into the juhú); for splendour etc."; (after that comes the passage "he for whom knowing this the prayájas are offered pushes his enemies out of these worlds; stepping forward he is to offer them for victory"); and after this passage again a matter subsidiary to the prayájas is enjoined in the words "he who knows the coupling of the prayájas etc". For this reason the stepping forward which is mentioned in the middle of two things subsidiary to the prayájas is to be considered as itself subsidiary to the latter.<sup>(1)</sup> For after the idea has arisen that a contribution towards the sacrifice is to be made by means of bringing about a transcendental result by the prayájas, there arises the question "how is the transcendental result to be brought about by means of the prayájas?" and this want of something teaching the mode of action is satisfied by the stepping forward etc which actions are enjoined in the middle of matters subsidiary to the prayájas. Nor can the objection be raised that the productive energy connected with the subsidiaries does not stand in need of a mode of action being pointed out; for such a need actually exists this particular kind of productive energy participating in the general nature of productive energy.

Prakarāṇa directly teaches the application of actions only, and only by means of the latter the application of materials, qualities (which are connected with the actions). When f. i. with regard to the energy tending towards the realization of a certain fruit expressed in the passage "he who desires paradise is to sacrifice" the want of some mode how to bring about the result arises we have to take the set of actions which are mentioned in the sacred text in proximity to the above passage and with regard to which no fruit is mentioned (for if some special fruit were mentioned the set of actions could no longer be considered subsidiary to some other action); this set of actions which stands itself in need of something towards which it might contribute is to be connected with the above passage as indicating the mode of action.

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(1) For a different argumentation with regard to the same passage see J. N. M. V. p. 100.—The practical issue of the decision is that only the person concerned with the prayájas has to step forward and not all those engaged in the darsapúṇamāsa.

That actions only can satisfy the want of the mode of procedure is a matter of common experience. For if with regard to sentences like "the hand is to cleave by means of the axe" the question is asked "how (is the cleaving performed)?" the proper answer does not lie in the word "hand" although enunciated, but rather in the raising and lowering of the axe, the sense being "he is to cleave by raising and lowering the axe by means of the hand"; and thus the hand is connected with the act of cleaving only by means of the raising and lowering as is known to every body.

Prakarāṇa has greater weight than position (sthāna) and the following means of proof. For this reason the acts like dicing etc. which are enjoined in the passage "he is to play at dice with a Rājanya" are, although they are read in the holy text in proximity to the abhiśeehanīya-ceremony and therefore would on the ground of position be subsidiary to the latter, in reality subsidiary to the rājasūya-sacrifice on the ground of prakarāṇa.

By position (sthāna) is to be understood equality of place. It is of two kinds, being either equality of place according to the text (pāthasādeśya) or equality of place according to the performance (anushthānasādeśya). The term "krama" (order of succession) has the same meaning as sthāna (position).

Equality of place according to the text again is of two different kinds, being either text according to number or else text according to proximity.

An example of text according to number is offered by the following passages "he spreads a cake on eleven potsherds to Indrāgni" and "he spreads a cake on twelve potsherds to Viśvānara". With regard to these passages which are found in the text in the given order the application of the yājñya and anuvākya mantras (indrāgni rocharā divah etc.) is settled according to "text according to number" i. e. the first mantra is applied to the first sacrificial action, the second mantra to the second action. For if with regard to the mantra read in the first place the question arises 'to what purpose does it serve?', the sacrificial action enjoined in the first place presents itself first as they both occupy corresponding places. And so with regard to the second mantra also.—That things subsidiary to a modification, which things are enjoined with refer-

ence to subsidiaries of a fundamental form and stand in the middle of two injunctions, belong to the modification is to be concluded from "text according to proximity." So f. i. in the case of the oblations called *ámanahomas* (Taitt. S. II. 3. 9). For as with regard to them the want of something to which they may refer arises, the transcendental result consequent on a certain modified form of the sacrifice naturally connects itself as fruit (with these oblations), because this modified form readily presents itself (the modified form of the sacrifice which is mentioned in the holy text close by the *ámana-homas* is the *kámye-shṭi* the originative injunction of which is contained in the words "*vaiśvadevīm sámgrahanīm nirvaped grámakámaḥ*").—If on the other hand (instead of the named oblations being considered subsidiary to a certain modification) an independent fruit were assumed for them (they being considered to produce a special *apúrva* of their own) their being mentioned in the sacred text in immediate proximity to some modified form would be purposeless—

Equality of place according to the performance shows t. i. that the different details stated with regard to the sacrificial animal refer to the animal sacrificed to *Agní-homan*: for the sacrifice of the animal offered to *Agní-homan* is performed on the *aupavasa-thya* day and on the same day (i. e. among the description of the ceremonies to be performed on that day) the details concerning the animal sacrifice are stated. And as now there arises the want of something towards which these details might contribute the transcendental result produced by the animal sacrifice which presents itself as something to be achieved naturally connects itself as that which is to be realized (by means of these details).—Position (*sthána*) is of greater weight than *samákhyá* (name). For this reason the mantra about purification (*śundhadhvaṃ daiváya karmāṇe* etc.) stands in subsidiary relation to the *sámáyya*-vessel only as it is read in proximity to these vessels, and does not on account of the title "*pauroḍáśikam*" (i. e. referring to the sacrificial cake; the name of that chapter which treats of the offering of the sacrificial cake) stand in subsidiary relation to all the vessels connected with the sacrificial cake.

By 'name' ( *samákhyá* ) are to be understood words the meaning of

which is found by decomposing them into their elements (yangikah śabdah).—It is of two kinds belonging either to the language of the Veda or to common language. An example of the former kind is furnished by the vedic term “hotrichamasah”, from which we conclude that the hotri stands in subsidiary relation to the drinking of (the contents of) the cup called chamasa. (The term “chamasa” which has to be derived from the root cham “to sip” and signifies the cup from which the soma is drunk shows that the soma contained in the cup is to be drunk by the hotri; for which circumstance a more direct rule is not given). The word “ādhvaryava” on the other hand which belongs to common language points out that the adhvaryu stands in subsidiary relation to different things (mentioned in the ādhvaryava kāṇḍa).<sup>(1)</sup> This is a short statement of the power of samākhyā.

Thus we have shortly explained the six means of proof, direct enunciation etc., assisted by which injunctions of application—as f. i. he is to offer the darśapūrnamāsa-sacrifice contributing towards it with the samidhs etc.—teach the proper application of subsidiary matters. These subsidiaries are of two kinds being either accomplished things or actions. By accomplished things we understand species (jāti), substances (dravya), numbers (samkhyā) etc.<sup>(2)</sup> All these have a visible purpose only. Subsidiary actions are again of two different kinds, being either secondary (guṇakarma) or primary (pradhānakarma). These same two classes of actions are also called actions contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step (sannipatyopakāraka) and actions contributing (towards the general result) immediately or directly (ārādupakāraka). By actions of the former kind we understand actions enjoined with reference to some substance etc. which latter is itself subsidiary to some other action. Of this kind are f. i. the beating of the rice-grains (in order to detach them from the husks), sprinkling with water etc. These actions

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(1) By “common language” we have to understand the technical terms used by the yājñikas, in so far as they are not found in the text of the Veda itself.

(2) Species as f. i. the generic character of an animal which is offered as a sacrifice; substances like rice-grains etc; number as f. i. the singularity, duality etc of the things used for the sacrifice—All these contribute towards the accomplishment of the svarūpa, the outward form of the sacrifice.

are either such as have a seen effect or such as have an unseen effect or such as have a seen as well as an unseen effect. To the first class belongs f. i. the beating of the rice-grains ( the effect of which is their being detached from the husks ); to the second class belongs f. i. the sprinkling with water ( which does not produce a visible effect on the rice-grains ); to the third class belong ( the actions referring to ) the animal, the sacrificial cake etc., for these actions produce an unseen result in as far as they comprise the offering of a certain material ( viz. the material offered in the sacrifice ), while at the same time in as far as they are performed with regard to a certain divinity they produce a visible result viz. the remembrance of the divinity.<sup>(1)</sup> By an action contributing directly (árádupakáraka) we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As f. i. the prayájās. Such actions are of use only in originating the highest transcendental result (paramápúrva; the transcendental result produced by the sacrificial action in its totality ); while the actions contributing through an intermediate step are of use also for the outward form of the sacrifice by means of their producing a modification (saṃskára) of the material of the sacrifice and of the divinity ( whereby they produce the so-called utpatty-apúrva ).<sup>(2)</sup> The same kind of actions are also called inherent actions ( áśrayi-karma ; viz. inherent in some substance, divinity etc. ).—Herewith we have given a short account of the injunctions of application.

Prayoga-vidhi, injunction of performance, is that injunction which intimates speediness of performance. This kind of injunction ( is not a separate one, there being no passages which are merely prayogavidhi and nothing else but ) consists simply in the injunction of the main sacrificial action ( as f. i. “ he who is desirous of paradise is to offer the darśapúrṇamāsa-sacrifice ” )

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(1) For the sacrifice is the parting with a certain substance (dravyatyága) with a view to—or aiming at—a certain divinity (devatoddeśena).—Regarding the relation of the different kinds of actions to the apúrva cp. J. N. M. V. p. 57.

(2) On the different kinds of apúrva see—in addition to J. N. M. V. p. 57—the instructive article अपूर्व in Goldstücker's Sanskrit Dictionary. It is however hardly correct to render “apúrva”, as G. does, by “the unseen or transcendental power of a religious or sacrificial act which produces the desired result at another time etc.”; for apúrva is not the power of producing a result but a result itself.



which forms one syntactical whole with the sentences enjoining subsidiary things (the prayájas etc.): for this (injunction of the main action etc.) causing the execution of the main action with all its subsidiaries enjoins speediness of the performance which latter expression means as much as absence of delay (or pause), as there is no special means of proof for delay. Nor must it be objected that there also is no special means of proof for the absence of delay. For if (the things enjoined in the different injunctions were to be done) with delay, they could not be done connectedly (together: *saha*) and that they are to be done connectedly is understood from the circumstance of the injunctions referring to the chief action and its subsidiaries forming one syntactical whole. Just as we see that in common life two things which are done with delay (as f. i. the one thing to-day the other to-morrow) are never said to be done "together" (or "connectedly"). This absence of delay is obtained when a fixed order is followed: for otherwise there arise doubts regarding the order of consecution of the different actions and the whole performance is spoiled. Therefore an injunction of performance enjoins, for the purpose of bringing about speediness of the performance of what it enjoins, at the same time a fixed order which order is to be taken as a special attribute of the things enjoined (if it were not taken as a mere attribute of the things enjoined but as an independent thing the prayogavidhi would be open to the reproach of vákyabheda). For this reason "injunction of performance" is also defined as that injunction which teaches the order of the subsidiaries. By "order" (*krama*) we understand a particular kind of extension or rather (extension being applicable to coexistent things too) the relation of (different things) being earlier and later with regard to each other. For settling this order of succession (of different actions) we have six means of proof, viz direct enunciation (*śruti*), sense (*artha*), text (*páṭha*), position (*sthāna*), principal matter (*mukhya*), procedure (*pravṛtti*). By direct enunciation (*śruti*) we understand any passage whose purport it is to intimate order of succession. It is of two kinds, having either the purport of intimating merely order of succession or the purport of intimating something particulariz-

ed by order of succession. An example of the former kind is the passage "having prepared the veda he is to prepare the vedi"; this passage merely has the purport of intimating an order of succession; for the preparation of the vedi is already taught by another passage. (The śruti in the above quoted passage is contained in the suffix *ktvā* of *kṛtvā*—*vedam kṛtvā vediṃ karoti*. The passage contains the statement of the relative order of preparation of veda and vedi, in the way of *anuvāda* to those other passages which have the purpose of enjoining the preparation of the two mentioned things independent of their relative order in time). On the other hand the passage "the first draught belongs to the Vashaṭ-karṭri" has the purpose of enjoining a thing (viz. drinking) particularized by a certain order; for it can not be taken as enjoining order only with reference to the drinking because this would involve a break of the unity of syntactical construction. (The passage must be taken as containing information of a double nature as there is no other passage enjoining the act of drinking by the vashaṭ-karṭri. It might now be maintained that it enjoins two altogether different things, firstly the drinking, secondly the place of this act with regard to other acts. But as this assumption would involve *vākyabheda*, it is thought more proper to declare that the passage enjoins only one thing particularized by a second one.—(Cp. the analogous case of "somena yajeta"). Direct enunciation has greater weight than the other means of proof, because the latter obtain their authority only by means of a direct statement founded on them being constructed. For this reason the cup devoted to the *āśvinau* is offered in the tenth place (among the cups offered during the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) because there is the direct statement "the cup for the *Āśvinau* is to be offered as the tenth"; although one might think that is to be offered as the third according to the order in which the cups are mentioned in the sacred text. (Starting from the *aindravāyava* graha we find the *āśvina* graha mentioned in the third place, *Taitt. S. I. 4. 6*; *VI. 4. 9*, so that according to *pāṭha* it ought to be offered in the third place; but the direct statement contained in the word "tenth" of the passage quoted above is stronger than *pāṭha* and settles the order of performance.—The

principle according to which the order of precedence of the different means of proof is determined in the case of krama is the same as the one followed in the case of the means of proof assisting viniyoga-vidhi. In the present example f. i. we might, on the ground of the ásvina graha being mentioned in the text in the third place, construct an injunction containing a śruti viz. "he is to offer the ásvina graha in the third place", the silent presumption being that such an arrangement would not be impossible, not against artha, which latter must be satisfied before we can pass from páṭha to śruti. But this constructed injunction would be met and invalidated by an injunction found ready in the holy text viz. "the cup for the ásvinau is offered in the tenth place").—That order of succession which is settled according to the demands of the purpose ( for which different actions are performed ) is called order according to the sense. As f. i. the relative order of the agnihotra-offering and the cooking of rice-gruel; to which actions the two passages "he is to offer the agnihotra" and "he is to cook the rice-gruel" refer. For as the rice-gruel serves the purpose of the agnihotra its cooking, according to the demands of the purpose, is to be accomplished first.—This order of succession according to the sense is stronger than order of succession according to the text. For if, the purpose as a means whereby to settle order of succession being set aside, the actions were performed according to the order of the text the cooking of the rice-gruel could merely have an unseen purpose, for if done after the oblation it could not serve any visible purpose. ( But this would run counter to the general principle of never assuming an unseen purpose when a visible one can be established; hence the decision. —The order of succession of sentences which intimate certain things is called order of succession according to the text and according to it the order of succession of the things themselves is settled. For the sentences following upon each other in the text in a certain order produce when being read the ideas of the things ( of which they treat ) in the same order and according to the order of the ideas the order of the execution of the things is settled.—This text ( páṭha ) is twofold, text of the mantras and text of the Bráhmaṇa-passages. The order f. i.

which is settled for the cake offered to Agni and the cake offered to Agnīshomau by means of the order in which the yájya and anuvákya mantras are read in the text, is founded upon mantra-text. (The injunction referring to the agnīshomīya-cake is found in the second anuváka of the Taittirīya-bráhmaṇa, while the passage enjoining the ágneya cake occurs in the third anuváka. From this it might be concluded that at the fullmoon-sacrifice the agnīshomīya cake is to be offered before the ágneya cake. The order however of the mantras accompanying the two offerings, as found in the mantra-káṇḍa, establishes the contrary.) Mantra-text is of greater weight than bráhmaṇa-text, because the mantra text is more intimately connected with the actual performance of the sacrifice than the bráhmaṇa-text. For the latter gives to understand that such and such a thing is to be done, outside of the sacrifice (during which the bráhmaṇa-text is not itself of actual use) and has thereby accomplished its purpose. The mantras on the other hand are actually employed at the time of the performance of the sacrifice the order of the performance depending on the order in which the single parts of the performance are remembered and as the order of remembrance again depends on the order of the mantras (whose property it is to remind one), the mantra-text forms an essential part of the performance of the sacrifice.—The order of succession of the prayájas which is derived from the order of the text of certain injunctions (viz. “he offers the samidhs” “he offers tanúnápát” etc.) is based on the order of the bráhmaṇa-text. For although the bráhmaṇa-passages may be said to have fulfilled their purpose by enjoining a certain thing, nevertheless—in the absence of some other passage pointing out the order of succession of the prayájas etc., the same bráhmaṇa-passages are to be accepted as pointing out the order of the succession as well.<sup>(1)</sup>—By “position” (sthána) is to be understood presentation, presenting one’s self (upasthiti) for if at the place of something (as f. i. in the example given below at the place of the savanīya) something else is performed (as f. i. the ag-

(1) The commentary here takes a different view and maintains, as it appears rightly, that the order of succession of the prayájas is founded on mantra-text, not bráhmaṇa-text.

nīshomīya and ānubandhya in the sacrifice called sādyaśkra), that mentioned something (f. i. the savanīya) presents itself first after the thing by which it is regularly preceded (f. i. the āśvinagrahaṇa) has been performed and it is therefore proper that it should be performed first. For this reason in the soma-sacrifice called sādyaśkra where the three animal sacrifices viz. the agnīshomīya, the savanīya and the ānubandhya have to be performed together (i. e. in immediate consecution) in the place of the savanīya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the fundamental form—the agnīshṭoma—the savanīya alone is offered) the savanīya animal has to be offered first, the two others afterwards, as in that place after the offering of the āśvina cup the savanīya first presents itself to the mind. For to the jyotiśṭoma (of which the sādyaśkra is a modification) belong three animal sacrifices, the agnīshomīya, the savanīya and the ānubandhya. These three have different places, the agnīshomīya being offered on the upavasatha-day, the savanīya at the time of the pressing of the soma and the ānubandhya at the end of the sacrifice. Sādyaśkra now is the name of a particular somasacrifice which on account of its indefiniteness (i. e. on account of no special divinity being mentioned with regard to it) is to be considered as a mere modification of the jyotiśṭoma. Therefore the three animal sacrifices are established for the sādyaśkra also by the original injunction (which establishes them for the prakṛiti-form i. e. the agnīshṭoma and which has to be transferred to the different vikṛitis also). That there they have to be performed together (not on different days) is seen from the direct statement “he offers the animals together.” This common sacrifice of the three animals has to be performed at the place of the savanīya (i. e. at that point of the sacrifice where in the case of the agnīshṭoma the savanīya alone is offered) since that place is near to the principal sacrificial action (of all somasacrifices viz. the pressing of the soma) and since the fault of some of the animal sacrifices being removed from their proper places is the same (on whatever day they may be performed together). For if the three sacrifices are performed at the place of the savanīya, only the agnīshomīya and the ānubandhya are removed from their proper places; while in the case of the three sacrifices being performed

either on the day of the agnīshomīya or on the day of the ānubandhya all three are removed from their proper places (for if they are performed on the day of the agnīshomīya paśu the latter itself can not be said to have its proper place as it thereby is removed from the pressing of the soma proximity to which becomes indispensable as soon as the injunction of all the three sacrifices having to be performed together is observed; the same reasoning if applied to the ānubandhya-paśu shows that the ānubandhya-day is not the proper one).<sup>(1)</sup> As we now read in the description of the fundamental form (of the sadyaskra i. e. the jyotiṣṭoma) “having done the āśvina cup and having tied round the sacrificial post with a thrice-twisted string he leads on the savanīya paśu” and thereby see that the sacrifice of the savanīya paśu is enjoined after the taking of the āśvina cup, the savanīya presents itself to the mind also in the sadyaskra immediately after the taking of the āśvina cup and thus, according to position (sthāna) it is proper that it should be performed first. The two other animal sacrifices have to be performed after the savanīya in the manner explained (viz. in the first pāda of Adhy. V of the Mīmāṃsā, where the commentators state that the agnīshomīya has to precede the ānubandhya).—By order founded on the principal matter (mukhya) we understand the order of the subsidiary matters belonging to some performance in as far as it is settled by the order of the principal matters. For in whatever order the principal matters are performed in the same order the subsidiary matters belonging to them are performed, since in this manner all subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matters in the same degree. If on the contrary the subsidiary matters were performed in an inverse order (compared with the order of the principal matters) the consequence would be that some subsidiary matters would be

(1) For the details of the lengthy and unimportant discussion referring to the sthānātikramasāmīya see the commentary on the Arthasamgraha in the lithographed Benares edition (It is to be remarked that the text of the mūla of the passage is very incorrect in the lithographed edition a piece of the commentary having got mixed up with it)—In the Jaim. N. M V. the pradhānasomapratyāṅgi is the only—and quite sufficient—reason for the three animals being sacrificed on the sadyā-day.—In Goisṭücker's edition of J. N. M V. p. 224 l. 3 read °छाभात् । तेष.

as near as possible to their principal matters and others again as far away as possible; and this would of course be improper, as it would interfere with the connectedness of actions intimated by the injunction of performance. Therefore the order of succession of the principal things determines the order of the subsidiaries as well. Thus f. i. a part of the (ghee which is the) remainder of the pra-yájas is at first poured over the oblation to Agni and after that another portion over the sour milk offered to Indra, because the sacrifice to Agni precedes in time the sacrifice to Indra. In this manner the two acts of pouring ghee are separated from the principal actions to which they belong (viz. the offering of the two oblations) in the same manner viz. by one intervening act (1. pouring of ghee on the ágneya oblation 2. pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation 3. offering of the ágneya 4. offering of the aindra); while in the case of the reverse order being adopted for the pouring of ghee the pouring of ghee on the ágneya and the offering of the ágneya would follow on each other immediately and on the other hand the pouring of ghee on the aindra oblation and the offering of the aindra oblation would be separated from each other by two intervening acts (viz. the pouring of ghee on the ágneya and the offering of the ágneya); and this, as already remarked, would be improper. Order founded on the principal matter is weaker than order according to the text (páthakrama); for the former determines the order (of the sacrificial acts) in a retarded manner only because it depends on the determination of the order of the principal actions which determination itself depends on some other means of proof. Order according to the text on the other hand is of a different kind as it merely depends on the order of the text as it is found in the Veda, which latter order is independent of anything else; it is therefore of greater weight.—On the other hand it is of greater authority than order founded on procedure (pravṛitti); for in the case of order founded on procedure many subsidiary matters are distant from the principal matter while they are near to it in the case of mukhya krama (about pravṛitti-krama see further on).

If in the case of several principal matters (or actions) being performed together and the subsidiary actions connected with

them having to be performed *seriatim*, the order of succession of the second, third etc. subsidiary actions is regulated according to the order of the subsidiary action performed first, that order of succession is called order according to procedure (*pravṛitti*). So f. i. in the case of the subsidiary actions connected with the animal sacrifices offered to Prajāpati (during the *vájapeya* where seventeen animals are offered to Prajāpati), with regard to which we read "having offered the *vaiśvadeva* oblation they proceed with the animals for Prajāpati". In this sentence the animals meant for Prajāpati are, as pointed out by the third case termination, enjoined, together with the actions constituting the mode of procedure, as having to be offered at one time. Consequently they (the sacrifices of the animals) as well as the subsidiary actions connected therewith as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. (of the victims) have to be performed together (or connectedly, *saha*). This performing together becomes, with regard to (the actual sacrifice of) the *prajāpatya* animals, possible by performing the actual sacrifice (of all of them) at the same time as one divinity (*viz.* Prajāpati) is fixed (for all of them).<sup>(1)</sup> On the other hand it is impossible to perform all the subsidiary actions as the leading on, the tying to the sacrificial post etc. at the same time and the only method of performing them *together* is therefore to perform them in such a manner as to separate the subsidiary actions to the least possible degree from the principal actions. For this end one performs at first the leading on of one animal and after that the leading on of the second and follows the same order with regard to the tying to the post etc. And thus selecting from among the animals about to be offered to Prajāpati a certain one, one begins with it and performs the same subsidiary action with regard to all animals; after this one performs the second subsidiary action on the same animal on which the first one had been performed and again proceeds following the same order with regard to all other animals. The order of succession determined according to this principle is called order of succession according

(1) The Comm. remarks that another reading is "*sampratipannadevatākālatvena*", and that the time meant is the time after the performance of the *vaiśvadevī* while the divinity is Prajāpati.



to procedure. It is of less weight than order of succession founded on direct statement etc.—Herewith we have given a short account of injunction of performance by defining the six different kinds of order of succession.

By injunction of claim or qualification (*adhikāravidhi*) we understand that kind of injunction which intimates the ownership with regard to some result which is brought about by some action. By "ownership" we understand the position of one who enjoys the result.—To this class of injunctions belongs f. i. the passage "he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice"; which passage while it enjoins the sacrifice with regard to paradise intimates the state of enjoyment of the result consequent on the sacrificial action by him who is desirous of paradise.—Another example is the passage "he whose houses Agni should burn down after he has constructed the holy fires, is to offer to the merciful Agni a cake on eight potsherds." This passage enjoining a certain sacrificial action on the occasion of a conflagration etc. intimates the ownership of him who acts on the mentioned occasion with regard to a result which consists in averting a calamity and which is produced by the sacrificial action.—In the same way the passage "he is daily to perform the *sandhyā*" intimates the ownership of him who leads a pure life, observing the proper times for all his duties, with regard to a fruit viz. the avoidance of disaster which ensues on the proper performance of the *sandhyā*.

This kind of ownership with regard to some result belongs to him only who is distinguished by the necessary qualification (*adhikāra*). By qualification we understand that which, in the passages containing injunctions, is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of the person (whom the injunction concerns). This is, in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for the fulfillment of a certain wish, the wish for the particular result; in the case of the sacrifices performed on a special occasion the ascertainment of the occasion: in the case of acts of permanent obligation as f. i. the performance of the *sandhyā* the circumstance of the man leading a pure life and observing the proper times for all his duties. For this reason too the passage "a king who is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world

is to perform the *rájasúya*-sacrifice" notwithstanding its enjoining (the *rájasúya*) with a view to the kingship of the heavenly world does not intimate that the enjoyment of the result will be obtained by any one who desires the kingship of the heavenly world, but only by him who being at the same time a king is desirous of the kingship of the heavenly world; for the passage contains a clear statement of the kingly dignity being a necessary attribute of the qualified person.—Sometimes a necessary attribute of the qualified person is to be understood although it may not be directly stated as an attribute of the person. This is the case f. i. with regard to the knowledge dependent on the injunction enforcing the study of the Veda. (This knowledge is a necessary qualification for any one who wishes to perform sacrifices,) since all the injunctions of sacrifices as they require a knowledge of the matters (used in the sacrifice) are given for those only who have acquired a knowledge of these matters in consequence of complying with the injunction inculcating the study of the Veda. In the same manner the quality of being provided with the sacred fires—which quality is obtained by the first construction of the fires—is a necessary qualification for all sacrificial acts which are to be effected by means of the holy fires; for as all these sacrifices can not be performed without the fires the injunctions prescribing them can be given for those only who by the construction of the fires have acquired the attribute of being owners of the sacred fires. In the same manner capability (to perform the duty is an understood qualification); for the injunction applies only to those who are capable (by bodily strength and health, mental power etc.) to carry it out, according to the principle expressed in the words "power (of understanding on the part of the hearer) co-operates with the verbs expressing a certain sense" (the verbs although possessing a certain sense have no effect on a person not able to understand it.)—Herewith we close the discussion of that part of the Veda which is denoted by the name "Injunction".

"Mantras" serve to recall to memory the matters connected with the sacrificial performance. By this their property of recalling to memory the matters mentioned they have a purpose and it is not to be supposed that their enunciation merely tends to produce

some unseen result, as it would be improper to assume merely an unseen result while a visible result (in this case the circumstance of the performer of the sacrifice being reminded of certain things) exists. Nor can it be maintained that the recitation of the mantras is purposeless because the visible end of reminding one of certain things can be obtained by other means also (as f. i. by the bráhmāṇa-passages of the Veda which would point out the divinities etc. of the sacrifice even without being combined with the mantra-passages); for (the exclusive use of the mantras for the purpose) is founded on an injunction of a necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi) according to which the mentioned matters are to be recalled to memory by means of the mantras only (not by any other means). By an injunction of necessary arrangement is to be understood an injunction which, in the case of one particular instrument being established (by some other means of proof) with regard to an action which can be performed by various instruments, establishes the use of some other instrument which is not yet established (by other means of proof). As it is said “An injunction takes place when something is absolutely non-established; an injunction of necessary arrangement when one alternative is already established; when both alternatives are already established, (the injunction required) is called limitation (parisamkhyá).” The sense of this passage is as follows.—That kind of injunction which establishes something not established by any other means of proof is called an injunction of something new (apúrva-vidhi) (or simply “injunction” as in the quoted śloka). Such an injunction is contained f. i. in the passage “he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice”; for it enjoins a sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining paradise which is not established by any other means of proof.—That kind of injunction which establishes something that is partially (i. e. on certain occasions) non-established is called an injunction of necessary arrangement (niyama-vidhi); as f. i. the passage “he is to beat the rice-grains.” If it is asked how this passage can be said to establish something partially non-established, we answer: in the following manner. The passage does not intimate that the beating of the ricegrains has the effect of clearing them from the husks; (for a special passage intimating this would be altogether unnecessary)

as that circumstance is well known from positive and negative instances (it being a matter of common observation that the rice-grains if beaten are freed from their husks while the husks remain attached to the grains when the latter are not beaten). But the passage has the purpose of a *niyama* whereby is to be understood the supplying of a part (hitherto) non-established. For as the freeing of the grains from the husks can be effected by more than one means, one might leave aside the beating and begin to make use of some other means (f. i. of the finger-nails); for this case now the beating being non-established the above quoted injunction effects the supplying of the non-established part, viz. the injunction of the beating. Thus in a so-called injunction of *niyama* the purport of the sentence is a necessary arrangement which consists in a non-established part being supplied. And this (in the quoted example) means as much as the injunction of the partially non-established beating of the rice-grains.—That kind of injunction which has the purpose of excluding one of two alternatives both of which are established by some other means is called injunction of limitation (*parisamkhyá-vidhi*). As f. i. the passage “five animals from among the animals having five nails may be eaten (are lawful for food)” This passage has not the purpose of establishing the eating of animals having five nails (is therefore not an *apúrva-vidhi*), as their being used for food is already established (without any special rule) by the natural appetite of man. Nor has it the purpose of a necessary arrangement, as the eating of animals having five nails and the eating of animals not having five nails is established simultaneously (the two not excluding each other) and it can therefore not be said that the eating of animals having five nails is partially non-established. For these reasons the purpose of the passage must be to exclude the eating of animals not having five nails and it therefore is an injunction of limitation. Injunctions of this kind are of two different kinds, the limitation being either directly stated (*śrauta*) or implied (*lákshānika*). An example of the former kind is afforded by the passage “for there only they sing”; for here the (directly enunciated) word “only” intimates the exclusion of all *stotras* except the *pavamāna*. An example of implied limitation is afforded by the mentioned

passage "five animals having five nails may be eaten"; for this passage does not contain any word which directly expresses the exclusion of other animals. For this reason merely implied limitation must be admitted to be affected with three different imperfections. These are firstly, setting aside of what is directly mentioned (in favour of something implied only), secondly assumption of something which is not directly stated and thirdly rejection of something already established (by other means). As is said in the śloka "on account of setting aside the matter directly stated and assuming a matter not directly stated and rejecting something established limitation is affected with three vices." (In the quoted passage the details of the three shortcomings are as follows). The thing directly stated which is to be set aside is the eating of animals with five nails. The matter not directly stated which is to be assumed is the exclusion of the eating of animals not having five nails. And the matter already established which is rejected is the eating of animals not having five nails (the means by which it is established being man's natural appetite). Two of these three imperfections lie merely in the words while the rejection of something established lies in the matter itself.

( Finally it must be remarked that ) Those mantras which do not possess the power of reminding one of the things connected with the sacrificial performance must, since no other alternative is left, be assumed to contribute towards the unseen result by the mere circumstance of their being uttered and they are therefore not purposeless.

"Names" (as forming one of the constituent parts of the Veda) have a purpose by their defining (or limiting) the matter enjoined. So f. i. the word "udbhidá" in the passage "he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhid (i. e. is to perform the sacrifice called udbhid)." In this passage the word "udbhid" is the name of a sacrifice and effects the limitation of the matter ( the sacrifice ) enjoined. This is to be understood as follows. The passage by pointing out a certain result enjoins a sacrifice not established elsewhere. As it does not enjoin sacrifices in general ( that it does not do this is shown by the fact of a special result being mentioned ) it must be assumed to enjoin a special sacrifice. If now the

question arises what special sacrifice is meant, we learn from the word “udbhīd” that the sacrifice called udbhīd is intended. Udbhīdā taken as a name fits into the sentence by means of the relation of inhering in the same abode or coordination (sāmānādhikarānya), the sense of the whole passage being “he is to realize cattle by means of udbhīd the sacrifice” (in which sentence the two words “udbhīdā” and “yāgena” are coordinate).—That certain words found in the Veda have to be considered as names appears from one or the other of four reasons 1. from the danger of possessive indication 2. from the danger of split of the sentence 3. on account of another scriptural passage declaring it 4. on account of the comparison with it (for the details of which reasons see the following).

In the passage already quoted viz. “he who is desirous of cattle is to sacrifice with the udbhīd” the word “udbhīdā” must be assumed to be the name of a sacrifice on account of the danger of possessive indication. This appears from the following reasoning. (If udbhīd did not denote a particular sacrifice, the only other alternative would be to assume that it denotes a certain instrument by means of which the sacrifice is performed; an explanation which might appear to be founded on the etymology of the word.—But then the following difficulties present themselves) in the first place it is not proper to suppose that the passage contains the injunction of the sacrifice with a view to the result and at the same time the injunction of some secondary matter (an instrument) with a view to the sacrifice; for this assumption would involve a split of the sentence (two different matters being enjoined in one sentence). In the second place (if somebody should propose an other explanation free from the mentioned defect) if the word “udbhīdā” is supposed to express merely a secondary matter (an instrument) it would have to be said—as the sacrifice itself is not established by any other passage—that the passage enjoins a sacrificial action distinguished by a certain secondary matter, so that the sense would be “he is to realize cattle by means of a sacrifice distinguished by the udbhīd.” But in all such injunctions of sacrifices distinguished by some secondary matter the assumption of possessive indication has to be made, as already explained. (It is therefore preferable to take udbhīd as the name of a certain sacrifice).

sacrifices (not as denoting secondary matters) on account of another scriptural passage declaratory of it.

In the passage “he is to sacrifice attacking with the śyena” the word śyena is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice (and not as denoting the material of the sacrifice) on account of “the comparison with it (on account of the comparison of the sacrificial act with a falcon, which comparison is contained in an arthavāda-passage) as this comparison can not take place in any other way (but on the assumption of śyena denoting a certain sacrifice). This appears from the following reasoning. Whatever is enjoined (in an injunction) is glorified (in the corresponding arthavāda-passage). If now the injunction was meant to enjoin the falcon (as the material of the sacrifice), the arthavāda-passages would have to contain a praise of the falcon. But the arthavāda-passage “for as the falcon swooping down seizes his prey thus he (the sacrificer) swooping down seizes his hating enemy” can not be used as a praise of the falcon as it clearly effects the praise of something else by means of comparing it to a falcon. Nor can the falcon be praised by its being compared to itself, as in each comparison the quality of being that to which something is compared and the quality of being that which is compared to something reside in different things.—If on the contrary the passage enjoins a sacrifice named śyena then the arthavāda-passage is able to effect the praise of the sacrifice by comparing it to a falcon. Thus the word śyena must be taken as denoting a sacrifice on account of the “comparison with it.”

( In addition to these four determining reasons which oblige us to explain certain words as names of sacrifices ) Some assume a fifth determining reason of this kind viz. the greater weight of the secondary matter as taught in the originative injunction ( utpatti ). As an example of this they quote the passage “he is to sacrifice with the vaiśvadeva” and declare that the word “vaiśvadeva” is to be taken as the name of a sacrifice and is not meant to enjoin the Viśve-devas as the divinities of the sacrifice, on account of the greater weight of the divinities Agni etc., which are already enjoined by the originative injunctions referring to this sacrificio ( which are contained in the passage “āgneyam aṣṭakapālam nir-

vapati, saumyam charum etc").—But in reality (it is unnecessary to assume this fifth determining reason) as the circumstance of "vaiśvadeva" being a name already follows from the third of the four reasons detailed above. For with regard to the sacrifice under consideration there is found a statement, in the shape of an arthavāda which establishes the Viśvedevas as a secondary matter, viz. "that all the gods (viśvedevās) sacrificed together that is the viśvedeva-quality of the vaiśvadeva." (It therefore appears that the passage quoted above has not the purpose of pointing out the Viśvedevas as the divinity of the sacrifice and consequently the word "vaiśvadeva" is to be taken as a name).

By prohibition (nishedha) we understand sentences turning off man (from some action); for the purpose of sentences of prohibition lies exclusively in their effecting (man's) turning away from actions which would be the cause of some disadvantage. The details are as follows. In the same manner as an injunction conveying an instigation in order to give effect to its instigatory power intimates that the thing enjoined f. i. the sacrifice is the instrument for obtaining some desired result and thereby instigates the person towards it, in the same manner a prohibitory passage as f. i. "he is not to eat kalañja" conveying the idea of turning off (from some action) in order to give effect to its power of turning off intimates that the thing prohibited as f. i. the eating of kalañja is the instrument of bringing about some highly undesirable result and thereby turns man off from it. If it is now asked how a prohibitory sentence conveys the idea of turning off from something, we answer as follows. The sense of the word "not" is not connected with the sense of the root (of the verb in the prohibitory passage); for although the two words stand in immediate proximity the sense of the root presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the actual creative energy (ārthī bhāvanā) which is expressed by the suffix (of words like bhakshayet). For something which presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to one thing can not be connected with something else. Otherwise in the sentence "bring the king's man" (lit. the king-man, rājapurusha) the king himself would enter into relation with the action (while in reality the king only stands in relation to his servant, the



latter in his turn being the object of the action expressed by “bring”). Therefore the sense of the word “not” stands in relation to the sense of the suffix only and here again not to the ártihí bhāvaná which is expressed by that element (of the suffix) which denotes the verb—for the ártihí bhāvaná presents itself as standing in subordinate relation to the instigation expressed by that element which denotes the optative—but to the verbal bhāvaná denoted by the optative element of the suffix, the verbal bhāvaná occupying the chief position of all. Thus the nature of the word “not” is to intimate the thing opposite to the thing with which it (the word “not”) is logically connected. As in the sentence “the jar is not” the word “not” standing in connexion with the word “is” intimates the non-existence of the jar which is the opposite to the jar’s existence, in the same way here (in prohibitory passages) the word “not” standing in connexion with the optative exclusively intimates the turning-off (from some action) which is the opposite to an instigation towards what is expressed by the optative. For as on hearing an injunctive sentence a person has the idea “that one (the speaker) instigates me”, a person on hearing a prohibitory sentence has the conception of a turning off i. e. of an energy tending to produce in him (the hearer) a cessation of activity; which idea may be expressed in the sentence “he is turning me off.” Therefore in the case of a prohibitory sentence the exclusive sense of the passage is a turning off.

Where there is however an obstacle in the way of the word “not” being connected with what is expressed by the verbal suffix, it is connected exclusively with what is expressed by the root itself. Such obstacles are of two kinds 1. the beginning with the phrase “his vowed observances are as follows” and 2. the contingent probability of a vikalpa (option).

An example of the former kind is f. i. found in the following passage “he is not to look at the rising Sun” as this sentence is read after a commencement has been made with the words “his vowed observances are as follows.” For this reason a paryudāsa (not a pratishedha) is to be assumed here<sup>(1)</sup> For as the word

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(1) In the case of “not” being connected with the kriyá the sentence is called a pratishedha, while it is termed a paryudāsa if the “not” negatives a náman or the

“vrata” (vow or vowed observance) has the settled meaning of something which is to be done, the clause “his vowed observances are as follows” begins the enumeration of the vowed observances of the Snátaka as things to be done. If now the question arises “what are the things to be done?”, sentences like “he is not to look at the rising sun” must be taken as intimating something to be done. Otherwise the syntactical unity of the former and latter sentences would be destroyed. Thus the sense of the verbal suffix is not to be considered as connected with the sense of the word “not”, as in that case the passage could not be understood as expressing a thing to be done. For a “not” of that kind (i. e. a “not” connected with the sense of the verbal suffix) would express only a turning away (from some action) which is the contrary of the instigation conveyed by an injunction; and such a turning away does not express something to be done. Therefore in the sentence “he is not to look at the rising sun” the word “not” expresses by indication (lakṣhaṇá) the vow of not-looking which is the opposite of what is expressed by the root (in íksheta); for not-looking may be taken as something to be done. So that the whole sentence has to be explained as follows “he is to effect (bhávayet) by means of the resolution of not-looking which (resolution) has for its object the sun. And if it is asked “what is he to effect thereby?” the destruction of evil which is intimated by the complementary sentence “from so much sin he becomes separated” connects itself (with the bhávaná) as the thing to be effected. And in this manner the syntactical unity of the former and the latter sentences (which was spoken of above) is established.—Nor must here the objection be raised that there is no reason for the resolution of not-looking only being connected with the bhávaná as there are different other things which are opposite to the sense of the root; for these different other things are not things (or “the things”) to be done and can therefore in the case under consideration not be connected with the bhávaná.(1)

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dhátvartha, in which cases the “na” might be replaced by the “a” of a compound word as “abrahmaṇa”.

(1) The commentary on this passage runs as follows: But as many things might be done contrary to the looking which is the sense of the root how is it that with regard

The second (kind of obstacle to the negative particle being connected with the verb) applies to passages as the following one "he is to say ye yajámahe at (the beginning of) all yágyás, not at the anuyájas." For here too we must assume a prohibition of the kind called paryudása as otherwise there would be the probability of an option (optional procedure, vikalpa). The reason for this is as follows. If in the quoted passage the verbal suffix were connected with what is expressed by the particle "not", the mantra "ye yajámahe" would be prohibited in the case of the anuyájas, the sense being "at the anuyájas he is not to say ye yajámahe." But a prohibition (pratishedha) must be preceded by an establishment (by some means or other, of what is prohibited) as only a matter previously established can be prohibited. This establishment can only be found in the scriptural passage "he is to say ye yajámahe at the yágyás" (for there is no other means by which the employment of this mantra could be established). But if something previously established by a scriptural passage is prohibited, (by another scriptural passage) only option (vikalpa) can take place and not complete sublation (bádha) (of the former passage by the latter) because the scriptural passage on which it (i. e. the employment of the mantra) bases is not capable of complete sublation by means of another scriptural passage as this is the case with passion forming the base of the establishment (of some act.—Passion may instigate a man to the murder of a Bráhmaṇa which latter act is therefore said to be established by passion; here however scriptural passages like "a bráhmaṇa is not to be killed" step in

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to the quoted passage the resolution of not looking alone is accepted as capable of being the instrument of the bhāvanā?—The answer to this objection is: Although different other things as f. i. covering the eyes with a cloth might be considered as being the opposites of the looking which is the sense of the root, nevertheless, the sentence not conveying the idea of any particular energy of the body or of speech while at the same time mental activity is not prohibited there is left only a particular mental energy viz. the resolution of not looking (as the instrument of the bhāvanā). The reason for this is given in the clause of the text 'for these etc.' Because these different other things as f. i. covering the eyes with a cloth can not be meant as that which is to be done, only something else opposite to the looking which is the sense of the root and extending to all actions is fit to be connected with the bhāvanā. For this reason the resolution of not looking which is opposite to the sense of the root is fit to be connected with the bhāvanā as it (viz. the resolution) extends to all actions.

and by their superior authority completely sublata the dictates of passion. On the other hand one scriptural passage can not completely sublata another as it has no claims to superior authority).—Nor must it be objected that as the general scriptural passage “the oblation is made into the áhavaníya-fire” is sublata by the special passage “he is to make the oblation on the foot-print”, in the same way the passage “not at the anuyájas” sublata the preceding passage “he says ye yajámahe at the yágyás”; for only such scriptural passages as are independent of each other stand in the relation of that which is sublata and that which sublata. For the quoted passage about the homa to be made on the footprint does not, in order to enjoin its purport, stand in need of the passage about the áhavaníya and is therefore independent. But in the case under consideration the prohibitory passage (na anuyájeshu) stands, in order that the thing to be prohibited may be established, in need of the preceding passage “he is to say the ye yajámahe at the yágyás” and is therefore not independent. For this reason in the case of a thing enjoined by one scriptural passage being prohibited by another only option (vikalpa) is possible (and not complete sublata of one rule by another). But to assume option is not proper, because its consequence is the partial non-authoritativeness of scriptural passages. For if the ye-yajámahe is employed with the anuyájas the authoritativeness of the clause “not with the anuyájas” is not upheld, in the same way as the authoritativeness of the passage enjoining the use of barley for the sacrifice is not upheld when the sacrifice is performed with rice. Moreover the assumption of vikalpa would involve the assumption of a double unseen result as the injunction as well as the prohibition are for the benefit of man (purushártha.—The employment or non-employment of the ye-yajámahe do not contribute anything towards the svarúpa of the sacrifice, are not kratvartha; an adṛṣṭa has therefore to be assumed as the result of each). For these reasons the passage under consideration can not be explained as containing a pratishedha (where “not” negatives the verb) but we must consider “na” as connected with the word “anuyájas” and take the passage as a paryudása. So that the proper understanding of the sense of the passage is as follows “he is to use the

mantra ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās other than anuyājas", as the particle "na" conveys by indication the notion of ( those yājyās ) which are different from the anuyājas. And thus option has not to be admitted. And this sentence (i. e. the sentence constructed out of the words na anuyājeshu viz. "he is to use the ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās other than anuyājas") does not enjoin the use of the ye-yajāmahe as the latter is already established by the preceding clause, viz. "he is to use the ye-yajāmahe with the yājyās", but merely enjoins with reference to (as an anuvāda to) the ye-yajāmahe already established by a general text its (the ye-yajāmahe's) belonging to those yājyās which are other than anuyājas. So that the sense of the sentence is "the ye-yajāmahe which is uttered with the yājyās is to be uttered with those only which are other than anuyājas." But—it might be objected—according to the above explanation a paryudāsa-prohibition would not be different from a so-called upasamhāra whose purport is to restrict to some particular case something established by a scriptural passage of general application.—To this we reply that it is not so. For an upasamhāra has the purport of restricting to that only (i. e. to that which is mentioned in the upasamhāra-passage); as f. i. the fourfold division (of the sacrificial cake) which is established by the general text "he is to divide the cake into four parts" is restricted to the āgneya puroḍāśa exclusively by the special text "he is to divide the āgneya puroḍāśa into four parts." A paryudāsa on the other hand has the purport of restricting something generally established exclusively to what is different from the special thing (mentioned in the paryudāsa). Thus it appears that paryudāsa and upasamhāra are different.—Sometimes, no other possibility being left, a simple pratiśhodha has to be accepted although thereby the probability of a vikalpa arises. Thus f. i. although from the prohibition of the taking of the shodaśin-cup which (prohibition) is established by the passage "at the atirātra he is not to take the shodaśin-cup" the probability of a vikalpa arises (i. e. the optional taking or not-taking of the shodaśin-cup at the atirātra), nevertheless the passage can not be taken as a paryudāsa (whereby option would be precluded) because this is impossible. For the following reasons. If the word "not" were connected

with the word "the shodāśin-cup", the sense of the passage would be "at the atirātra he is to take the cups other than the shodāśin"; but such an interpretation is impossible as it would be in open conflict with the express injunction contained in the other passage "at the atirātra he is to take the shodāśin." If on the other hand the word "not" were connected with the atirātra the sense of the passage would be "he is to take the shodāśin at the sacrifices other than the atirātra" and this explanation again is impossible as it would be in conflict with the injunction of the shodāśin (for the atirātra). For these reasons, no other possibility being left, the passage can only be explained as a prohibition of the taking of the shodāśin-cup which is established by another scriptural passage. And to this explanation it must not be objected that it involves a vikalpa, because a vikalpa too is to be acknowledged (under certain circumstances). The following difference (between the several cases where a pratishedha has to be acknowledged) is however to be noted. In the case of a pratishedha of one thing arising from vikalpa (in the case of one thing established by some scriptural passage being prohibited by some other scriptural passage enjoining the contrary) the thing prohibited is not the cause of any disadvantage (anartha) because in that case the injunction as well as the prohibition are merely for the sacrifice's sake (kratvartha; not purushārtha.—In the example given above the taking as well as the not taking of the shodāśin are kratvartha, contribute to the outward form of the sacrifice). On the other hand in those cases where there is no vikalpa and the establishment (of what is subsequently prohibited by a scriptural passage) bases on the natural passion of man only, and the prohibition is for the sake of man, there the thing prohibited is the cause of disadvantage as f. i. the eating of kalañja which is prohibited by the passage "he is not to eat kalañja"; for here only the prohibition of eating is for the sake of man.—Nor is it to be objected that in the same way a vikalpa would result from the prohibition of things established by scripture as giving, making offerings etc. which prohibition is contained in the passage "the man who has undergone initiation is not to give, not to make offerings etc."; for in this case although the prohibition of giving, offering etc. which things are of their own

nature for the purpose of man is not for the purpose of man the forbidden thing is the cause of disadvantage to man. The reason of this is that the prohibition of these things being for the purpose of the sacrifice they (i. e. giving, offering etc. if done by the *dikshita*) would destroy the power of the sacrifice. An analogous case is presented by the prohibition of approaching one's wife at the proper season (approaching one's wife at the *ṛitu* is generally enjoined but would in spite of that be a cause of disadvantage to the *dikshita* because it would destroy the efficacy of the sacrifice). (The result of which is that in the two last mentioned cases there is no opening for *vikalpa*).

Sentences whose purport is either praise (glorification) or blame are called *arthavāda*. Such sentences effect a matter with a purpose by indication (*lakṣanā*: the sentences taken by themselves not being able to effect any purpose). For the *arthavāda*-sentences, there being no purpose in their conveying merely their own sense, by indication convey praise or blame of matters to be enjoined or prohibited, as they would be open to the reproach of purposelessness if their only object were (to convey) their own sense. (This latter statement is based on the *sūtra* I. 2. 1.) "on account of the (whole) *veda* referring to actions" (if the *arthavāda*-passages were taken as merely intimating their own sense without being connected with the passages expressive of injunctions and prohibitions they would be purposeless as the whole *Veda* avowedly refers to actions, things to be done. The *arthavādas* are therefore to be taken as containing praise or blame of the actions enjoined or prohibited in the *vidhi*-and *nishedha*-passages). Nor is it possible to assume purposelessness (of the *arthavāda*-passages), as the latter is rendered impossible by the *arthavādas* being comprised in the injunction of study contained in the passage "*vādhyayo' dhyetavyah*" which gives to understand that the whole *Veda* is to be studied and notifies the whole *veda*'s effecting matters having a purpose.

*Arthavāda*-passages are of two different kinds being either complements of *vidhi*-passages or complements of *nishedha*-passages. Thus the passage "*Vāyu* indeed is the swiftest divinity etc."—which forms a complement of the injunctive passage "he who is desirous of prosperity is to offer a white animal to *Vāyu*

etc.”—has the purpose of intimating a glorification of the matter enjoined. On the other hand the passage “he howled; that he howled (arodít) that is Rudra’s Rudratva etc.”—which forms a complement to the prohibitory passage “silver is not to be given on the sacrificial grass etc.”—has a purpose by intimating the blameworthiness of the matter prohibited.—Nor must one raise the objection that the arthaváda-passages are ( nevertheless ) purposeless because the idea of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is of no practical use. For these ideas have a decided use because they promote the activity of man who from laziness or other reasons does not set to work (to perform what is enjoined in the vidhi-passages)

Again arthaváda is of three different kinds as it is said in the śloka “in case of contradiction it is guṇaváda; in case of asseveration it is anuváda; in case of the absence of both it is bhútáarthaváda; thus arthaváda is of three different kinds.” The sense of this śloka is as follows. An arthaváda is guṇaváda i. e. statement of some quality, if it contradicts some other means of proof. As f. i. the passage “Āditya ( the sun ) is yúpa ( the sacrificial post ).” There as the sameness of the yúpa and the sun is contradicted by perception, the passage establishes by indication (lakṣaṇá) the quality ( of the yúpa ) being shining like the sun.—Arthaváda if conveying a sense already established by another means of proof is called anuváda, reiterative statement. As f. i. the passage “Agni ( the fire ) is a remedy against cold”; for here the quality of fire being opposite to cold is already known from sensual perception.—A statement conveying something which is neither established by another means of proof nor in conflict with such a one is called a bhútáarthaváda, a statement regarding something which has happened. As f. i. the passage “Indra raised the thunderbolt against Vṛitra.”

Thus we have established that the entire veda which consists of sentences like “he who is desirous of paradise is to sacrifice etc.” immediately or mediately effects duty ( dharma ) consisting in sacrifices etc. Such ( acts of ) duty if done with a view to that ( result ) with a view to which they are enjoined are the cause of that particular result, if done with the intention of making of them an offering to God ( Íśvara ) they are the cause of the highest beatitude.



Nor can it be said that there is no authority for performing such acts with the intention of making of them an offering to God; for the following passage of the Bhagavadgítá furnishes the required authority "whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you give, whatever you do in way of penance, Kaunteya, do it all as an offering to me." And the authoritativeness of Smṛiti is established in the páda treating of Smṛiti ( I. 3. ) by the argument of its being based on Śruti.

For the easy understanding of young students the wise Bháskara has composed this succinct compendium of the subjects treated in the Jaiminíya-Śástra.

Herewith is finished the compendium of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá which is entitled "Artha-saṅgraha" and which was composed by Mahopádhyáya Laṅgáksī Bháskara.

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## ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Transl. p. 1. l. 22 : so that the beginning aphorism (i. e. the first aphorism of the Mīmāṃsā-darśana) means etc.

P. 6. l. 12 after “material” add : so that, by means of the possessive indication contained in the word soma, the sense of the sentence is “he is to effect the desired result by means of the sacrifice distinguished by soma.”

P. 48. l. 10 : succinct.

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शङ्करमतप्रकाश अर्थात् भगवद्गीता के शङ्करभाष्य का भाषा, काशीखण्ड रामानन्दी टीका सहित बहुत शुद्ध ... ..	२	०	०
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इन से अधिक संस्कृत अंग्रेजी आदि पुस्तकों का सूचीपत्र पृथक् मुद्रित हुआ है जिन को अपेक्षित हो हमारे पास लिखें ।

**ब्रजभूषणदास और कम्पनी**  
**चान्दनी चौक के उत्तर नई सड़क**  
**बनारस ।**



णत्वेनाश्रुतमप्यधिकारिविशेषणम् । यथाध्ययनविधिसिद्धा विद्या,  
क्रतुविधीनामर्थज्ञानापेक्षणीयत्वेनाध्ययनविधिसिद्धार्थज्ञानवन्तं प्र-

च्यते नतु राज्यसंबन्धमात्रेण तदन्योऽपि । तेन क्षत्रियस्यैव राजसूयेऽधि-  
कारो नतु तदन्यस्य ब्राह्मणादेरित्यन्यत्र विस्तर इति भावः ।

इदमत्र चिन्त्यते—‘दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेते’ति श्रूयते । तत्र  
क्रियानिष्पादकत्वं कर्तृत्वं फलभोक्तृतया स्वामित्वमधिकारः तादृशोऽधिकारो  
यागकर्तुर्नास्ति । कुतः । फलभोगाभावात् । तथाहि यजेतेत्यत्राख्यातेन  
भावनाभिधीयते । तस्यां च धात्वर्थो भाव्यः, एकपदोपात्तत्वात् । स्वर्गस्तु  
पदान्तरोपात्तत्वाद्वाक्येन भाव्यतयाऽन्वेतव्यः । तच्च वाक्यमेकपदरूपया  
श्रुत्या बाध्यते । स्वर्गस्य भाव्यत्वाभावे सति गुणत्वमभ्युपेयम् । स्वर्गशब्दो  
नात्र सुखवाची किंतु सुखसाधनं चन्दनादिद्रव्यं ब्रूते । लोके तथा व्यवहा-  
रात् । तच्च कामयितुं योग्यम् । तेन द्रव्येण विना यागानिष्पत्तेः । तस्मा-  
दस्मिन्वाक्ये फलानभिधाने तद्भोगाभावात्कर्तुर्यागे कर्तृत्वमेव नत्वधिकार इ-  
त्यधिकारलक्षणं नारब्धव्यमिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—यजेतेत्यत्र प्रत्ययस्य केवलमा-  
ख्यातरूपत्वमेवेति नच मन्तव्यं, किंतु लिङ्प्रत्ययत्वेन विधिरूपत्वमप्यस्ति  
तत्राख्यातत्वाकारेण भावनामाचष्टे, विधित्वाकारेण पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति, पुरुषश्च  
स्वाभिमतफलमन्तरेण न प्रवर्तते इति तदपेक्षितं स्वर्गमेव भाव्यतया विधि-  
रूपादत्ते । स्वर्गशब्दश्चोक्तृष्टे सुखे रूढः । द्रव्ये तु लाक्षणिकः । तस्मात्सु-  
खस्य भाव्यत्वं विधिश्रुत्या सिद्धम् । धात्वर्थस्य तु भाव्यत्वमेकपदेन प्रतीय-  
मानमपि प्रत्ययेन नावगम्यते, किंतु प्रकृत्या । तथासति स्वर्गभाव्यत्वं भाव-  
नायां प्रत्यासन्नमेकेनैव विधिरूपेणाख्यातेनावगमात्कमियोगादपि स्वर्गस्यैव  
भाव्यत्वम् । तस्मात्फलभोगसंभवेन कर्तुरधिकारोऽस्तीत्यधिकारलक्षणमारब्धव्य-  
मिति विधिवाक्येष्वश्रुतमपि किञ्चिदधिकारिविशेषणत्वेनान्यथानुपपत्त्या त-  
त्समाश्रयणेन व्यवहारोपपत्तिरित्याशयेनाह—**क्वचित्त्विति** । तत्रोदाहरण-  
माह—**यथेति** । विधेरन्यत्र विधिवाक्येष्वश्रुतमप्यधिकारिविशेषणत्वेन तद्वि-  
शेषणमिति शेषः । तत्र हेतुमाह—**क्रत्वित्यादिना** । तत्रैवोदाहरणान्तर-

त्येव प्रवृत्तेः । एवमग्निसाध्यकर्मसु आधानसिद्धाग्निमत्ता । अग्निसाध्य-  
कर्मणामभ्यपेक्षत्वेन तद्विधीनामाधानसिद्धाग्निमन्तं प्रत्येव प्रवृत्तेः ।

माह—एवमिति । अग्निमत्तेत्यत्रापि पूर्ववदेव शेषो बोध्यः । तत्रापि हेतु-  
माह—अग्निसाध्येति । तद्विधीनामिति । अग्निसाध्यकर्मविधीनामित्यर्थः ।  
अनेन च निरुक्ताधिकारिविशेषणेन शूद्रस्य यागेऽनधिकारो ध्वनितः । तस्या-  
ध्ययनविधिसिद्धविद्याया अभावादाधानसिद्धाग्निमत्तायां अभावाच्च । किंच  
अध्ययने ह्युपनीतस्यैवाधिकारात् उपनयनेऽपि च ‘अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयी-  
ते’त्यादिना त्रैवर्णिकस्यैवाधिकारविधानात् । अभ्याधानेऽपि ‘वसन्ते ब्राह्म-  
णोऽग्नीनादधीते’त्यादिना त्रैवर्णिकमात्रस्याधिकारविधानाच्च । यद्यपि ‘वर्षासु  
रथकारोऽग्नीनादधीते’त्यनेन रथकारस्य सौधन्वनापरनामकस्याभ्याधानं वि-  
हितं योगाद्रूढेर्बलीयस्त्वात् तथापि नास्योत्तरकर्मस्वधिकारः तस्याध्ययनविधि-  
सिद्धविद्याया अभावादित्यन्यत्र विस्तर इति भावः । ननु तत्र रथं करोतीति  
व्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिक एव रथकारो नतु शूद्रस्य तत्राप्यधिकार इति चेन्न । सं-  
कीर्णजातिविशेषे रथकारशब्दस्य रूढत्वात् । तथाहि—वैश्यायां क्षत्रियादुत्पन्नो  
माहिष्यः । शूद्रायां वैश्यादुत्पन्ना करणी । तस्यां करण्यां माहिष्यादुत्पन्नो रथ-  
कारः । तथाच याज्ञवल्क्यः—‘माहिष्येण करण्यां तु रथकारः प्रजायते’  
इति । तस्मान्न तादृशव्युत्पत्त्या त्रैवर्णिको रथकारशब्देन ग्रहीतुं शक्यत इति ।  
किंच कुत्रचिद्यागेऽपि कस्यचिच्छूद्रस्याधिकारो भवति ‘वास्तुमयं रौद्रं चरुं  
निर्वपे’दिति प्रकृत्य ‘एतया निषादस्थपतिं याजये’दिति श्रवणात् । वास्तुशब्दः  
किंचित्प्रकृतिद्रव्यविशेषमाह । एतस्यामिष्टावधिकारी निषादस्थपतिशब्दवाच्यः  
त्रैवर्णिक एव । कुतः । निषादानां स्थपतिरिति षष्ठीसमासस्य त्रैवर्णिके संभ-  
वात् । तस्य ह्यधीतवेदत्वेन विद्यासंभवाच्चेति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—निषादश्चासौ स्थप-  
तिश्चेति कर्मधारयसमासस्य मुख्यत्वान्न षष्ठीसमासेन त्रैवर्णिको निषादस्थप-  
तिशब्दार्थः । षष्ठीसमासे तु संकीर्णजातिविशेषवाचिना निषादशब्देन तत्सं-  
बन्ध उपलक्ष्येत । नत्वयं कर्मधारये दोषोऽस्ति । तस्मात् तात्कालिकाचा-  
र्योपदेशादिना विद्यां संपाद्य धनिको निषादो रौद्रं यागं कुर्यादिति राद्धान्तः ।  
अध्ययनविधिसिद्धविद्यादिवत्पुरुषसामर्थ्यमपि विधिवाक्येष्वश्रुतमप्यधिकारि-

एवं सामर्थ्यमपि 'आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी'ति

विशेषणमित्याह—एवमिति । सामर्थ्यमिति । आज्यावेक्षणादिकं लौ-  
किकपुंसामर्थमित्यर्थः । वैदिकसामर्थ्यस्याध्ययनविधिसिद्धविद्यादेः पूर्वमेवो-  
क्तत्वादित्यर्थः । वृद्धोक्तन्यायं विनिगमकं समुदाहरन् तत्र हेतुमाह—आ-  
ख्यातानामिति । अनेन च विशेषणेनान्धादेरनधिकारो ध्वनितः । इदमत्र  
विचार्यते—अन्धः पङ्गुर्बधिरो मूको गवाश्वादयश्च तिर्यञ्च इत्यादीनां चेतन-  
त्वेन निरतिशयसुखरूपे स्वर्गकामना संभवति । अथोच्येत केषुचिदङ्गेषु  
तेषां शक्तिर्नास्ति । तथाहि—अन्धो नाज्यमवेक्षितुं क्षमः, पङ्गुर्विष्णुक्रमे-  
ष्वशक्तः, बधिरो नाध्वर्युप्रोक्तं शृणोति । तथाच 'कृसीर्वाचयती'ति विहित-  
स्यानुष्ठानं न सिद्ध्येत् । मूकोऽनुमन्त्रणादावसमर्थः । तिर्यञ्चो बहुष्वसमर्था  
इति तन्न । यथाशक्यज्ञानामनुष्ठेयत्वात् । 'स्वर्गकामो यजेते'त्यनेन प्रधान-  
वाक्येन सर्वाधिकारः प्रतीयते । सचाज्यावेक्षणाद्यङ्गवाक्यानुसारेण न संको-  
चयितुं युक्तः, किंतु प्रधानानुसारेणाङ्गानुष्ठानमेव संकोचयितुं युक्तं, तस्मा-  
दन्धादेरप्यधिकार इति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—यदाज्यावेक्षणादयः पुरुषार्थतया वि-  
धीयेरन् तदा तल्लोपयितुः क्रतोर्वैकल्यम्, इह तु ऋत्वङ्गतया ते विहिता इति  
तल्लोपे क्रतुरेव न निष्पद्येत, तस्मादसमर्थस्य नास्यधिकार इति सिद्धम् ।  
किञ्च ज्योतिष्टोमे श्रूयते—'यद्युद्राताऽपच्छिद्येतादक्षिणो यज्ञः संस्थाप्योऽथान्य-  
श्चाहर्तव्यस्तत्र तत्तदद्याद्यत्पूर्वस्मिन्दास्यनस्यात् यदि प्रतिहर्तापच्छिद्येत स-  
र्वस्व दद्यादि'ति । अस्यायमर्थः—प्रातःसवने बहिष्पवमानेन स्तोष्यमाणा ऋ-  
त्विजः शालाया बहिः प्रसर्पन्ति तदानीमेकस्य पृष्ठतोऽन्य इत्येवं पिपीलि-  
कावत्पङ्कथाकारेण गन्तव्यम् । तत्र पुरतो गन्तुः कच्छं गृहीत्वैव पृष्ठतोऽन्यो  
गच्छेत् । एवं सति यदि प्रमादादुद्राता गृहीत कच्छ मुञ्चेत्तदा दक्षिणाम-  
दत्त्वा प्रक्रान्तो यज्ञः समापनीयः । तं समाप्य पुनरपि स यज्ञः प्रयोक्तव्यः ।  
तस्मिन्प्रयोगे पूर्वं यद्विसितं द्रव्यं तदद्यात् । यदा प्रतिहर्ता मुञ्चेत् तदा त-  
स्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे सर्वस्वं दद्यादिति । तत्र यद्युद्रातृप्रतिहर्तारौ युगपत्तन्मुञ्चेतां  
तदानीमुक्तं प्रायश्चित्तनिमित्तं विहन्येत । एककर्तृको ह्यपच्छेदो निमित्तत्वेन  
श्रुतः अयं तूभयकर्तृकत्वान्नैकेन व्यपदेष्टुं शक्यते, तस्माच्छ्रूयमाणस्य निमि-

तस्य विहितत्वान्नास्ति प्रायश्चित्तमिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—द्वौ ह्यत्रापच्छेदौ तयोरे-  
कैकस्यैकैक एव कर्तेति निमित्तस्य नास्ति विघातः कालमात्रैक्यादेकापच्छे-  
दभ्रान्तिः तस्मान्निमित्तविघाताभावादस्ति प्रायश्चित्तम् । किञ्च अदक्षिणत्वं  
सर्वस्वदक्षिणत्वं चेति यत्प्रायश्चित्तद्वयं निमित्तभेदेन श्रुतं तन्निमित्तद्वयसंनि-  
पाते सेमुच्चेतव्यम्, यद्यदक्षिणत्वसर्वस्वदानयोरन्योन्यविरोधस्तर्हि प्रयोगभेदेन  
व्यवस्थापनीयम्, अपच्छेदयुक्ते प्रथमप्रयोगे दक्षिणा न दातव्या उत्तरप्रयोगे  
सर्वस्व दातव्यं सत्यपि प्रयोगभेदे कर्मण एकत्वात् समुच्चय इति प्राप्ते  
ब्रूमः—ननुत्तरप्रयोगेऽपच्छेदो विद्यते । नचासति निमित्ते प्रायश्चित्तं युक्तम् ।  
तस्मात्प्रथमप्रयोग एव निमित्तद्वयवशात्प्रायश्चित्तद्वयं प्राप्त तच्चान्योन्यविरुद्धं  
विकल्प्यते । किञ्च उद्गातृप्रतिहर्तृकर्तृकयोरपच्छेदयोर्यौगपद्ये समानबलत्वाद्स्तु  
प्रायश्चित्तयोर्विकल्पः । यदा तु क्रमेणापच्छेदौ स्यातां तदानीमसजातविरो-  
धित्वेन पूर्वस्य प्रबलत्वाच्छ्रुतिलिङ्गादावित्तरस्य प्रवृत्तिर्निरुध्यत इति चेत् ।  
मैवम् । श्रुतिलिङ्गादावित्तरस्य पूर्वसापेक्षत्वात्पूर्वेण विरोधे सत्युत्तरस्योत्पत्तिरेव  
नास्ति । इहतु ज्ञानद्वयमन्योन्यनिरपेक्षं वाक्यद्वयादुत्पद्यत इत्युत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धो  
नास्ति । उत्पद्यमानं चोत्तरज्ञानं स्वविरुद्धस्य पूर्वज्ञानस्य बाधेनैवोत्पद्यते ।  
**ननु** निरपेक्षत्वस्य समानत्वात्पूर्वज्ञानमेवोत्तरस्य बाधकमस्त्विति चेन्न ।  
पूर्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिदशायामविद्यमानस्योत्तरज्ञानस्य बाध्यत्वायोगात् । उत्तरकाले तु  
स्वय बाधितं पूर्वज्ञानं कथमुत्तरस्य बाधकं भवेत् नान्यत्किञ्चिदुत्तरस्य बाधकं  
पश्यामः । तस्मादुत्तरकालीनापच्छेदनिमित्तं प्रायश्चित्तमनुष्ठेयम् । किञ्च  
यद्युद्गाता पश्चादपच्छिद्यते तदा तस्यापच्छेदस्य प्रबलत्वात्तन्निमित्तं प्राय-  
श्चित्तमनुष्ठेयं तच्च प्रायश्चित्तमीदृश—प्रथमं प्रयोगं दक्षिणारहितमनुष्ठाय द्वितीय-  
प्रयोगे पूर्वं दित्सिता दक्षिणा दातव्येति । पूर्वं च गवा द्वादशाधिकं  
शतं दित्सितं तस्य ज्योतिष्टोमदक्षिणारूपेण विहितत्वात्तस्मादुत्तरप्रयोगे  
द्वादशशतं देयमिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—प्रतिहर्तुः प्रथममपच्छेदे सति तन्नि-  
मित्तकं सर्वस्वदानरूपं प्रायश्चित्तं प्रथमप्रयोगे प्राप्तं तेन च ऋतुस्वभावप्रयु-  
क्तस्य द्वादशशतस्य बाधात्सर्वस्वं दित्सितं, नचोद्गात्रपच्छेदेन पश्चाद्भाविना सर्व-



न्यायात् समर्थं प्रत्येव विधिप्रवृत्तेः । तदेवं निरूपितो विधिः ।

दित्सा बाध्यत इति शङ्कनीयम् । बाधकस्य दक्षिणान्तरस्य तत्रानुक्तत्वात् ।  
यदित्सितं तदुत्तरप्रयोगे देयमित्येतावदेव तत्रोच्यते । दित्सितं च सर्वस्वमि-  
त्युक्तम् । अत उत्तरकालीनोद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तेऽपि पुनःप्रयोगे पूर्वकालीनप्र-  
तिहर्त्रपच्छेदप्रयुक्तं सर्वस्वमेव दातव्यमित्यादिकमर्थजातं निरूपणीयमभिप्रेत्य  
विधिनिरूपणमुपसंहरति—तदेवमिति । तस्मिन्नतीते ग्रन्थ उक्तप्रकारे-  
णेत्यर्थः ।

यः सर्वकर्ता सकलात्मरूपश्चन्द्रार्कवह्नीक्षणकश्चिदात्मा ।

साम्बो हि सोमार्धविभूषणाढ्यस्तं नौमि देवार्चितपादपीठम् ॥ १ ॥

IE KL

RETE

अथ मन्त्रमीमांसा ।

प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारका मन्त्राः । तेषां च तादृशार्थस्मारकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वम् । ननु तदुच्चारणमदृष्टार्थम्, संभवति दृष्टफलकत्वेऽदृष्टकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात्, नच दृष्टस्यार्थस्मरणस्य प्रकारान्तरेणापि संभवान्मन्त्राम्नानं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । मन्त्रैरेव स्मर्तव्यमिति नियमविध्याश्रयणात् ।

नियमविधिः ।

नानासाधनसाध्यक्रियायामेकसाधनप्राप्तावप्राप्तस्यापरसाधनस्य प्रापको विधिर्नियमविधिः । यथाहुः 'विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्तौ नियमः पाक्षिके सति । तत्र चान्यत्र च प्राप्तौ परिसंख्येति गीयत' इति । अस्यार्थः । प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिरपूर्वविधिः यथा 'यजेत

इदानी मन्त्ररूपं वेदभागं निरूपयति—प्रयोगेति । तेषामिति । मन्त्राणामित्यर्थः । तादृशार्थेति । प्रयोगसमवेतार्थेत्यर्थः । अर्थवत्त्वमिति । प्रयोजनवत्त्वमित्यर्थः । ननु मन्त्रोच्चारणस्यादृष्टार्थकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः कुतस्तेषां प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वेनैव प्रयोजनवत्त्वमित्यत आह—नत्विति । तदुच्चारणमिति । मन्त्रोच्चारणमित्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—दृष्टफलकत्व इति । ननु दृष्टस्य देवतार्थस्मरणस्य ब्राह्मणवाक्यादिनापि संभवान्मन्त्रोच्चारणस्यादृष्टार्थकत्वानङ्गीकारे तदाम्नानस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तिरित्याशङ्क्य मन्त्रैरेव सोऽर्थः स्मर्तव्य इति नियमविध्यङ्गीकारान्न मन्त्राम्नानस्य वैयर्थ्यमिति परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना ।

ननु किलक्षणको नियमविधिर्यदाश्रयणादन्यस्यार्थस्मारकस्य व्यवच्छेदो लभ्यत इत्याशङ्क्य नियमविधिलक्षणमाह—नानासाधनेति । तत्र संमतिमाह—यथाहुरिति । तां व्याचष्टे—अस्यार्थ इत्यादिना । तत्रापि विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्ताविति प्रथमपादमपूर्वविधिपरं व्याचष्टे—प्रमाणान्तरेणेति । प्रमाणान्तरेण यदर्थत्वेनाप्राप्तस्य तदर्थत्वेन प्रापको यो विधिः सोऽपूर्वविधिरि-

स्वर्गकाम' इत्यादिः । स्वर्गार्थकयागस्य प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्यानेन विधानात् । पक्षेऽप्राप्तस्य प्रापको विधिर्नियमविधिः । यथा 'ब्रीहीनवहन्ती'त्यादिः । कथमस्य पक्षेऽप्राप्तप्रापकत्वमिति चेदित्थम् । अनेन ह्यवघातस्य वैतुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यतेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धत्वात् । किंतु नियमः । सचाप्राप्तांशपूरणम् । वैतुष्यस्य हि नानोपायसाध्यत्वाद्यदावघातं परित्यज्य उपायान्तरं गृहीतुमारभते, तदावघातस्याप्राप्तत्वेन तद्विधाननामकमप्राप्तांशपूरणमेवानेन विधिना

त्यर्थः । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—यथेति । तस्यापूर्वविधित्वे हेतुमाह—स्वर्गेति । स्वर्गार्थकत्वेन प्रमाणान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य यागस्य तदर्थत्वेन यजेत स्वर्गकाम इत्यनेन विधानाद्भवत्ययमपूर्वविधिरित्यर्थः । नियमः पाक्षिके सतीति द्वितीयपाद प्रकृते संमतिरूपं व्याचष्टे—पक्षेऽप्राप्तस्येति । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—यथेति । ननु ब्रीहीनवहन्तीत्यस्यावघातविधेः कथं पक्षेऽप्राप्तस्यावघातस्य प्रापकत्वं स्वीक्रियते, वैतुष्यार्थत्वेन प्रमाणान्तरेण प्राप्तस्य तस्य तदर्थत्वेनानेन विधानोपपत्तेरित्याशङ्क्यानेन हि विधिनोपघातस्य वितुष्यार्थत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य तदर्थत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धत्वात्, अवघातादिसत्त्वे ब्रीहीणां वैतुष्यं जायते तदसत्त्वे तदभाव इति सार्वजनीनमिति परिहरति—कथमित्यादीना । इत्थमिति । अनेन वक्ष्यमाणप्रकारेणेत्यर्थः । ननु यद्यवघातादीनां सर्वेषामेव वैतुष्यार्थत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिद्धं तदा ब्रीहीनवहन्तीत्यवघातविधेरन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धावघातप्रापकत्वेन वैयर्थ्यमेवापद्येतानुवादकत्वादित्याशङ्कते—किंत्विति । नास्य विधेरनुवादकत्वेन वैयर्थ्यं संभवति नियमविधायकत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेरिति परिहरति—नियम इति । ब्रीहीणां वैतुष्यमवघातेनैव संपादनीयमिति नियमः प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यर्थः । ननु तादृशनियमप्रतिपादनेऽत्र कीदृशो वाक्यार्थो भवतीत्यत आह—सचेति । स एवाप्राप्तांशपूरणरूपो नियमोऽत्र वाक्यार्थ इत्यर्थः । ननु कथमत्राप्राप्तांशो लभ्यते यस्य पूरणेनास्य विधेः सार्थक्यमित्यतोऽत्राप्राप्तांशपूरणरूपमेव वाक्यार्थमुपपादयति—वैतुष्येत्यादिना । उपपादितमप्राप्तांशपूरणरूपं वाक्यार्थमुपसंह-

क्रियते । अतश्च नियमविधावप्राप्तांशपूरणात्मको नियम एव वाक्यार्थः । पक्षेऽप्राप्तावर्धातस्य विधानमिति यावत् ।

परिसंख्याविधिः ।

उभयोश्च युगपत्प्राप्तावितरव्यावृत्तिपरो विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः । यथा—‘पञ्चपञ्चनखा भक्ष्या’ इति । इदं हि वाक्यं न पञ्चनख-भक्षणपरं, तस्य रागतः प्राप्तत्वात् । नापि नियमपरं पञ्चनखापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य युगपत्प्राप्तेः पक्षे प्राप्त्यभावात् । अत इदमपञ्चनख-भक्षणनिवृत्तिपरमिति भवति परिसंख्याविधिः ।

परिसंख्यायाः श्रौतीत्वलाक्षणिकीत्वभेदौ ।

सा च द्विविधा—श्रौती लाक्षणिकी चेति । तत्र ‘अत्र ह्येवावयन्ती’ ति श्रौती परिसंख्या । एवकारेण पवमानातिरिक्तस्तोत्रव्यावृत्तेरभिधानात् । ‘पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या’ इति तु लाक्षणिकी ।

रति—अतश्चेति । अस्य विधेरप्राप्तांशपूरणरूपनियमप्रतिपादकत्वाच्चेत्यर्थः । पर्यवसितार्थमाह—पक्ष इति । यावदिति । पर्यवसन्नमित्यर्थः ।

तत्र चेत्याद्युत्तरार्धं परिसंख्याविधिपरं व्याचष्टे—उभयोश्चेति । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—यथेति । अस्यात्यन्तमप्राप्तविधित्वरूपमपूर्वविधित्वमाशङ्क्य निराचष्टे—इदं हीति । तत्र हेतुमाह—तस्येति । पञ्चनखभक्षणस्येत्यर्थः । अस्य वाक्यस्य नियमविधित्वमपि निराचष्टे—नापीति । तत्रापि हेतुमाह—पञ्चनखेति । अत इति । विधिद्वयासंभवदित्यर्थः । इदमिति । पञ्च प्रञ्चनखा भक्ष्या इति वाक्यमित्यर्थः । पञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तिस्तु न केनापि प्राप्ता । ततश्च तद्विधायकत्वेन नास्य वाक्यस्यानुवादकत्वमपि । तथाच सैवात्र वाक्यार्थ इति भावः ।

सा च परिसंख्या द्विविधेत्याह—सा चेति । आद्यामुदाहरति—तत्रेति । द्वयोः परिसंख्ययोर्मध्य इत्यर्थः । अत्रेति । प्रकृत इत्यर्थः । अवयन्तीति । अवजानन्तीत्यर्थः, गायन्तीति यावत् । श्रौत्याः परिसंख्यायास्तत्त्वे हेतुमाह—एवकारेणेति । द्वितीयामुदाहरति—पञ्चेति । पञ्चपञ्च-

इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावात् । अतएवैषा त्रिदोषग्रस्ता ।

परिसंख्याया दोषत्रयम् ।

दोषत्रयं च श्रुतहानि-रश्रुतकल्पना-प्राप्तबाधश्चेति । तदुक्तम्—  
'श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनम् । प्राप्तस्य बाधादित्येवं परि-  
संख्या त्रिदूषणा' इति । श्रुतस्य पञ्चनखभक्षणस्य हानात्, अश्रुता-  
ऽपञ्चनखभक्षणनिवृत्तेः कल्पनात्, प्राप्तस्य चापञ्चनखभक्षणस्य बाध-  
नादिति । अस्मिंश्च दोषत्रये दोषद्वयं शब्दनिष्ठम् । प्राप्तबाधस्त्वर्थ-  
निष्ठ इति दिक् ।

अथ नामधेयमीमांसा ।

येषां तु प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वं न संभवति तदुच्चारणस्यान-  
न्यगत्याऽदृष्टार्थकत्वं कल्प्यत इति नानर्थक्यमिति । नामधेयानां च  
विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । तथाहि 'उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम'

नखास्तु 'पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्या ब्रह्मक्षत्रेण राघव ॥ शशकः शलुकी गोधा  
खड्गी कूर्मोऽथ पञ्चमः' इत्यादिवचनोदाहृता बोध्याः । अस्या अपि तत्त्वे  
हेतुमाह—इतरनिवृत्तीति । अतएवेति । इतरनिवृत्तिवाचकपदाभावा-  
दित्यर्थः । एवेति । लाक्षणिकीत्यर्थः ।

दोषत्रयं प्रदर्शयति—दोषत्रयं चेति । तत्र श्रुतहानौ हेतुमाह—  
श्रुतस्येति । अश्रुतकल्पनायां हेतुमाह—अश्रुतेति । प्राप्तस्य बाधेऽपि  
हेतुमाह—प्राप्तस्येति । रागतः प्राप्तस्येत्यर्थः । अस्य दोषत्रयस्य व्यवस्थया  
वृत्तित्वमाह—अस्मिंश्चेति । दोषत्रयमध्य इत्यर्थः ।

ननु कथं सर्वेषां मन्त्राणां प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वमुपपद्यते हुं-  
फडादिमन्त्राणां प्रयोगसमवेतार्थस्मारकत्वासंभवादित्याशङ्क्याह—**येषामित्या-  
दिना । तदुच्चारणस्येति । हुंफडादिमन्त्रोच्चारणस्येत्यर्थः । अनन्यगत्या-  
ऽदृष्टार्थत्वमित्यत्रादृष्टार्थत्वमिति पदच्छेदः । इति नानर्थक्यमिति । अतो  
हेतोर्हुंफडादिमन्त्राणां नानर्थक्यमित्यर्थः । मन्त्रभागस्य यथायथं प्रयोजनवत्त्व-  
मुपपाद्येदानीं क्रमप्राप्तं नामधेयानां सार्थक्यमुपपादयति—**नामधेयाना-  
मिति । विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतयेति । विजातीयव्यावर्तकत्वेन विधेयार्थ-****

इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दो यागनामधेयं तेन च विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदः क्रियते ।  
तथाहि अनेन वाक्येनाप्राप्तत्वात्फलोद्देशेन यागो विधीयते । याग-  
सामान्यस्याविधेयत्वात् यागविशेष एव विधीयते । तत्र कोऽसौ  
यागविशेष इत्यपेक्षायामुद्भिच्छब्दादुद्भिद्रूपो याग इति ज्ञायते ।  
उद्भिदा यागेन पशुं भावयेदित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन नाम-  
धेयान्वयात् ।

निश्चायकतयेत्यर्थः । विधेयार्थस्यैव समर्थकतयेति यावत् । एतदेव प्रदर्श-  
यति—तथाहीत्यादिना । तेन चेति । उद्भिच्छब्देन चेत्यर्थः । उद्भि-  
च्छब्दस्य विधेयार्थपरिच्छेदकतया नामधेयत्वप्रदर्शनाय भूमिकामारचयति—  
तथाहीत्यादिना । अनेनेति । ‘उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यनेनेत्यर्थः ।  
फलोद्देशेनेति । पशुरूपफलोद्देशेनेत्यर्थः । यागेति । साधनवैलक्षण्यम-  
न्तरेण फलवैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेर्नात्र यागसामान्यं विधीयते । ततश्च यागविशेष एव  
विधीयत इत्यर्थः । तत्रेति । यागविशेषस्य विधेयत्व इत्यर्थः । क इति । कोऽसौ  
यागविशेष इति यागविशेषापेक्षायामित्यर्थः । उद्भिच्छब्दादुद्भिद्रूपो याग  
इति ज्ञायत इति । उद्भिच्छब्दात्पुनरुद्भिन्नामको यो यागः स एवात्र याग-  
विशेष इति विज्ञायत इत्यर्थः । एवंच सिद्धमुद्भिच्छब्दस्य धात्वर्थसामाना-  
धिकरण्येनान्वयं फलितमाह—उद्भिदेति । ननूद्भिच्छब्दस्य नीलमुत्पलमिव  
नीलपदस्योत्पलपदसामानाधिकरण्यवद्यजिसामानाधिकरण्य भवेत्किं नामधेय-  
त्वेनेति चेन्न, वैषम्यात् । तथाहि तत्र हि नीलपदस्यार्थो नीलगुण उत्पलप-  
दार्थादुत्पलरूपद्रव्यादतिरिक्तो भवति, लक्षणया तु नीलपदस्य तादृशद्रव्यप-  
रत्वेनोत्पलपदसामानाधिकरण्यमुपपद्यते । उद्भिच्छब्दस्य तु यज्यवगतयाग-  
विशेषान्नातिरिक्तोऽर्थोऽस्ति, तस्यैव तत्र विशेषत्वसमर्पकत्वात् । ततश्चार्था-  
न्तरवाचकत्वाभावेन नोद्भिच्छब्दस्य नीलशब्दस्योत्पलशब्दसामानाधिकरण्यव-  
द्यजिसामानाधिकरण्यमुपपद्यते, किं तर्हि ‘वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षे’त्यत्रामिक्षापदस्य वै-  
श्वदेवीशब्दसामानाधिकरण्यवत्, वैश्वदेवीशब्दस्य हि देवतातद्धितत्वात्  
तस्य च ‘सास्य देवते’ति सर्वनामार्थे स्मरणात् सर्वनाम्नां चोपस्थितविशे-

नामधेये निमित्तचतुष्टयम् ।

नामधेयत्वं च निमित्तचतुष्टयात् । मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयाद्वाक्यभेदभयात्तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्चेति । तत्र 'उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम' इत्यत्रोद्भिच्छब्दस्य यागनामधेयत्वं मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयात् । तथाहि न तावदनेन वाक्येन फलंप्रति यागविधानम्, तंप्रति च गुणविधानं

षवाचित्वेन विशेषपरत्वम् । तत्र कोऽसौ वैश्वदेवीशब्दोपात्तो विशेष इत्यपेक्षायाम् आमिक्षापदसान्निध्यादामिक्षारूपो विशेष इत्यवगम्यते । यथाहुः—'आमिक्षां देवतायुक्तां वदत्येवैष तद्धितः । आमिक्षापदसान्निध्यादस्यैव विषयार्पण'मिति । तस्माद्यथा वैश्वदेवीशब्दोपात्तविशेषसमर्पकत्वेनामिक्षापदस्य वैश्वदेवीशब्देन सामानाधिकरण्यमेव सामान्यस्याविधेयत्वाद्यज्यवगतयागविशेषसमर्पकत्वेनैवोद्भिच्छब्दस्य यजिसामानाधिकरण्यमित्युक्तप्रकारेणैव नामधेयानामन्वयः साधुरिति । तथाचोक्त 'तदधीनत्वाद्यागविशेषसिद्धे'रिति ।

तच्च निमित्तचतुष्टयाद्भवतीत्याह—नामधेयत्वं चेति । निमित्तचतुष्टयं निर्दिशति—मत्वर्थेत्यादिना । तत्राद्यनिमित्तविषयमुदाहरति—तत्रोद्भिदा यजेतेति । तत्रेति चतुर्षु मध्य इत्यर्थः । अत्र मत्वर्थलक्षणापत्तिप्रदर्शनाय तावद्वाक्यभेदमापादयति—न तावदिति । अस्मिन्पक्षे तूद्भिद्यते भूमिरनेनेति व्युत्पत्त्या खनित्रवाच्यसावुद्भिच्छब्दो भवेत्तथाच 'उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकाम' इत्यनेन वाक्येन यागेन पशुं भावयेद्यागं च खनित्रेण भावयेदिति फलंप्रति यागविधानं यागंप्रति च गुणविधानं क्रियेत, तच्च नयुज्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—वाक्येति । आवृत्तिरूपवाक्यभेदापत्तेरित्यर्थः । नन्वनेन वाक्येन खनित्ररूपो गुण एव विधीयते । 'दध्ना जुहोती'त्यनेन गुणविधिना समानत्वात् । नचात्र पशुफलकः कश्चिद्यागो विधीयत इति वाच्यम् । पशूनां गुणफलत्वात् । यथा गोदोहनेन पशुकामस्येत्यत्र पशवो गोदोहनगुणस्य फलं तथेह खनित्रगुणस्य फलमस्तु यदि 'चमसेनापः प्रणयती'ति विहितं प्रकृतमपा प्रणयनमाश्रित्य गोदोहन विधीयते तर्ह्यत्रापि ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेतेति विहितं प्रकृतं ज्योतिष्टोममाश्रित्य खनित्रं विधी-

युज्यते, वाक्यभेदापत्तेः । उद्भिच्छब्दस्य गुणसमर्पकत्वे च यागस्याप्यप्राप्तत्वात् गुणविशिष्टकर्मविधानं वाच्यम् । उद्भिद्वता यागेन पशुं भावयेदिति विशिष्टविधौ च मत्वर्थलक्षणेत्युक्तमेव ।

नामधेयत्वस्य द्वितीयं वाक्यभेदोदाहरणम् ।

‘चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यत्र चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं वाक्यभेदभयात् । तथाहि न तावदत्र गुणविशिष्टयागविधानं संभवति । ‘दधि मधु पयो घृतं धाना उदकं तण्डुलास्तत्संसृष्टं प्राजा-

यतां तस्माद्गुणविधिरित्याशङ्क्य पशुकामो यजेतेत्यस्य पदद्वयस्यायमर्थः— पशुरूपं फलं यागेन कुर्यादिति । तत्र केन यागेनेत्यपेक्षायां उद्भिदेति तृतीयान्तं पदं यागनामत्वेनान्वेति । उद्भिद्यते पशुफलमनेन यागेनेति निरुक्त्या नामत्वमुद्भिपदस्योपपद्यते । नचैवमपि गुणविधिनामधेयत्वयोः शब्दनिर्वचनसाम्यान्न निर्णय इति वाच्यम् । सामानाधिकरण्यस्य निर्णायकत्वात् । तथाहि उद्भिन्नामकेन यागेन पशुरूपं फलं कुर्यादित्युक्ते सामानाधिकरण्यं लभ्यते । गुणविधित्वे तु खनित्रेण साध्यो यो यागस्तेन तादृशफलं कुर्यादित्येवं वैयधिकरण्यं स्यात् । तच्चायुक्तम् । किञ्च नानेन वाक्येन ज्योतिष्टोमे खनित्ररूपो गुणो विधातुं शक्यते, तस्य सोमेन यजेतेत्युत्पत्ति-शिष्टसोमरूपगुणावरुद्धत्वात् । किञ्च यद्यस्योद्भिच्छब्दस्य खनित्ररूपगुणसमर्पकत्वं स्वीक्रियते तदा यत्र तेन गुणः समर्पणीयस्तादृशकर्मणोऽप्यप्राप्तत्वादनेन वाक्येन खनित्ररूपगुणविशिष्टकर्मविधानमेव वक्तव्यमन्यथा वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । ततश्चोद्भिच्छब्दार्थरूपखनित्रवता यागेनेति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयो भविष्यति । तथाच मत्वर्थलक्षणापत्तिरिति परिहरति—उद्भिच्छब्दस्येत्यादिना । उक्तमेवेति । ‘सोमेन यजेते’ति विध्यर्थनिरूपणप्रस्ताव इति शेषः ।

इदानीं द्वितीयं वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गरूपं नामधेयत्वस्य निमित्तमुदाहरणद्वारा प्रदर्शयति—चित्रया यजेतेति । वाक्यभेदमेवोपपादयति—तथा हीत्यादिना । अत्रेति । ‘चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्यस्मिन्वाक्य इत्यर्थः । गुणविशिष्टेति । चित्राशब्दार्थभूतचित्रवर्णककिञ्चिद्गुणविशिष्टेत्यर्थः । अत्र विशिष्टविधानासंभवे हेतुमाह—दधीत्यादिना । तत्संसृष्टं प्राजापत्य-



पत्य'मित्यनेन गुणस्य विहितत्वात्तद्विशिष्टयागविध्यनुपपत्तेः । यागस्य फलसंबन्धे गुणसंबन्धे च विधीयमाने वाक्यभेदः । तस्माच्चित्राशब्दः कर्मनामधेयम् । तथाच चित्रायागेन पशुं भावयेदिति सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वयान्न वाक्यभेदः । प्रकृतेष्टेरेनेकद्रव्यत्वेन चित्राशब्दवाच्यत्वोपपत्तिः ।

मितीति । तैर्दध्यादिभिर्द्रव्यैर्युक्तं प्रजापतिदेवताकं कर्मैत्यर्थः । तद्विशिष्टेति । निरुक्तगुणविशिष्टेत्यर्थः । दधीत्यादिप्रकृतवाक्यस्यैतत्कर्मणोस्तूपत्ति-वाक्यत्वादस्य कर्मण उत्पत्तिशिष्टदध्यादिगुणावरुद्धत्वान्न तत्र गुणान्तरं विधातुं शक्यत इति भावः । अत्र दध्यादिवाक्ये दध्यादीनि षडेव द्रव्याणि श्रुता-वान्नातानि, उदकपदं तु प्रमादादायातम्, श्रुतितात्पर्यज्ञैर्माधवाचार्यैस्तथैवास्य वाक्यस्य व्याख्यातत्वात् । तथाच तद्वचनं दध्यादीनि विचित्राणि देयद्र-व्याणि षडान्नातानीति । नन्वत्र वाक्ये व्युत्पत्तिवाक्यसिद्धस्वरूपस्य यागस्य पशुरूपफलसंबन्धो विचित्रद्रव्यरूपगुणसंबन्धश्च विधीयते । ततश्च न कर्म-नामधेयत्वं चित्राशब्दस्येत्याङ्गबाह—यागस्येति । तथाच यागेन पशुं भावयेद्यागं च तादृशगुणेन भावयेदिति यागस्य गुणफलोभयसंबन्धे विधी-यमाने सत्यावृत्तिलक्षणो वाक्यभेदो दुर्वार इति भावः । उपपादितं वाक्य-भेदप्रसङ्गमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति । सिद्धे चित्राशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वे वाक्यं योजयति—तथाचेति । सामानाधिकरण्येनेति । यजिधात्वर्थयाग-सामानाधिकरण्येन नामधेयस्यान्वयाच्चित्रानामकेन यागेन पशुं भावयेदित्या-कारकान्न निरुक्तवाक्यभेदापत्तिरित्यर्थः । अनेकद्रव्यत्वेनेति । दध्यादि-विचित्रानेकद्रव्यसाध्यत्वेनेत्यर्थः । ननु चित्राशब्दाच्चित्रत्वस्त्रीत्वयोः प्रतीतेः स्त्रीत्वस्य च स्वभावतः प्राणिधर्मत्वात्प्रकृते दध्यादिद्रव्यके कर्मणि निवेशासं-भवान्नानेन वाक्येन प्रकृते कर्मणि तादृशगुणविधानं क्रियते किंतु प्राणि-द्रव्यके कर्मणि, अनारभ्याधीतानां चाङ्गानां प्रकृतिमात्रे प्रवेशाङ्गीकारात् । चित्रावाक्यस्याप्यनारभ्याधीतत्वात्सर्वपशुयागप्रकृतिभूते प्राणिद्रव्यकेऽग्नीषोमीये

तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रानामधेयत्वम् ।

‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहोती’ त्यत्राग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तत्प्रख्य-  
शास्त्रात् । तस्य गुणस्य प्रख्यापकस्य प्रापकस्य शास्त्रस्य विद्यमान-  
त्वात्, अग्निहोत्रशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति यावत् । नन्वयं गुण-

कर्मणि तेन गुणो विधीयते । तथाच ‘अग्नीषोमीय पशुमालभेते’ति विहितं  
पशुयागमत्र वाक्ये यजेतेति पदेनानूद्य तत्र चित्रापदेन चित्रत्वस्त्रीत्वरूपौ  
गुणौ विधीयेते इति चेन्न । चित्रत्वेन स्त्रीत्वेन च तं भावयेदिति द्वयोर्गुण-  
योर्विधाने वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । प्राप्ते कर्मण्यनेकगुणविधाने वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गस्य  
सर्वसंमतत्वात् । तथाचोक्तम्—‘प्राप्ते कर्मणि नानेको विधातुं शक्यते गुणः ॥  
अप्राप्ते तु विधीयेरन्वहवोऽप्येकयत्नतः’ इति ॥

नन्वत्र वाक्यभेदपरिहाराय गुणद्वयविशिष्ट पशुद्वयरूपं कारकं विधी-  
यत इति चेन्न । गौरवलक्षणवाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्च दध्यादिवाक्यं प्रकृ-  
तमस्य चित्रानामकस्य यागस्योत्पत्तिवचनं भवति । यागस्वरूपभूतयोर्दध्या-  
दिद्रव्यप्रजापतिदेवतयोरत्रोपदिश्यमानत्वात् । उत्पन्नस्य च तस्य यागस्य  
‘चित्रया यजेत पशुकाम’ इत्येतत्फलवाक्यमत्र यागस्य फलसंबन्धबोधनात् ।  
एवञ्च सति प्रकृतार्थो लभ्येत । अग्नीषोमीयपश्वनुवादेन, तादृशगुणविधाने तु  
प्रकृतहानाप्रकृतप्रक्रिये प्रसज्येयातां, लिङ्प्रत्ययस्य चानुवादत्वाङ्गीकारा-  
न्मुख्यो विध्यर्थो बाध्येत, तस्माच्चित्रापदं नामधेयमेव न गुणविधिरिति  
ध्येयम् ।

इदानीं तत्प्रख्यशास्त्ररूपात्तृतीयनिमित्तानामधेयत्वमग्निहोत्रशब्दस्य प्रदर्श-  
यति—अग्निहोत्रमिति । ‘तत्प्रख्यं चान्यशास्त्रमिति’ हि तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रसू-  
त्रम् । तस्य फलितार्थमाह—तस्येत्यादिना ।

नन्वाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीत्यत्राग्निरूपस्य गुणस्यैव विधिर्न नामधेयत्वमग्निहोत्र-  
शब्दस्य स्वीकर्तव्यमित्याशङ्कते—नन्वयमिति । यद्यत्र सप्तमीसमासमाश्रित्य  
होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपस्य गुणस्य विधानं स्वीक्रियते तदा तदाधारत्वेनाग्नि-  
रूपस्य गुणस्य वाक्यान्तरेण प्राप्तत्वात्तत्त्वेन तद्विधानस्यानर्थक्यमापद्येते-

विधिरेव कुतो नेति चेन्न । यद्यग्नौ होत्रमस्मिन्निति सप्तमीसमासमाश्रित्य होमाधारत्वेनाग्निरूपो गुणो विधेयस्तदा 'यदाहवनीये जुहोती' त्यनेनैवाग्नेः प्राप्तत्वात्तद्विधानानर्थक्यम्, अग्नये होत्रमिति चतुर्थीसमासमाश्रित्य अग्निदेवतारूपगुणोऽनेन विधीयत इति चेन्न । तदेवतायाः शास्त्रान्तरेण प्राप्तत्वात् ।

देवतारूपेणाग्निप्रापकशास्त्रप्रश्नः ।

किं तच्छास्त्रान्तरमिति चेत् । 'यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोती'ति केचित् । अपरे तु 'अग्निर्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरग्निः स्वाहेति मन्त्रवर्ण एवाग्निरूप-

त्याह—यद्यग्नवित्यादिना । चतुर्थीसमासनाश्रित्यात्राग्निदेवतारूपस्य गुणस्य विधानमाशङ्कते—चतुर्थीत्यादिना । नात्र देवतारूपेणाग्निरूपस्य गुणस्य विधानमुपपद्यत इति समाधत्ते—नेति । तत्र हेतुमाह—तदेवताया इति । अग्निरत्र तच्छब्दार्थः ।

देवतारूपेणाग्निप्रापकं शास्त्रं पृच्छति—किमिति । केषांचिन्मतानुसारेणोत्तरमाह—यदग्नये चेति । अत्राग्निर्ज्योतिरित्यादिमन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजापतिमात्रविधाने लाघवं तदुभयसमुच्चितस्यैवात्र विधाने गौरवमिति न समुच्चितोभयविधानं 'यदग्नये च सायं जुहोती'त्यत्र स्वीकर्तव्यमित्यस्वरसंबीजं केचिदित्यनेन सूचितम् । अधुना सिद्धान्तमतेनोत्तरमाह—अपरेत्विति । किंच 'अग्निर्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरग्निः स्वाहेति सायं जुहोती'ति विहितेन मन्त्रेण प्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितस्य प्रजापतेः 'यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोती'त्यत्र सायं कालेऽग्निहोत्रदेवतात्वं विधीयते । 'सूर्यो ज्योतिर्ज्योतिः सूर्यः स्वाहेति प्रातर्जुहोती'ति विहितेन च मन्त्रेण प्राप्तं सूर्यमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितस्य च तस्य 'यत्सूर्याय च प्रजापतये च प्रातर्जुहोती'त्यत्र प्रातःकालेऽग्निहोत्रदेवतात्वं विधीयते । तेनाग्नेर्मान्त्रवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिविधेरेकेनैव वाक्येन सिद्धेः 'यदग्नये च प्रजापतये सायं जुहोति, यत्सूर्याय च प्रातर्जुहोती'तीत्यत्र वाक्यद्वयं व्यर्थमिति निरस्ते सायं होमेऽग्निसमुच्चितस्य प्रजापतेर्विधानं प्रातर्होमे सूर्यसमुच्चितस्य च तस्यैकेन वाक्येन कर्तुमशक्यत्वा-

देवताप्रापकः । नन्वग्नेर्मान्नवर्णिकत्वे प्रजापतिदेवताया बाधः स्यात् ।  
 मन्त्रवर्णस्य चतुर्थीतो दुर्बलत्वात् । यथाहुः—तद्धितेन चतुर्थ्या वा मन्त्र-  
 वर्णेन वा पुनः । देवताया विधिस्तत्र दुर्बलं तु परं पर' मिति चेन्न ।  
 'यदग्नये च प्रजापतये च सायं जुहोती'त्यत्र न केवलं प्रजापतिविधानम्,  
 किंतु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजापतेः । एवंच न बाधः,  
 केवलप्रजापतिविधानाभावात् । नचात्र समुचितोभयविधानमेव कथं

दित्यलं विस्तरेणाधिकं तु न्यायप्रकाशे द्रष्टव्यम् । नन्वग्नेर्मान्नवर्णिकत्वे  
 प्रजापतिना तस्य बाधः स्यात्प्रजापतेश्चतुर्थ्या देवतारूपेण प्राप्तत्वेन प्रबल-  
 त्वात् । अग्नेस्तु मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तत्वेन दुर्बलत्वाच्च । नच 'सास्य देवते'ति तद्धि-  
 तप्रत्ययस्य देवतात्वे स्मरणवच्चतुर्थी न देवतात्वे स्मर्यते 'संप्रदाने चतुर्थी'ति  
 संप्रदानमात्रे तस्याः स्मरणात् । तस्मात्प्रजापतिना कथमग्नेर्बाधः स्यादिति  
 वाच्यम् । त्यज्यमानद्रव्योद्देश्यत्वे सति प्रतिग्रहीतृत्वस्य संप्रदानपदार्थत्वेन  
 त्यज्यमानद्रव्योद्देश्यत्वरूपस्य देवतात्वस्य संप्रदानस्वरूपान्तर्गतत्वान् । तत-  
 श्चतुर्थीतः संप्रदानैकदेशतया देवतात्वप्रत्ययो भवत्येव मन्त्रवर्णात्तु न देव-  
 तात्वप्रतीतिरस्ति कित्वधिष्ठानत्वमेव ततः प्रतीयते । तस्मान्मन्त्रवर्णश्चतुर्थीतो  
 दुर्बल एव । तथाच प्रबलप्रमाणबोधितप्रजापतिदेवतया दुर्बलप्रमाणबोधि-  
 ताग्नेर्बाधो दुर्वार एवेत्याशयेन शङ्कते—**नन्विति** । तत्रसंमतिमाह—**यथा-**  
**हुरिति । तत्रेति** । तद्धितादिषु मध्य इत्यर्थः । **परमिति** । तद्धितापेक्षया  
 चतुर्थ्या दौर्बल्यं चतुर्थ्यपेक्षया च मन्त्रवर्णस्य दौर्बल्यं भवतीति परंपरं  
 दुर्बलं बोध्यमित्यर्थः । ततः परमिति पाठे तु ततस्ततः परं दुर्बलप्रमाण-  
 मिति वीप्सापरत्वेन व्याख्येयम् । यदिच 'प्रजापतये जुहोती'ति केवलप्र-  
 जापतिविधानं स्यात्तदा तु भवेदपि प्रजापतिनाग्नेर्बाधः परंतु न तथा  
 विधानं क्रियते इति परिहरति—**यदग्नयेचेत्यादिना** । प्रजापतेरित्यत्र  
 विधानमित्यस्यानुषङ्गः । **एवंचेति** । मन्त्रवर्णप्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितस्य  
 प्रजापतेर्विधाने चेत्यर्थः । **न बाध इति** । न प्रजापतिनाग्नेर्बाध इत्यर्थः ।  
 तत्र हेतुमाह—**केवलेति** । **ननु** यदग्नये च प्रजापतये चेत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये

नेति वाच्यम् । समुच्चितोभयविधानापेक्षयान्यतः प्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य तत्समुच्चितप्रजापतिमात्रविधाने लाघवात् । एवं प्रयाजेषु समिदादिदेवतानां 'समिधः समिधो अग्न आज्यस्य व्यन्त्व' त्यादिमन्त्रवर्णभ्यः प्राप्तत्वात् ४ 'समिधो यजती'त्यादिषु समिदादिशब्दास्तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रात्कर्मनामधेयम् ।

तद्व्यपदेशेन कर्मनामधेयत्वम् ।

'श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेते'त्यत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं तद्व्यपदेशात् । तेन व्यपदेशादुपमानात्तदन्यथानुपपत्तेरिति यावत् । तथाहि यद्विधेयं तस्य स्तुतिर्भवति । यद्यत्र श्येनो विधेयः स्यात्, तदार्थवादैस्तस्यैव स्तुतिः कार्या 'यथा वै श्येनो निपत्यादत्ते एवमयं

होमानुवादेन समुचितस्यैवोभयस्य विधानं क्रियत इति कथं न स्वीक्रियत इत्याशङ्क्य तयोः समुचितयोर्विधानापेक्षया मन्त्रवर्णतः प्राप्तमग्निमनूद्य लाघवेन तत्समुच्चितप्रजापतेर्विधानमेवोचितमिति परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना । तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रानामधेयत्वे उदाहरणान्तरमाह—एवमिति । समिदादिशब्दा इत्यत्रादिपदेन तनूनपातादयः शब्दा गृह्यन्ते ।

इदानीं चतुर्थनिमित्तेन तद्व्यपदेशरूपेण श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं प्रदर्शयति—श्येनेति । कर्मनामधेयत्वमिति । नन्वत्र श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं न भवति, किंतु सोमयागे नित्यं सोमद्रव्यं बाधित्वा तस्य स्थाने पक्षिद्रव्यरूपो गुणः काम्यो विधीयते, तथा सति श्येनशब्दस्य पक्षिणि लोकप्रसिद्धा रूढिरुपपन्ना भवतीत्याशङ्क्य श्येनशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वे हेतुमाह—तद्व्यपदेशादिति । तद्व्यपदेशशब्दं व्याचष्टे—तेनेति । श्येनेनेत्यर्थः । तदिति । उपमानोपमेयभावस्य भेदघटितत्वादेवार्थवादवाक्ये श्येनोपमानेन विधेयस्तुतेः श्येननामककर्मविशेषं विनानुपपत्तेर्नात्र पक्षिद्रव्यरूपो गुणो विधातुं शक्यत इति भावः । तदन्यथानुपपत्तिमेवोपपादयति—तथाहीत्यादिना । तदिति । विधेयस्य स्तुतेः कर्तव्यत्वादित्यर्थः । अत्रेति । श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेतेत्यत्रेत्यर्थः । श्येन इति । श्येननामकपक्षिविशेष इत्यर्थः । तस्यैवेति । श्येननामकपक्षि-

द्विषन्तं भ्रातृव्यं निपत्यादत्त' इत्यनेनार्थवादेन श्येनः स्तोतुं न शक्यः, श्येनोपमानेनार्थान्तरस्तुतेः क्रियमाणत्वात् । नच श्येनोपमानत्वेन स एव स्तोतुं शक्यते, उपमानोपमेयभावस्य भिन्ननिष्ठत्वात् । यदा तु श्येनसंज्ञको यागो विधीयते तदार्थवादेन श्येनोपमानेन तस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्यत इति श्येनशब्दः कर्मनामधेयं तद्व्यपदेशादिति ।

कर्मनामधेयत्वे उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणबलीयस्त्वम् ।

उत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणबलीयस्त्वमपि पञ्चमं नामधेयनिमित्तमिति केचित् ।

विशेषस्यैवेत्यर्थः । यथेति । यथा श्येनः पक्षिविशेषो निपत्य मत्स्यादीज्जन्तूनादत्ते एवमयं श्येननामको यागो द्विषन्तं भ्रातृव्यं शत्रुं निपत्यादत्त इत्यर्थः । यमभिचरति । श्येनेनेति वाक्यशेषः । अत्रेति । अत्र प्रकृतेऽनेन श्येनार्थवादेन श्येनः पक्षिविशेष एव स्तोतुं न शक्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—श्येनेति । ननु श्येनार्थवादोपमानेन श्येन एव पक्षिविशेषः कथं न स्तोतुं शक्यः स्यादित्यत आह—न श्येनोपमानत्वेनेति । तदशक्यत्वे हेतुमाह—उपमानेति । यद्यत्र श्येनसंज्ञकस्य यागस्य विधेयत्वं स्वीक्रियते तदा तादृशार्थवादोपमानेन तस्य श्येनसंज्ञकस्य यागस्य स्तुतिः कर्तुं शक्या भवत्येवेत्याह—तदेत्यादिना । फलितमुपसंहरति—इतीति । एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेणेत्यर्थः ।

अत्र कर्मनामधेयत्वे चोत्पत्तिशिष्टगुणबलीयस्त्वं पञ्चममपि निमित्तं भवतीति केषांचिन्मतमाह—उत्पत्तिशिष्टेति । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—यथेति । अत्रेति । अस्मिन्वाक्ये वैश्वदेवशब्दस्य विश्वदेवदेवताविधायकत्वं न संभवत्युत्पत्तिशिष्टाभ्यादीनां बलीयस्त्वादित्यन्वयः । फलितार्थमुपसंहरति—इतीति । तस्येति शेषः । अत्रेदं बोध्यम्—चातुर्मास्ये चत्वारि पर्वाणि—वैश्वदेवो वरुणप्रघासः साकमेधः शुनासीरीयश्चेति । तेषु प्रथमे पर्वण्यष्टौ यागा विहिताः—आग्नेयमष्टाकपालं निर्वपति, सौम्यं चरुं, सावित्रं द्वादशकपालं, सारस्वत चरुं, पौष्णं चरुं, मारुतं सप्तकपालं, वैश्वदेवीमामिक्षां, यावापृथिव्यमेककपालमिति । तेषामष्टानां यागानां संनिधाविदमान्नायते—

यथा 'वैश्वदेवेन यजेते'त्यादावत्रोत्पत्तिशिष्टाभ्यादीनां बलीयस्त्वाद्वै-  
श्वदेवशब्दस्य विश्वदेवदेवताभिधायकत्वं न संभवतीति कर्मनामधेय-  
त्वम् । वस्तुतस्तु तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रादेवास्य कर्मनामधेयत्वं प्रकृतयागे  
विश्वदेवरूपगुणसंप्रतिपन्नशास्त्रस्यार्थवादरूपस्यैव सत्त्वात् । 'यद्विश्वे-  
देवाः समयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्वम्' इति ॥

वैश्वदेवेन यजेतेति । अत्र चाग्नेयादीन्यागान्यजेतेत्यनूद्य वैश्वदेवशब्देन  
देवतारूपो गुणस्तेषु विधीयते । यद्यपि वैश्वदेव्यामामिक्षायां विश्वेदेवाः  
प्राप्तास्तथाप्याग्नेयादिषु सप्तसु यागेष्वप्राप्तत्वाद्विधीयन्ते । तेष्वप्यश्यादिदेवताः  
सन्तीति चेत्तर्हि गत्यभावात्तेषु देवता विकल्प्यताम् । नामधेयत्वे तु नाममात्र-  
स्याविधेयत्वाद्भव्यदेवतयोरभावेन यागस्यात्र स्वरूपासंभवाच्छ्रूयमाणो विधिर-  
नर्थकः स्यात्तस्माद्गुणविधिरिति पूर्वपक्षः । उत्पत्तिवाक्यैर्विहिताग्नेयादीनष्टौ  
यागान्यजेतेत्यनूद्याष्टानां सङ्ख्ये वैश्वदेवशब्दो नामत्वेनोपवर्ण्यते । नच विधि-  
त्वाभावेऽपि नामोपदेशस्य वैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् । 'प्राचीनप्रवणे वैश्वदेवेन  
यजेते'त्यादिषु वैश्वदेवशब्देनैकेनैवाष्टानां सङ्ख्यस्य व्यवहर्तव्यत्वेनार्थवत्त्वोप-  
पत्तेः । नामप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूता निरुक्तिस्तु द्विधा । आमिक्षायागे विश्वेषां  
देवानामिज्यमानतया तत्सहचरितानां सर्वेषां छत्रिन्यायेन वैश्वदेवत्वमिति,  
विश्वेदेवा अष्टानां कर्तार इति वा तेषां वैश्वदेवत्वम् । तथाच ब्राह्मणं 'यद्वि-  
श्वेदेवाः समयजन्त तद्वैश्वदेवस्य वैश्वदेवत्व'मिति । देवताविकल्पस्तु समान-  
बलत्वाभावान्न युज्यते, अग्न्यादय उत्पत्तिशिष्टत्वात्प्रबलाः विश्वेदेवा उत्पन्न-  
शिष्टत्वाद्बुबलाः तस्माद्वैश्वदेवशब्दः कर्मनामधेयमिति सिद्धान्तः । वस्तुगति-  
माश्रित्य तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रादेव वैश्वदेवशब्दस्य कर्मनामधेयत्वमाह—**वस्तुत-  
स्त्विति । प्रकृतयाग इति ।** वैश्वदेवनामकेष्टानामाग्नेयादीनां सङ्ख्यात्मके  
प्रकृतयाग इत्यर्थः । **विश्वदेवेति ।** प्रकृतयागे विश्वदेवरूपगुणः संप्रतिपन्नः  
संप्राप्तो यस्मात्तादृशशास्त्रस्येत्यर्थः । तत्र गुणप्रापकं शास्त्रमुदाहरति—  
**यद्विश्वेदेवा इति ।** अस्य शास्त्रस्य कर्तृरूपेण प्रकृते यागे विश्वदेवरूपगु-  
णप्रापकत्वमिति भावः । नामधेयस्य प्रयोजनं तु सर्वत्र व्यवहार एव । नह्य-

अथ निषेधमीमांसा ।

पुरुषस्य निवर्तकं वाक्यं निषेधः, निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतु-  
क्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वात् । तथाहि यथा विधिः प्रवर्तनां प्र-  
तिपादयन्स्वप्रवर्तकत्वनिर्वाहार्थं विधेयस्य यागादेरिष्टसाधनत्वमाक्षि-  
पन्पुरुषं तत्र प्रवर्तयति, तथा 'न कलञ्जं भक्षये' इत्यादिनिषेधो-  
ऽपि निवर्तनां प्रतिपादयन्स्वनिवर्तकत्वनिर्वाहार्थं निषेध्यस्य कलञ्ज-  
भक्षणस्य परानिष्टसाधनत्वमाक्षिपन्पुरुषं ततो निवर्तयति ।

धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वयः ।

**ननु निषेधवाक्यस्य कथं निवर्तनाप्रतिपादकत्वमिति चेदुच्यते ।**

न्तरेण नामधेयमृत्विग्वरणादिष्वनेनाहं यक्ष्य इत्याख्यानोपायो लघुः कश्चि-  
दस्ति, तस्माद्वैश्वदेवादिशब्दानां कर्मनामधेयत्वमेवेति सिद्धम् ।

तदेवं मत्वर्थलक्षणादिनिमित्तचतुष्टयनिरूपणेन नामधेयस्य विधेयार्थपरि-  
च्छेदकतयार्थवत्त्वं निरूपितम् । अधुना निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थवत्त्वनिरूपणाय नि-  
षेधवाक्यं लक्षयति—**पुरुषस्य निवर्तकमिति । निषेधेति ।** 'न कलञ्जं  
भक्षयेत्' इत्यादिनिषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतुभूतायाः कलञ्जभक्षणादिक्रियायाः  
सकाशात्पुरुषस्य निवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वं न किञ्चित्कर्तव्यताप्रतिपादक-  
त्वेनेति भावः, यथा विधिवाक्यानां स्वप्रवर्तकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या विधेयार्थस्य  
स्वर्गादिरूपेष्टसाधनत्वप्रत्यायनेन तत्र विधेयार्थे पुरुषप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वं तथा  
निषेधानामपि स्वनिवर्तकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या निषेध्यस्य पुरुषानिष्टसाधनत्वप्र-  
त्यायनेन, ततः कलञ्जभक्षणादेः पुरुषनिवृत्तिजनकत्वमिति दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्ति-  
काभ्यां निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतुक्रियायाः पुरुषनिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैवार्थवत्त्वमुप-  
पादयति—**तथाहीत्यादिना ।**

**ननु** निषेधवाक्यानां निवर्तनाप्रतिपादकत्वं न संभवति, न भक्षयेन्न हन्तव्य  
इत्येवमादावव्यवधानेन नञर्थस्याभावस्य धात्वर्थेनान्वये सति धात्वर्थवर्ज-  
नकर्तव्यताया एव सर्वत्र वाक्यार्थत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वात् । तथाच यथा यजे-  
तेत्यादौ यागकर्तव्यता वाक्यार्थो भवति तथा 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्' 'ब्राह्मणो  
न हन्तव्यः' इत्यादावपि तत्तद्धात्वर्थवर्जनकर्तव्यतैव वाक्यार्थो न निवर्तनेत्या-



न तावदत्र धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वयः, अव्यवधानेऽपि तस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः । नह्यन्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितमन्यत्रान्वेति । अन्यथा राजपुरुषमानयेत्यादावपि राज्ञः क्रियान्वयापत्तेः । अतः प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव नञर्थेनान्वयः । तत्रापि नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावनायास्तस्या लिङंशवाच्यप्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितेः, किंतु लिङंशवाच्यशब्दभावनायाः, तस्याः सर्वापेक्षया प्रधानत्वात् ।

शयेनाशङ्कते—**नन्विति** । नञर्थस्याभावस्य धात्वर्थेनाव्यवधानेऽपि धात्वर्थस्य प्रत्ययार्थभावनोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितत्वान्न नञर्थेनान्वयः संभवति । अन्यत्रोपसर्जनत्वेनान्वितस्यान्यत्रोपसर्जनत्वेनान्वयायोगादिति परिहरति—**उच्यत इत्यादिना । अत्रेति ।** ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षये’दित्यादावित्यर्थः । अव्यवधानेऽपीत्यत्र धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनेत्यनुषङ्गः । **तस्येति ।** धात्वर्थस्येत्यर्थः । अन्योपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितस्याप्यन्यत्रोपसर्जनत्वेनान्वये को दोष इत्यत आह—**नहीति ।** तत्र बाधकं दोषमाह—**अन्यथेति ।** अन्यविशेषणत्वेनोपस्थितस्याप्यन्यत्र विशेषणत्वेनान्वयस्वीकारे पुरुषोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितस्य राज्ञोऽपि क्रियोपसर्जनत्वेनान्वयापत्तेरित्यर्थः । धात्वर्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वयासंभवात्कलञ्जादिपदार्थस्यापि कारकोपसर्जनत्वेनोपस्थितस्य तत्रान्वयासंभवाच्च परिशेषात्प्रत्ययार्थस्यैव नञर्थेनान्वयो भवतीत्याह—**अत इति ।** किञ्च प्रत्ययार्थोऽपि द्विविधो भवतीत्याख्यातत्वांशवाच्यार्थभावना लिङंशवाच्या शब्दभावना चेति, तयोर्मध्ये नाख्यातत्वांशवाच्यभूताया अर्थभावनाया नञर्थेऽन्वयः संभवतीत्याह—**तत्रापीति ।** तत्र हेतुमाह—**तस्या इति ।** प्रवर्तनोपसर्जनत्वेनेति । शब्दभावनाविशेषणत्वेनेत्यर्थः । लिङंशवाच्येत्यस्य लिङो योऽंशो लिङ्त्वरूपो धर्मस्तद्वाच्येत्यर्थो बोध्यः । एवमग्रेऽपि । **ननु** ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षये’दित्यादौ कलञ्जादिपदार्थस्य धात्वर्थस्य च नञर्थेनान्वयो भवतैव निरस्तः, प्रत्ययार्थस्याप्यर्थभावनारूपस्य नञर्थेनान्वयानङ्गीकारे प्रत्ययार्थत्वाविशेषाच्छब्दभावनाया अपि तेनान्वयासंभवेनान्वितशब्दस्याप्रामाण्यापत्तिरित्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—**किंत्विति ।** तत्र हेतुमाह—**तस्या इति ।** प्रत्ययार्थत्वं न नञर्थेनान्वये

नञ्स्वभावकथनम् ।

नञश्चैष स्वभावो यत्स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वम् । यथा घटो नास्तीत्यादौ अस्तीतिशब्दसमभिव्याहृतो नञ् घटसत्त्व-विरोधि घटासत्त्वं गमयति तदिह लिङ्समभिव्याहृतो नञ् लिङर्थ-प्रवर्तनाविरोधिनीं निवर्तनामेव बोधयति । तदिह विधिवाक्यश्रव-णेऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रतीतेः । तस्मान्निषेधवाक्यस्थले निवर्तनैव

प्रयोजक किंतु सर्वापेक्षया मुख्यत्वेनोपस्थितत्वं, तच्च शब्दभावनायामबाधि-तमिति भावः ।

एवं शब्दभावनारूपस्य प्रत्ययार्थस्य प्रवर्तनाविशेषस्य नञर्थेनान्वये सिद्धे नञः प्रत्ययार्थभूतप्रवर्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनाबोधकत्वप्रदर्शनाय प्रथमं तत्स्व-भावं प्रदर्शयति—नञश्चैष स्वभाव इति । अत्र स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थविरो-धिबोधकत्वं स्वान्वितपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्व बोध्यम् । तेन कलञ्जादिपदार्थाना-मपि विरोधिबोधकत्वं नञो दुर्वारं स्यात्तेषामप्येकत्र सहपाठरूपनञ्समभि-व्याहारस्य सत्त्वादिति निरस्तम् । तेषां नञन्वितपदार्थत्वाभावस्य दर्शितत्वेन नञस्तद्विरोधिबोधकत्वासंभवात् । नञः स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थविरोधिबोधकत्वं दृष्टान्तेन स्पष्टयति—यथेत्यादिना । घटसत्त्वविरोधीति । नास्तीत्युक्ते कस्यासत्त्वमस्तीति सत्त्वशब्दान्वयिना नञात्र बोध्यते इति सत्त्वनिरूपकाका-ङ्क्षायाः सत्त्वाद्धटनिरूपितसत्त्वविरोधीत्यर्थः । इदानीं नञः स्वभावप्रदर्शनस्य फलं दर्शयति—तदिति । तन्नञित्यन्वयः । तत्पददर्शितस्वभावं नञित्यर्थः । इहेति । ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षयेद्ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्य’ इत्यादौ वाक्य इत्यर्थः । ननु लिङः प्रवर्तनाप्रतिपादकत्वे सिद्धे तत्संबद्धनञस्तदर्थं प्रवर्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनाप्र-तिपादकत्वं सेत्स्यति तदेव कुत इत्याशङ्क्य तत्र हेतुमाह—विधीति । प्रतीतेरिति । प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः । यद्वा ‘यजेत स्वर्गकाम’ इति विधि-वाक्यश्रवणेऽयं मां प्रवर्तयतीति प्रवर्तनाप्रतीतिवत्, ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षये’दित्यादिनि-षेधवाक्यश्रवणेऽप्ययं मा निवर्तयतीति निवर्तनाप्रतीतेरित्यध्याहारेण विधीत्या-दिहेतुवाक्यं दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकविधया योजनीयम् । एव सिद्ध निवर्तनारूपं निषेधवाक्यार्थमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति । ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षये’दित्यत्र कलञ्ज-

वाक्यार्थः । यदा तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये बाधकं तदा धात्वर्थस्यैव तत्रान्वयः ।

बाधकं द्विविधम् ।

तच्च बाधकं द्विविधम् । तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रमो विकल्पप्रसक्तिश्च । तत्राद्यं 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्य'मित्यादौ तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रम्यैतद्वाक्यपाठात् । तथाचात्र पर्युदासाश्रयणम् । तथाहि—व्रतशब्दस्य कर्तव्यार्थे रूढत्वा-

कर्मकभक्षणानुकूलपुरुषप्रवृत्तिजनकप्रवर्तनाप्रति लिङर्थप्रवर्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनैव वाक्यार्थः । एवमन्यत्रापि निषेधवाक्येषु सर्वत्र निवर्तनाया एव वाक्यार्थत्वे विधिनिषेधयोर्भिन्नार्थत्वमप्युपपन्नं भवति, हननादिवर्जनकर्तव्यतावाक्यार्थत्व-पक्षे तु कर्तव्यताया एवोभयत्र प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्तयोरेकार्थत्वं स्यात्तच्च न युक्तम् । यथाहुः—'अन्तरं यादृशं लोके ब्रह्महत्याश्वमेधयोः । दृश्यते तादृगोवेह विधान-प्रतिषेधयो'रिति । तस्मान्निवर्तनैव प्रतिषेधेषु वाक्यार्थ इति सिद्धम् । यदि तु प्रत्ययार्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वये किञ्चिद्बाधकं वर्तते तदा धात्वर्थस्यैव नञर्थेना-न्वयो भवतीत्याह—यदात्वित्यादिना ।

तत्र बाधकं विभजते—तच्चेति । प्रत्ययार्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वये वर्तमानं चे-त्यर्थः । तत्राद्यमिति । तयोरुक्तयोर्द्वयोर्मध्य आद्यबाधकमित्यर्थः । तस्य व्रत-मितीति । तस्य स्नातकस्य ब्रह्मचारिविशेषस्य व्रतं प्रजापतिदेवताकमात्मानिक्ष-णसंकल्पादिकं किञ्चिदनुष्ठेयमित्यर्थः । एतद्वाक्यपाठादिति । 'नेक्षेतोद्य-न्तमादित्यं नास्तंयन्तं कदाचने'त्येतद्वाक्यपाठादित्यर्थः । तथाचेति । तस्य व्रतमिति स्नातकस्यानुष्ठेयमुपक्रम्य 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्त'मित्यादिवाक्यपाठे चास्मि-न्वाक्ये पर्युदास एव समाश्रीयत इत्यर्थः । किञ्च 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्य'मित्यत्र नञ्पदमभिधावृत्त्या प्रतिषेधं ब्रूते नतु पर्युदासं, लक्षणापत्तेः प्रतिषेधस्य च प्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वाद्वैदिकस्य प्रतिषेधस्य वैदिक्येव प्राप्तिस्तु प्रत्यासन्ना भवेत् । तथाच सति यत्र कृतावादिलेक्षणं विहितं तत्राय प्रतिषेध उदयास्तमयोद्देशेन प्रवर्तते । एवंच सति नात्र फलकल्पनीय स्यात् । पर्युदासमाश्रित्य पुरुषार्थत्वा-ङ्गीकारे त्वधिकारसिद्धये फलस्य कल्पनीयत्वमापद्येत, तस्मादत्र क्रत्वर्थः प्रतिषेध इत्याशङ्क्य, तस्य व्रतमित्युपक्रम्य 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमि'त्याद्यान्नातत्वाद्व्रतशब्दस्य

तस्य व्रतमित्यत्र स्नातकस्य व्रतानां कर्तव्यत्वेनोपक्रमात् † किं तत्कर्तव्यमित्याकाङ्क्षायां 'नेक्षेतोद्यन्त'मित्यादिना कर्तव्यार्थ एव प्रतिपादनीयः । अन्यथा पूर्वोत्तरवाक्ययोरेकवाक्यत्वं न स्यात् । तथाच नञर्थेन न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः कर्तव्यार्थानवबोधात् । विध्यर्थप्रवर्तनाविरोधिनिवर्तनाया एव तादृशनञ्जा बोधनात्, तस्याश्च कर्तव्यार्थ-

च कर्तव्यरूपार्थे रूढत्वाद्वा किञ्चिदनुष्ठेयमेव प्रतिभाति । तच्च पर्युदासाश्रयणे सत्येवोपपद्यते । किञ्चोपक्रमवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञातस्येवार्थस्यात्रापि वक्तव्यत्वात्, उपक्रमवाक्ये तु स्नातकानुष्ठेयव्रतानामेव प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् कानि तानि व्रतानीत्यपेक्षायां स्नातकव्रतप्रदर्शनायास्य वाक्यस्यावतारादत्र कर्तव्य एव कश्चिदर्थो वक्तव्यः, सच पर्युदासपक्षे लभ्यते निषेधपक्षे तु दुर्लभ एवेत्यभिप्रायेण पर्युदासपक्षमुपपादयति—**तथाहीत्यादिना** । नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमित्यादौ कर्तव्यरूपस्यार्थस्याप्रतिपादनीयत्वे बाधकमाह—**अन्यथेति । पूर्वोत्तरेति** । तस्य व्रतमिति पूर्ववाक्यम् नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमित्याद्युत्तरवाक्यं च तयोरेकवाक्यत्वं बाध्येतेत्यर्थः । **ननु** नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमित्यादौ भवतु कर्तव्यरूपार्थस्यैव प्रतिपादनं ततोऽपि किं स्यादित्यत आह—**तथाचेति** । तथाच नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमित्यादौ कर्तव्यरूपार्थस्य प्रतिपादनीयत्वे च नञर्थेन प्रत्ययार्थान्वयावकाशो न भवतीत्यर्थः । **ननु** नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादिस्यमित्यत्र नञर्थेन प्रत्ययार्थस्यान्वये को दोष इत्याशङ्क्य तत्र हेतुमाह—**कर्तव्येति** । नञर्थेन प्रत्ययार्थस्य तत्रान्वये ततः कर्तव्यार्थानवबोधापत्तेरित्यर्थः । **ननु** प्रत्ययान्वितस्य नञः कर्तव्यार्थावबोधकत्वानङ्गीकारे को वार्थस्तेनावबोध्यत इत्यत आह—**विध्यर्थेति । तादृशनञ्जेति** प्रत्ययान्वितेन नञेत्यर्थः । तादृशनिवर्तनैव कर्तव्यरूपार्थो भवतु को दोष इति मन्दाभिप्रायमाशङ्क्याह—**तस्याश्चेति** । निरुक्तनिवर्तनायाश्चेत्यर्थः । किञ्चैवं नञः प्रत्ययेनान्वयासंभवे प्रत्ययादवतारितो नञ् धातुना सह संबध्यते धातुना नञः संबन्धे च न तस्य निषेधकत्वं संभवति विधायकसंबन्धस्यैव नञो निषेधकत्वात्, निषेधकत्वस्य विधायकत्वप्रतिपक्षत्वात्, नामधातुभ्यां योगे तु नञो न निषेधकत्वं युक्तं तयोरविधायकत्वात् । यथाहुः—'नामधात्वर्थयोगे तु नैव नञ् प्रतिषेधकः । वदत्यब्राह्मणाधर्मावन्यमात्रविरोधिना'विति । तस्मान्नेक्षेतेत्यत्र नञो

त्वाभावात् । तस्मान्नेक्षेतेत्यत्र नञा धात्वर्थविरोध्यनीक्षणसंकल्प एव लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते तस्य कर्तव्यत्वसंभवात् ।

पर्युदासपक्षे नेक्षेतेत्यस्य वाक्यार्थः ।

आदित्यविषयकानीक्षणसंकल्पेन भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थः । तत्र भाव्याकाङ्क्षायाम् 'एतावता हैनसा वियुक्तो भवती'ति वाक्यशेषावगतः

धातुना योगान्नञा धात्वर्थेक्षणविरोधी कश्चनार्थः प्रतिपाद्यते । यद्यपि नञोऽभाव एव शक्तिः । तथाचेक्षणस्याभाव एव नञः शक्यार्थो लाघवात् नतु तद्विरोधी तस्मादभावघटितत्वेन गौरवापत्तेः । तदन्यतद्विरुद्धतदभावेषु नञिति स्मरणं तु प्रतीत्यभिप्रायं न शक्त्यभिप्रायं, तथापि नेक्षेतेत्यत्र प्रत्ययस्य नञा संबन्धात् नञ्संबन्धशून्येन च तेन तावत्कश्चिदर्थो विधेयः स्वीकर्तव्यः । तत्र न तावद्भात्वर्थो विधातुं शक्यते, नञा तदभावबोधनात् । नापि तदभावो विधातुं शक्यते, अभावस्याविधेयत्वात्, तस्मात्पर्युदासाश्रयणेन धात्वर्थेक्षणविरोधी कश्चनात्र विधानयोग्योर्थो नञा लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यते, सच विधानयोग्यः पदार्थोऽनीक्षणसंकल्प एव तस्येक्षणविरोधित्वात्कर्तव्यत्वसंभवाच्च स एव संकल्पोऽत्रानुष्ठेयत्वेन विधीयत इत्यभिप्रायेण पर्युदासस्यावश्यकत्वात्प्रत्ययादवतारितस्य नञो धातुसंबन्धेन तदर्थविरोध्यनीक्षणसंकल्पप्रतिपादकत्वमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति । लक्षणयेति । स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थाभाव एव नञः स्वशक्यार्थो भवति । तथाच स्वसंबन्ध्यमानधात्वर्थाभावं शक्या प्रतिपादयन् नञ् तदभावसंबन्धिनं तदर्थविरोधिनं लक्षणया प्रतिपादयत्येव तदभावतद्विरोधिनोः संबन्धस्य संभवात् । दृश्यते हि तेजोऽभावतमसोः संबन्धः । तथाचोद्यन्तमस्तंयन्तं चादित्य नेक्षिष्य इत्येवंरूपः संकल्पोऽत्रानुष्ठेयत्वेन विधीयमानो नञा लक्षणया प्रतिपाद्यत इति भावः । तस्येति । अनीक्षणसंकल्पस्येत्यर्थः ।

पर्युदासपक्षे नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्यस्य वाक्यस्यार्थं प्रदर्शयति—आदित्येति । यत्तु पर्युदासपक्षे फलस्यात्र कल्पनीयत्वमापादितं तदपि न, वाक्यशेषावगतस्य पापक्षयस्यैवात्र फलत्वसंभवादित्याशयेनात्र भाव्यान्वयं प्रदर्शयति—तत्रेति । अनीक्षणसंकल्पभावनायामित्यर्थः । एनसा वियुक्तो

पापक्षयो भाव्यतयान्वेति । एवंच पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकवाक्यत्वं निर्वहत्येव । नचात्र धात्वर्थविरोधिनः पदार्थान्तरस्यापि संभवात्कथमनीक्षणसं-  
कल्पस्यैव भावनान्वय इति वाच्यम् । तस्य कर्तव्यताऽभावेन प्रकृते  
भावनान्वयायोग्यत्वात् । द्वितीयं 'यजतिषु येयजामहं करोति  
नानुयाजेष्वित्यादावत्र विकल्पप्रसक्तौ च पर्युदासाश्रयणात् ।

विकल्पप्रसक्तौ पर्युदासाश्रयणम् ।

तथाहि यद्यत्र वाक्ये नञर्थे प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः स्यात्तदा 'अनुयाजेषु  
ये यजामह'इति मन्त्रस्य प्रतिषेधः स्यात्, अनुयाजेषु येयजामहं न  
भवतीति । पापेन विरहितो भवतीत्यर्थः । किञ्च नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमित्य-  
त्रानीक्षणसंकल्परूपस्यानुष्ठेयस्य प्रतिपादने तस्य व्रतमिति स्नातकव्रतोपक्रम-  
वाक्यस्य नेक्षेतेत्याद्युत्तरवाक्येनैकवाक्यत्वमुपपन्नं भवति, पूर्वप्रतिज्ञानस्यै-  
वोत्तरप्रतिपादनादित्याह—**एवमिति । ननु** धात्वर्थेक्षणविरोधिनो बहवः  
पदार्था अनुष्ठेयाः सन्ति, ततश्च कथमत्र वाक्येऽनीक्षणसंकल्पस्यैव भाव-  
नायां करणत्वेनान्वयः स्वीक्रियत इत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—**नचेत्यादिना ।**  
यद्यपि पदार्थान्तराणां पटेन चक्षुषोऽपिधानादिरूपाणां धात्वर्थेक्षणविरो-  
धित्वं संभवति, तथापि कायिकवाचिकव्यापारविशेषाणामत्राप्रतीयमानत्वा-  
न्मानसव्यापारस्य चाप्रतिषेधात्संकल्प एव मानसव्यापारविशेषोऽत्र परिशि-  
ष्यत इत्यभिप्रेत्य तत्र हेतुमाह—**तस्येति ।** पटादिना चक्षुषोः पिधानादि-  
रूपस्य पदार्थान्तरस्य कर्तव्यताभावेन कर्तव्यत्वेन विवक्षासंभवेन सर्वक्रिया-  
ऽविनाभूतस्यैव धात्वर्थेक्षणविरोधिपदार्थान्तरस्य नेक्षेतेत्यादौ प्रकृते भावनान्व-  
ययोग्यत्वमुपपद्यते । तथाच धात्वर्थेक्षणविरोध्यनीक्षणसंकल्पस्यैवात्र भावना-  
न्वययोग्यता संभवति, तस्य सर्वक्रियाऽविनाभूतत्वान्नतु तादृशपदार्थान्तरस्य  
तस्य सर्वक्रियाविनाभूतत्वासंभवादिति भावः । प्रत्ययार्थस्य नञर्थेनान्वये  
विकल्पप्रसक्तिरूपस्य बाधकस्य प्रतिषेधविघटनेन पर्युदासगमकत्वप्रदर्शनाय  
तद्विषयमुदाहरति—**द्वितीयमिति ।**

अत्र पर्युदासाश्रयणाय विकल्पप्रसक्तिमेवोपपादयति—**तथाहीत्यादिना ।**  
**सचेति ।** निषेधश्चेत्यर्थः । तत्र हेतुमाह—**ग्राप्तस्यैवेति ।** शास्त्रादेवेति ।

कुर्यादिति । सच प्राप्तिपूर्वक एव, प्राप्तस्यैव प्रतिषेधात् । प्राप्तिश्च 'यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती'ति शास्त्रादेव वाच्या । शास्त्रप्राप्तस्य च प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव नतु बाधः । प्राप्तिमूलरागस्येव तन्मूलशा-

ब्राह्मणहननादेरिव रागतः प्राप्त्यसंभवात्तस्य शास्त्रादेव प्राप्तिर्वाच्येत्यर्थः । उपपादितां विकल्पप्रसक्तिमुपसंहरति—शास्त्रप्राप्तस्येति । ननु यथा रागतो हननादौ प्रवृत्तं पुरुषं हननादिप्राप्तिमूलभूतरागस्य बाधेन ततो न हन्तव्य इत्यादिशास्त्रं निवर्तयति, तथा 'यजतिषु येयजामहं करोती'ति शास्त्रादनुयाजेष्वप्यनुष्ठानकाले यजतित्वाविशेषादेव 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रस्य समुच्चारणे प्रवृत्तं पुरुषं तत्प्राप्तिमूलभूतस्य प्रदर्शितशास्त्रस्य यजतिसामान्ये 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रप्रापकस्यानुयाजेषु बाधेन ततो 'नानुयाजेषु ये यजामहं करोती'ति शास्त्रं निवर्तयत्येवेति कथं न शास्त्रप्राप्तस्य बाधः स्यादित्यत आह—प्राप्तीति । शास्त्रेण बाध इति शेषः । तन्मूलशास्त्रस्येति । 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रप्राप्तिमूलशास्त्रात् 'यजतिषु ये यजामहं करोती'त्येवरूपाच्छास्त्रान्तरेण 'नानुयाजेषु यजामहं करोती'त्येवरूपेण प्रदर्शितमन्त्रप्राप्तिमूलभूतस्य प्रदर्शितशास्त्रस्य बाधायोगादित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तस्त्वत्र व्यतिरेकी बोध्यः । तथाच यथा हननादिप्राप्तिमूलरागस्य भ्रान्तिनिमित्तकस्य शास्त्रेण बाधो भवति तथा मन्त्रप्राप्तिमूलशास्त्रान्छास्त्रान्तरेण मन्त्रप्राप्तिमूलशास्त्रस्य बाधो न युक्तो निषेधशास्त्रस्य निषेध्यप्राप्तिसापेक्षत्वेन तत्प्रापकस्याबाधकत्वादित्यनुपदं स्पष्टीभविष्यति मूल इति भावः । यद्वा तन्मूलशास्त्रादिति पञ्चमी षष्ठ्यर्थे बोध्येति, तेनानुषङ्गविभक्तिविपरिणामयोर्न श्रमः कर्तव्यः स्यात् । केचित्तु तन्मूलशास्त्रादिति बाधमूलशास्त्राद्बाधकरूपात्प्राप्तिमूलरागस्य यथा बाधस्तथा शास्त्रान्तरेण प्राप्तिमूलशास्त्रस्य बाधायोगादिति व्याचक्षते । ननु यथा पदाधिकरणकहोमविधायकविशेषशास्त्रेणाहवनीयाधिकरणकहोमविधायकस्य सामान्यशास्त्रस्य बाधः क्रियते, तथानुयाजेषु ये यजामहमन्त्रप्रतिषेधकरूपविशेषशास्त्रेण यागसामान्ये तन्मन्त्रविधायकस्य सामान्यशास्त्रस्य

स्त्रस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण बाधायोगात् । नच 'पदे जुहोती'ति विशेषशास्त्रे-  
णा'हवनीये जुहोती'ति शास्त्रस्येव 'नानुयाजेष्वित्यनेन 'यजतिषु ये  
यजामहं करोती'त्यस्य बाधः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । परस्परनिरपेक्षयोरेव  
शास्त्रयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावात् । पदशास्त्रस्य हि स्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनी-  
यशास्त्रानपेक्षणान्निरपेक्षत्वम् । प्रकृते तु निषेधशास्त्रस्य निषेध्यप्रस-  
क्त्यर्थं 'यजतिषु ये यजामह' मित्यस्यापेक्षणान्न निरपेक्षत्वम् ।

बाधायोगोपसंहारः ।

तस्माच्छास्त्रविहितस्य शास्त्रान्तरेण प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव । सच न  
युक्तः । विकल्पे शास्त्रस्य पाक्षिकाप्रामाण्यापातात् । नह्यनुयाजेषु ये  
यजामहमित्यस्यानुष्ठाने नानुयाजेष्वित्यस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति, त्री-

बाधः कथं न क्रियत इत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना । नच वाच्यमित्यत्र  
हेतुमाह—परस्परेति । शास्त्रयोरेकविषये बाध्यबाधकभावे परस्परनिरपेक्षत्व  
हेतुः पदशास्त्रस्य पदाधिकरणकहोमरूपस्वार्थविधानार्थमाहवनीयशास्त्रनिर-  
पेक्षत्वादनुयाजेषु ये यजामहमन्नप्रतिषेधकशास्त्रस्य तत्र प्रतिषेध्यमन्नप्रसक्त्यर्थं  
यजतिसामान्ये तादृशमन्नविधायकसामान्यशास्त्रसापेक्षत्वाच्चेति दृष्टान्तदार्ष्ट-  
ान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यं प्रदर्शयति—पदशास्त्रस्येत्यादिना । तथाच प्रतिषेधशा-  
स्त्रस्य विशेषविषयत्वेन प्रबलत्ववद्विधिशास्त्रस्याप्युपजीव्यत्वेन प्रबलत्वमस्तीति  
न प्रतिषेधशास्त्रेण विधिशास्त्रस्यात्यन्तबाधो युक्त इति विहितप्रतिषिद्धत्वाद्वि-  
कल्पः स्यात्सच न युक्त इत्युपरिष्ठात्सष्टीभविष्यतीति भावः ।

बाधायोगोपसंहारः—तस्मादिति । मन्नविधायकशास्त्रस्य तत्प्रति-  
षेधकशास्त्रेण बाधायोगाद्विहितस्यापि तेन प्रतिषेधे विकल्प एव स्यान्न बाध  
इत्यर्थः । ननु भवतु विकल्प एव तेन किं हीयत इत्यत आह—  
सचेति । विकल्पस्यायुक्तत्वे हेतुमाह—विकल्प इति । ननु विकल्पस्वी-  
कारे कथं पक्षे शास्त्रस्याप्रामाण्यापात इत्यत आह—नहीति । यथा  
त्रीहिभिर्यागानुष्ठानसमये यवशास्त्रस्य न प्रामाण्यं भवति, तथा विधायक-  
शास्त्रानुसारेण 'ये यजामह' इति मन्नस्यानुयाजेषूच्चारणानुष्ठानसमये न तत्प्र-  
तिषेधकशास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवतीत्यर्थः । किंच विकल्पपक्षे हि द्विरदृष्टक-



हियागानुष्ठाने यवशास्त्रस्येव । द्विरदृष्टकल्पना च स्यात्, विधिप्रतिषेधयोरपि पुरुषार्थत्वात्, अतो नात्र प्रतिषेधस्याश्रयणम्, किंतु नञोऽनुयाजसंबन्धमाश्रित्य पर्युदासस्यैव । इत्थं चानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेषु यजतिषु ये यजामह इति मन्त्रं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थबोधः, नञोऽनुयाजव्यतिरिक्ते लाक्षणिकत्वात् । एवं च न विकल्पः । अत्र च वाक्ये ये यजामहमिति न विधीयते, यजतिषु ये यजामह इत्यनेनैव प्राप्तत्वात् । किंतु सामान्यशास्त्रप्राप्त—येयजामह इ-

ल्पनाप्रसङ्गोऽपि स्यात्, विधिशास्त्राद्धेयवमवगम्यते 'यदनुयाजेषु ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रस्य करणे कश्चनोपकारो भवतीति प्रतिषेधशास्त्रादपि तत्र तदकरणात्कश्चनोपकारो भवति । दर्शपूर्णमासयोरनृतवदनाकरणादिजन्योपकारवदित्यवगम्यते तच्चोपकारद्वयमदृष्टरूपमिति द्विरदृष्टकल्पनाप्रसङ्ग इत्याह—

**द्विरदृष्टकल्पना चेति ।** तत्र हेतुमाह—**विधीति ।** पुरुषार्थत्वादिति ।

विधानवत्प्रतिषेधस्याप्यदृष्टपुरुषार्थसंपादकत्वादित्यर्थः । तस्मान्नानुयाजेष्वित्यादौ प्रतिषेधस्वीकारे विकल्पादिदोषापत्तेर्नात्र प्रतिषेधः समाश्रीयते, किंतु नञो नामसंबन्धमाश्रित्य पर्युदासस्यैवाश्रयणं क्रियत इत्युपसंहरति—**अत इति ।** एव च 'नानुयाजेषु ये यजामह करोती'त्यस्य वाक्यस्यार्थमाह—

**इत्थं चेति ।** अनेन पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण चेत्यर्थः । अत्र पर्युदासस्य तात्पर्यविषयत्वेन करोतेरवतारितस्य नञोऽनुयाजशब्देन संबन्धसिद्धौ चेति यावत् ।

तत्र हेतुमाह—**नञ इति ।** अनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेऽनुयाजाभावस्य सत्त्वाच्छक्यसंबन्धसम्भवेन लक्षणोपपत्तिरिति भावः । अत्र प्रतिषेधपक्ष परित्यज्य पर्युदासपक्षस्वीकारस्य फलमाह—**एवंचेति ।** ननु 'नानुयाजेषु ये यजामहं करोती'त्यत्र 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रविधौ तस्यानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वविधौ च वाक्यभेदः स्यादित्यत आह—**अत्र चेति ।** सामान्यशास्त्रेति ।

'यजतिषु ये यजामह करोती'ति यजिसामान्ये तद्विधायकशास्त्रप्राप्तमेव 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रमनूय 'नानुयाजेषु ये यजामहं करोती'त्यत्र तस्यानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषयता विधीयत इत्यर्थः । तथा च यजतिष्वित्यादिसामान्यशास्त्रस्य विशेषापेक्षिणो नानुयाजेष्वित्यादिविशेषशास्त्रेणानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषयसमर्प-

त्यनुवादेन तस्यानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषयकत्वं विधीयते । यद्यजतिषु येयजामहं करोति तदनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तेष्विति ।

पर्युदासोपसंहारयोर्भेदवर्णनम् ।

नन्वेवं सामान्यशास्त्रप्राप्तस्य विशेषे संकोचनरूपादुपसंहारात्पर्युदासस्य भेदो न स्यादिति चेन्न । उपसंहारो हि तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थः । यथा पुरोडाशं चतुर्धा करोतीति सामान्यप्राप्तचतुर्धाकरणम् आग्नेयं चतुर्धा करोतीति विशेषादाग्नेयपुरोडाशमात्रे संकोच्यते । पर्युदासस्तु तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति ततो भेदात् । कुत्रचिद्विकल्पप्रसक्ता-

णादनुयाजव्यतिरिक्तयागेषु 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रः कर्तव्यतया प्राप्तः । अनुयाजेषु तु तस्य कर्तव्यत्वेनाप्राप्तत्वादप्रतिषिद्धत्वाच्च नात्र विकल्पप्रसङ्गोऽपि मंभवति । लक्षणयानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषयसमर्पणाच्च न नानुयाजेष्वित्यादिवाक्यस्याप्रामाण्यमपि भवति । तस्मात्पर्युदासाश्रयणे बाधकाभावात् स एव स्वीकर्तव्य इति भावः ।

ननु पर्युदासाश्रयणपक्षे 'यजतिषु ये यजामहं करोती'ति सामान्यशास्त्रेण यागमात्रे प्राप्तस्य 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रस्य 'नानुयाजेषु ये यजामहं करोती'ति विशेषशास्त्रेणानुयाजव्यतिरिक्तविषये यागविशेषे संकोचनात्पर्युदासस्योपसंहारादभेदापत्तिः स्यात् । सामान्ये प्राप्तस्य विशेषे संकोचस्यैवोपसंहारपदार्थत्वात् । यथा 'पुरोडाशं चतुर्धा करोती'ति पुरोडाशसामान्ये प्राप्तस्य चतुर्धाकरणस्य 'आग्नेयं चतुर्धा करोती'त्याग्नेये विशेषे संकोच इत्याशङ्कते—**नन्वेवमिति** । 'पुरोडाशं चतुर्धा करोती'त्यनेन पुरोडाशसामान्ये प्राप्तस्य चतुर्धाकरणस्य 'आग्नेयं चतुर्धा करोती'त्यनेन च पुरोडाशविशेषमात्रे संकोचः क्रियते । प्रकृते तु यजतिष्वित्यादिना यजतिसामान्ये प्राप्तस्य 'ये यजामह' इति मन्त्रस्य नानुयाजेष्वित्यादिना यजतिविशेषादनुयाजरूपादन्यमात्रे यजतिविशेषे संकोच इत्युपसंहारात्पर्युदासस्य भेदः स्पष्ट एवेति परिहरति—**नेत्यादिना** । तन्मात्रसंकोचार्थ इति । सामान्यप्राप्तस्य विशेषमात्रसंकोचार्थ इत्यर्थः । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—**यथेति** । तदन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इति । सामान्यप्राप्तस्यविशेषादन्यमात्रसंकोचार्थ इत्यर्थः । इति ततो भेदादिति । एवमुक्तप्रकारेणोपसंहारात्पर्युदासस्य

वप्यनन्यगत्या प्रतिषेधाश्रयणम् । यथा 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'त्यादौ । अत्र हि 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'ति शास्त्रप्राप्त-  
षोडशिग्रहणस्य निषेधाद्विकल्पप्रसक्तावपि न पर्युदासाश्रयणम्,  
असंभवात् । तथाहि यद्यत्र षोडशिपदार्थेन नञर्थान्वयस्तदातिरात्रे-  
षोडशिव्यतिरिक्तं गृह्णातीति वाक्यार्थबोधः स्यात् स च न संभवति,  
अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति प्रत्यक्षविधिविरोधात् । यदि चाति-  
रात्रेण पदार्थेनान्वयस्तदातिरात्रव्यतिरिक्ते षोडशिनं गृह्णातीति वा-  
क्यार्थबोधः स्यात्सोऽपि न संभवति तद्विधिविरोधात् । अतोऽत्रानन्य-

भेदान्न तयोरभेदापत्तिरित्यर्थः । अपरेतूपसंहारो नाम सामान्यतः प्राप्तस्य विशेषे  
मङ्कोचनरूपो विधेर्व्यापारविशेषः, पर्युदासस्तु 'पर्युदासः स विज्ञेयो यत्रोत्तरपदेन  
नञि'त्यभियुक्तोक्या प्रत्ययातिरिक्तेन नाम्ना धातुना च नञः संबन्ध-  
रूपः । तस्मादनयोस्तावत्स्वरूपतः स्पष्ट एव भेद इति न तयोरभेदापत्तिरि-  
त्याहुः । किञ्च यत्र तु पर्युदास आश्रयितुं न शक्यते तत्र विकल्पप्रसक्तावपि  
निषेध एवाश्रीयत इत्याह—**कुत्रचिदिति । अनन्यगत्येति ।** प्रतिषेधाद-  
न्यगतिविशेषस्य पर्युदासस्यासंभवेनेत्यर्थः । तत्रोदाहरणमाह—**यथेति ।**  
नातिरात्र इत्यादिवाक्ये प्रतिषेध एवाश्रीयते नतु पर्युदासः । अत्र चातिरात्र  
इत्यादिशास्त्रेण प्राप्तस्य षोडशिनामकपात्रविशेषग्रहणस्य प्रतिषेधाद्विकल्पप्रस-  
ङ्गेऽपि पर्युदासाश्रयणासंभवादित्याह—**अत्र हीत्यादिना ।** अत्र पर्युदासा-  
श्रयणासंभवमुपपादयति—**तथाहीत्यादिना । अत्रेति ।** नातिरात्रे षोड-  
शिनं गृह्णातीत्यत्रेत्यर्थः । **षोडशिपदार्थेन नञर्थान्वय इति ।** अतिरात्रे  
न षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यन्वय इत्यर्थः । एतदन्वयपक्षे वाक्यार्थमाह—**तदेति ।**  
एतादृशवाक्यार्थासंभवे हेतुमाह—**अतिरात्रे षोडशिनमिति ।** अत्र पर्युदा-  
सोपपत्तयेऽन्वयान्तरमाह—**यदीति । अन्वय इति ।** नञर्थस्येति शेषः । निरु-  
क्तान्वयानुरोधेन वाक्याथबोधासंभवेऽपि हेतुमाह—**तद्विधिविरोधादिति ।**  
अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यतिरात्रयागे षोडशिग्रहणविधायकप्रत्यक्षविधिविरो-  
धादित्यर्थः । उपपादितमुपसंहरति—**अत इति ।** उक्तदोषप्रसङ्गादस्मिन्वाक्ये

गत्या शास्त्रप्राप्तषोडशिग्रहणस्यैव निषेधः । नच विकल्पप्रसक्तिस्तस्या-  
प्यपेक्षणीयत्वात् ।

प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतुत्वम् ।

इयांस्तु विशेषो यद्विकल्पादेकप्रतिषेधेऽपि प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नान-  
र्थहेतुत्वम्, विधिनिषेधोभयस्यापि ऋत्वर्थत्वात् । यत्र तु न विकल्पः  
प्राप्तिश्च रागत एव प्रतिषेधश्च पुरुषार्थः तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थ-  
हेतुत्वम्, यथा 'न कलञ्जं भक्षये'दित्यादौ कलञ्जभक्षणादेः, तत्र

प्रतिषेधादन्यासंभवेन प्रतिषेध एव स्वीक्रियत इत्यर्थः । अत्र प्रतिषेधे सि-  
द्धान्तिते विकल्पप्रसङ्गमाशङ्क्येष्टापत्त्या परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना । अत्रेदं  
बोध्यम्—यत्र तस्य व्रतमित्याद्युपक्रमो नास्ति विकल्पाप्रसक्तिश्च तत्र प्रतिषेधो  
भवति यथा न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदिति । यत्र तु विकल्पप्रसङ्गेऽपि पर्युदासो नाश्र-  
यितुं शक्यते तत्र प्रतिषेध एव स्वीक्रियते यथा नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं  
गृह्णातीति ।

ननु नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णातीत्यत्र विकल्पप्रसङ्गेऽपि यदि षोडशिग्रह-  
णस्य प्रतिषेध एव स्वीक्रियते तदा प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वस्वी-  
कारात्षोडशिग्रहणस्यापि कलञ्जभक्षणादिवत्प्रतिषिध्यमानत्वेनानर्थहेतुत्वादर्थ-  
त्वबाधापत्तिरित्याशङ्क्याह—इयांस्त्वित्यादिना । प्रतिषिध्यमानयोरनर्थहे-  
तुत्वतदभावरूपो विशेष इत्यर्थः । विकल्पादिति । यत्र प्रतिषेधस्याविकल्पा-  
पादकत्वं तत्रैकस्य प्रतिषेधेऽपि न प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वमित्यर्थः । तत्र  
हेतुमाह—विधीति । रागत एवेत्येवकारेण षोडशिग्रहणादिवच्छास्त्रेण  
प्राप्तिः प्रतिषिध्यते । अत्र निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वे हेतुमाह—तत्रेति । षोड-  
शिग्रहणविधितत्प्रतिषेधयोरुभयोरपि ऋत्वर्थत्वात्तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य नानर्थहेतु-  
त्वम्, अत्र तु कलञ्जभक्षणादिप्रतिषेधस्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वं नतु तदनुष्ठानस्येति  
प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य कलञ्जभक्षणब्राह्मणहननादेरनर्थहेतुत्वमेवेति भावः । ननु  
यथा शास्त्रप्राप्तस्य षोडशिग्रहणस्य प्रतिषेधे विकल्पः स्वीकृतः, तथा शास्त्र-  
प्राप्तदानादीनामपि प्रतिषेधे विकल्पापत्तिः स्यादिति दृष्टान्ताभिप्रायेणा-

भक्षणनिषेधस्यैव पुरुषार्थत्वात् । नच 'दीक्षितो न ददाति न जुहोती'त्यादौ शास्त्रप्राप्तदानहोमादीनां निषेधाद्विकल्पापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । स्वतःपुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावेऽपि

तिप्रसङ्गमाशङ्क्य परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना । स्वत इति । स्वतः-पुरुषार्थभूतदानहोमादीनां पुरुषार्थत्वेनैव शास्त्रप्राप्तिः, क्रत्वर्थत्वेनैव च प्रतिषेध इति षोडशिग्रहणविधितत्प्रतिषेधयोरुभयोस्तुल्यार्थत्वाभावेन न विकल्पापत्तिः । किंच रागतः प्राप्तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वेन प्रतिषेधे प्रतिषिध्यमानस्य कलञ्जभक्षणादिवदनर्थहेतुत्वस्वीकारान्न दानहोमादेः प्रतिषिध्यमानस्याप्यनर्थहेतुत्वं संभवति तस्य रागतः प्राप्तत्वाभावात्, कलञ्जभक्षणादिप्रतिषेधवत्तत्प्रतिषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावाच्चेति भावः ॥ अत्रेदं बोध्यम्—ज्योतिष्टोमे श्रूयते 'दीक्षितो न ददाति न जुहोति न पचती'ति । तत्र यद्दानादिकं पुरुषार्थं यच्च क्रत्वर्थं तत्राप्युपदिष्टमतिदिष्टं च तत्सर्वं प्रतिषिध्यते । कुतः । न ददातीत्यादिवचनस्य सामान्यरूपत्वादित्यग्निहोत्रदानादीष्टस्यापि प्रतिषेधे सत्युपदेशो व्यर्थः स्यादिति ततोऽतिदिष्टं पुमर्थं चेत्येतदुभयमेव क्रत्वर्थत्वेनोपदिष्टं दानादिकमनुष्ठेयमिति मध्यमः पक्षः । नित्याग्निहोत्रदानादिकं पुरुषार्थत्वेन यत्प्रत्यक्षश्रुतावुपदिष्टं ज्योतिष्टोमकालेऽपि प्राप्तं यच्चातिदिष्टं दानादिकं तयोरुभयोर्मध्ये प्रत्यक्षोपदिष्टनिषेधस्योपदिष्टमेव संनिहितमिति पुमर्थस्यैवात्र निषेधः । नच नित्याग्निहोत्रदानादौ विधिनिषेधयोः प्रवृत्त्या विकल्पः शङ्क्यः, भिन्नविषयत्वात् । क्रत्वर्थो निषेधः क्रतुकाले तदनुष्ठानं वारयति । पुरुषार्थस्तु विधिः कालान्तरे तदनुष्ठापयति तस्मात्पुमर्थस्य निषेध इति । ननु यत्र रागतः प्राप्तस्य प्रतिषेधः पुरुषार्थो भवति तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वं यथा कलञ्जभक्षणादेः, ऋतौ स्वस्त्रीगमनप्रतिषेधस्य तु पुरुषार्थत्वाभावात्तत्र निषिध्यमानस्य स्वस्त्रीगमनस्य कथमनर्थहेतुत्वमित्यत आह—निषेधस्येति । यद्वा निषेधस्येत्यादिपूर्वमेवान्वेति तत्र प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं तु यथा क्रतावित्यादिकमेव भवति । तथाच स्वतः पुरुषार्थेत्यादेरयमर्थः—स्वत इति क्रत्वङ्गत्वोपाधिमन्तरेण केवलस्वरूपत एव पुमर्थभूतानां दानादीनां निषेधस्य पुरुषार्थत्वाभावेऽपि क्रत्वर्थत्वसंभवान्निषिध्यमानस्य दानादेः क्रतुवैगुण्यसंपादकत्वेनानर्थहेतुत्वमिति योजना । तथाच तेषामनुष्ठानस्य

निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वात्, यथा ऋतौ स्वस्त्रीगमनादेः, तन्निषेधस्य क्रत्वर्थत्वेन तस्य क्रतुवैगुण्यसंपादकत्वात् ।

अर्थवादमीमांसा ।

प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरपरं वाक्यमर्थवादः । तस्य च लक्षणया प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसानम् । तथाहि—अर्थवादवाक्यं हि स्वार्थप्रतिपादने प्रयोजनाभावाद्विधेयनिषेध्ययोः प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितत्वे लक्षणया प्रतिपादयति । स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे आनर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । आम्लायस्य हि क्रियार्थत्वात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः । ‘स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः’ इत्यध्ययनविधिना सकलवेदाध्ययनं कर्तव्यमिति बोधयता सर्ववेदस्य प्रयोजनवदर्थपर्यवसायित्वं सूचयतोपात्तत्वेनानर्थक्यानुपपत्तेः ।

स्वतः पुरुषार्थत्वेऽपि क्रत्वनुष्ठानकालेऽपुरुषार्थत्वात्तत्र तेषामनुष्ठानस्य भवत्यनर्थहेतुत्वमिति भावः । तस्येति । ऋतौ स्वस्त्रीगमनादेरित्यर्थः । ऋतौ स्त्रीगमनादेः कलञ्जभक्षणादिवदनर्थरूपनरकादिदुःखाहेतुत्वेऽपि क्रतुवैगुण्यसंपादकत्वेनानर्थहेतुत्वसंभवाद्भवत्यत्रापि निषिध्यमानस्यानर्थहेतुत्वमिति भावः । तस्मान्निषेधवाक्यानामनर्थहेतुक्रियानिवृत्तिजनकत्वेनैव पुरुषार्थानुबन्धित्वमिति सिद्धम् ॥

इदानीं सर्वार्थवादसाधारण्येनार्थवादरूपवेदभागस्य लक्षणमाह—प्राशस्त्येति । ननु ‘वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते’त्यादेरर्थवादवाक्यात्प्राशस्त्यादेरप्रतीयमानत्वान्न तस्य प्राशस्त्यादिपरत्वं ततश्चासंभवलक्षणमित्यत आह—तस्येति । तस्यार्थवादस्य लक्षणया प्राशस्त्यनिन्दान्यतरप्रतिपादकत्वसंभवेन नेदं लक्षणमसंभवीत्यर्थः । अर्थवादस्य फलवदर्थपर्यवसानमेवोपपादयति—तथाहीत्यादिना । अर्थवादवाक्यं कर्तुं प्राशस्त्यनिन्दितत्वे द्वे प्रतिपादयतीत्यन्वयः । नन्वर्थवादस्य स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे कथमानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गो ‘वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठे’त्यादेरर्थवादवाक्यात्क्षिप्रगामिवायुदेवतारूपार्थस्य प्रतीयमानत्वादित्यत आह—आम्लायस्येति । समस्तवेदस्य क्रियाप्रतिपादकत्वस्वीकारेण नास्य सिद्धार्थप्रतिपाद-

## अर्थवादविभागः ।

सं द्विविधः । विधिशेषो निषेधशेषश्चेति । तत्र 'वायव्यं श्वेतमालमेत भूतिकाम' इत्यादिविधिशेषस्य 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते'त्यादेर्विधेयार्थप्राशस्त्यबोधकतयार्थवत्त्वम् । 'बर्हिषि रजतं न देय'मित्यादिनिषेधशेषस्य 'सोऽरोदीद्यदरोदीत्तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वमि'त्यादेर्निषेधस्य निन्दि-

कस्य स्वार्थमात्रपरत्वे सार्थक्यमुपपद्यत इति भावः । अर्थवादवाक्यानामनर्थकत्वस्येष्टत्वमाशङ्क्य परिहरति—नचेत्यादिना ।

अर्थवादं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । विधिशेष इत्यादि । सोऽपि चतुर्विधः, प्रशंसा—निन्दा—परकृति—पुराकल्प-भेदात् । तत्र प्रशंसार्थवादो हि 'शोभतेऽस्य मुखं य एवं वेदै' इत्यादिः 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठे'त्यादिर्मूलोदाहृतश्च । निन्दार्थवादस्तु 'असन्नं वा एतद्यदच्छन्दोमन्न असृग्वि रजतं यो बर्हिषि ददाती'त्यादिः सोरोदीदित्यादिर्मूलोदाहृतश्च भवति । परेणेदं महता पुरुषेण कर्म कृतमिति प्रतिपादकोऽर्थवादः परकृतिरित्युच्यते यथा 'अग्निर्वा अकामयते'त्यादिः । परवक्त्रकार्यादिप्रतिपादकोऽर्थवादः पुराकल्प इत्युच्यते । यथा 'तमशयद्विया धियात्वावध्यासु'रित्यादिरिति । विधेयार्थप्राशस्त्येति । वायुः क्षिप्रगामित्वादतीव प्रशस्ता देवता भवत्यतस्तदैवत्यं कर्म प्रशस्तमिति विधेयकर्मदेवतागतप्राशस्त्यप्रतिपादनद्वारा विध्यैकवाक्यत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमित्यर्थः । निषेध्येति । निषेध्ये रजतनिन्दाप्रतिपादनद्वारा रजतनिषेधप्राशस्त्यपरत्वेन निषेधैकवाक्यत्वादर्थवत्त्वमित्यर्थः । एवम् 'अग्निर्वा अकामयते'त्यादेरप्यग्नि-दैवत्यो यागः पूर्वकालेऽग्निना कृतत्वात्प्रशस्तोऽत आधिक्यादिदानीतनैरप्यन्यैर्यजमानैरवश्यं कर्तव्यमिति विधेयकर्मगतप्राशस्त्यप्रतिपादनद्वारा विध्यैकवाक्यत्वेनार्थवत्त्वं बोध्यम् । एवमन्यत्रापि तत्तद्विधेयकर्मप्राशस्त्यादिप्रतिपादनद्वारेण तत्तद्विध्याद्यैकवाक्यत्वेनार्थवत्त्वं विभावनीयम् । कचिदर्थवादस्य संदिग्धार्थनिर्णायकत्वेन प्रामाण्यं स्वीकृतम् यथा 'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदध्या'दिति-विधावक्ता इति पदेन द्रवद्रव्यसामान्यं प्रतीयते । तच्च द्रव्यं किमिति संदेहे 'तेजो वै धृत'मित्यर्थवादरूपाद्वाक्यशेषाद्धृतमिति निश्चीयत इति । ननु

अर्थवादस्य भेदत्रयम् ।

स पुनरर्थवादो गुणवादोऽनुवादो भूतार्थवादश्चेति त्रिधा भवतीति पुनरपि तं त्रैधा विभजते—स पुनस्त्रेधेति । तस्य त्रिविधत्वे वृद्धसंमतिमुदाहरति— तदुक्तमिति । तद्वानादिति । तयोर्हानं तद्वानं तस्मादिति विग्रहः । प्रमाणान्तरविरोधप्रमाणान्तरावधारणयोर्हानादित्यर्थः । समुदाहृतवृद्धसंमतिं व्याचष्टे—अस्यार्थ इत्यादिना । इन्द्रो वृत्रायेति । अस्य वृत्रं प्रतीन्द्र-वज्रोद्यच्छनाभावावगाहिप्रमाणान्तरस्यादर्शनान्न तद्वोधने प्रमाणान्तरेण विरोधः, नापि प्रमाणान्तरावगतार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं वृत्रं प्रतीन्द्रवज्रोद्यच्छनप्रति-पादकप्रमाणान्तरस्यादर्शनादिति भावः । एवमुपपादितं विध्यर्थवादादि-रूपस्य पञ्चविधवेदस्य साक्षात्परम्परया यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमुप-



## ग्रन्थोपसंहारः ।

एवंच 'यजेत स्वर्गकाम' इत्यादिनिखिलवेदस्य साक्षात्परम्परया वा यागादिधर्मप्रतिपादकत्वं सिद्धम् । सोऽयं धर्मो यदुद्दिश्य विहितस्तदुद्देशेन क्रियमाणस्तद्वेतुः । ईश्वरार्पणबुद्ध्या क्रियमाणस्तु निःश्रेयसहेतुः । नच तदर्पणबुद्धानुष्ठाने प्रमाणाभावः 'यत्करोषि यद्' श्रासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत् । यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत्कुरुष्व मदर्पणमिति भगवद्गीतास्मृतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । स्मृतिचरणे तत्प्रामाण्यस्य श्रुतिमूलकत्वेन व्यवस्थापनादिति शिवम् ॥

संहरति—एवंचेति । उक्तेन प्रकारेण चेत्यर्थः । योयं यागादिरूपो धर्मो यत्स्वर्गादिफलमुद्दिश्य विहितः सोऽयं तादृशफलोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमान एव तस्य फलस्य हेतुर्भवति, परमेश्वरसमर्पणमनीषयानुष्ठीयमानस्तु चित्तशुद्धितत्त्वज्ञानप्राप्तिद्वारा परम्परया मोक्षहेतुरिति धर्मानुष्ठानस्य विविदिषा श्रुतिप्रामाण्यात्संयोगपृथक्त्वन्यायमाश्रित्य परमपुरुषार्थपर्यवसायित्वमुपक्षिपति—सोऽयमित्यादि । धर्मस्य परमेश्वरसमर्पणबुद्धानुष्ठाने प्रमाणाभावमाशङ्क्य तत्र भगवद्वाक्यं प्रमाणयति—नचेत्यादिना । तस्याः स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यमाशङ्क्य तन्ने स्मृतिपादे स्थितम् 'अष्टकाः कर्तव्या' इत्यादिस्मृतिवाक्यं न धर्मे प्रमाणं, पौरुषेयवाक्यत्वे सति मूलप्रमाणरहितत्वाद्विप्रलम्भकवाक्यवत् । अथ मूलप्रमाणवत्त्वाय वेदार्थ एव स्मृतिभिरुच्यत इति मन्येथाः तर्हि वेदेनैव तदर्थस्यावगतत्वादियं स्मृतिरनर्थिका स्यात् तदानीमनुवादकत्वादप्रामाण्यमिति प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—विमता स्मृतिर्वेदमूला वैदिकमन्वादिप्रणीतस्मृतित्वात् उपनयनाध्ययनादिस्मृतिवत् । नच वैयर्थ्यं शङ्कनीयम् । अस्मदादीना प्रत्यक्षेषु परोक्षेषु नानावेदेषु विप्रकीर्णस्यानुष्ठेयार्थस्यैकत्र संक्षिप्यमाणत्वात् । तस्मादियं स्मृतिर्धर्मे प्रमाणमिति ।

बालानां सुखबोधाय भास्करेण सुमेधसा ।

रचितोऽयं समासेन जैमिनीयार्थसंग्रहः ॥ १ ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायलौगाक्षिभास्करविरचितपूर्वमीमांसा-  
र्थसंग्रहनामकं प्रकरणं समाप्तिमगात् ॥

ननु किमनेन संग्रहनिरूपणेन विस्तृतभाष्यादिग्रन्थैरेव जैमिनीयन्यायार्थ-  
बोधसंभवादित्याशङ्क्य संग्रहनिरूपणे स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं प्रदर्शयति—बाला-  
नामिति । तेषां विस्तृतत्वेन दुःखप्राप्त्यात् तैर्बालशब्दितपूर्वमीमांसासं-  
स्कारशून्यानां जैमिनीयन्यायार्थबोधः संभवति । अनेन तु तत्तद्विस्तृतशा-  
स्त्रप्रवेशद्वारा संभवत्येव स इति भावः ॥

टीकाविहीने तु कृता हि टीका पूर्वे तु तन्ने खलु संग्रहेऽस्मिन् ।

दुर्बोधशास्त्रे किमु मादृशानां दृष्ट्वापि दोषं न सहन्ति धीराः ॥ १ ॥

यदाज्ञया बन्धविमोक्षणं विना स्वधर्मसेवा फलहेतुतां गता ।

प्रणौमि सोमं मृडमादिकारणं किमन्यदेवैर्जनफलगुहेतुभिः ॥ २ ॥

मदीययत्नः शिवपादसेवया गुरोः कटाक्षैकलवेन लब्धया ।

प्रयुज्यमानः शिवपादपङ्कजे स्वयं तु भूयान्मृडतोषकारणम् ॥ ३ ॥

सुजनपदविनीतो दुर्जनाददूरनिष्ठो

गुरुतरशिवभक्तस्तेन लब्धागमेक्षः ।

श्रुतिमणिपदनिष्ठो भिक्षुरामेश्वराख्यः

सुजननयनिवेशाय प्रबन्धं चकार ॥ ४ ॥

गुणगणमणिसिन्धुः शम्भुपादैकभक्तो

निगमशिरसि निष्ठो जातवैराग्यचित्तः ।

श्रुतिनलिनविकासे भानुभावो य ईश-

स्तमिह महिमपूज्यं नौमि गोपं यतीन्द्रम् ॥ ५ ॥

तस्मादेव गुरुवरादभीष्टलब्धं गोपालाश्रमपदगीयमानदैवात् ।

येनोमाधवचरणाब्जसेविनात्र तं वन्दे महिमगुरुं विशालबुद्धिम् ॥ ६ ॥

या काशी निखिलगुरोर्मेश्वरस्य प्राणान्ते सकलशिवप्रदा प्रसिद्धा ।

यत्राहं सकलसुरेशलब्धतत्त्वस्तत्रेयं सुजनहितप्रदा निबद्धा ॥ ७ ॥

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यगोपालेन्द्रसरस्वतीश्रीपूज्यपादशिष्य-

श्रीसदाशिवेन्द्रसरस्वतीशिष्येण श्रीरामेश्वरेण शिवयोगिभिक्षुणा

विरचिता मीमांसार्थसंग्रहकौमुदी चरमवर्णध्वंसमगात् ।



समाप्तोऽयं ग्रन्थः ।





